Demokratische Friedenstheorie - Wikipedia

Demokratische Friedenstheorie ist eine Theorie, die besagt, dass Demokratien zögern, mit bewaffneten Konflikten mit anderen ermittelten Demokratien in Konflikt zu treten. ^[1] Im Gegensatz zu Theorien, die das Kriegsengagement erklären, ist es eine "Theorie des Friedens", die Motive darstellt von staatlich gesponserter Gewalt abraten.

Einige Theoretiker bevorzugen Begriffe wie "Gegenseitiger Demokratischer Pazifismus" ^[2] oder "Nichtdemokratie-Nicht-Aggressionshypothese", um zu klären, dass ein Friedenszustand für Demokratien nicht einzigartig ist, sondern dass er leicht zwischen demokratischen Nationen aufrecht erhalten wird ^[3]

Unter den Befürwortern der demokratischen Friedenstheorie werden mehrere Faktoren als motivierender Frieden zwischen demokratischen Staaten angesehen:

• Demokratische Führer sind gezwungen, eine schuldhafte Bevölkerung wegen eines Kriegsverlusts zu akzeptieren;


• Öffentlich rechenschaftspflichtige Staaten neigen dazu, diplomatische Institutionen zur Lösung internationaler Spannungen einzurichten;


• Demokratien sind nicht geneigt, Länder mit angrenzender Politik und Verwaltung zu sehen Doktrin als Feindseligkeit;


• Demokratien besitzen in der Regel einen größeren öffentlichen Wohlstand als andere Staaten und verzichten daher auf einen Krieg, um Infrastruktur und Ressourcen zu erhalten.

Diejenigen, die diese Theorie in Frage stellen, tun dies oft, weil sie die Korrelation mit der Kausalität und dem damit verbundenen Konflikt verbinden Die akademischen Definitionen von "Demokratie" und "Krieg" können manipuliert werden, um einen künstlichen Trend herzustellen. ^[4]

Geschichte edit

Obwohl die Theorie des demokratischen Friedens nicht streng oder nicht streng war Bis in die 1960er Jahre wissenschaftlich untersucht, wurden die Grundprinzipien des Konzepts bereits in den 1700er Jahren in den Werken des Philosophen Immanuel Kant und politica argumentiert Ich Theoretiker Thomas Paine. Kant hat die Theorie in seinem Essay vorweggenommen. Perpetual Peace: Eine philosophische Skizze aus dem Jahr 1795, obwohl er der Meinung war, dass eine Welt mit nur konstitutionellen Republiken nur eine von mehreren notwendigen Bedingungen für einen ewigen Frieden ist. Kants Theorie war, dass eine Mehrheit der Bevölkerung niemals wählen würde, um in den Krieg zu ziehen, es sei denn in Notwehr. Wenn alle Nationen Republiken wären, würde dies den Krieg beenden, weil es keine Angreifer geben würde. In früheren, aber weniger zitierten Werken machte Thomas Paine ähnliche oder stärkere Behauptungen über die friedliche Natur der Republiken. Paine schrieb 1776 in "Common Sense": "Die Republiken Europas sind alle (und wir können immer sagen) in Frieden." Paine argumentierte, dass Könige aus Stolz in Situationen in den Krieg ziehen würden, in denen die Republiken dies nicht tun würden. ^[5] Der französische Historiker und Sozialwissenschaftler Alexis de Tocqueville argumentierte auch in Democracy in America (1835–1840), dass demokratisch Nationen waren weniger wahrscheinlich, Krieg zu führen. ^[6]

Dean Babst, ein Kriminologe, war der erste, der statistische Untersuchungen zu diesem Thema durchführte. Seine wissenschaftliche Arbeit zur Unterstützung der Theorie wurde 1964 in Wisconsin Sociologist veröffentlicht. Eine etwas populärere Version veröffentlichte er 1972 in der Fachzeitschrift Industrial Research . Beide Versionen wurden anfangs wenig beachtet.

Melvin Small und J. David Singer (1976: 50–69) antworteten; Sie fanden das Fehlen von Kriegen zwischen demokratischen Staaten mit zwei "Randausnahmen", bestritten jedoch, dass dieses Muster statistische Signifikanz hatte. Dieses Papier wurde in der Jerusalem Journal of International Relations veröffentlicht, das schließlich der Theorie größere Aufmerksamkeit schenkte und die akademische Debatte begann. Ein Papier des Politikwissenschaftlers Michael W. Doyle aus dem Jahr 1983 trug weiter zur Popularisierung der Theorie bei. Rudolph J. Rummel war ein anderer früher Forscher, der in seinen späteren Werken auf das Thema aufmerksam machte.

Maoz & Abdolali (1989) dehnten die Forschung auf weniger Konflikte aus als Kriege. Bremer (1992) und Maoz & Russett (1993) stellten fest, dass die Korrelation zwischen Demokratie und Friedlichkeit nach Kontrolle vieler möglicher Verwirrungsvariablen signifikant blieb. Dies brachte die Theorie in den Mainstream der Sozialwissenschaften. Befürworter des Realismus in den internationalen Beziehungen und anderen reagierten darauf mit vielen neuen Einwänden. Andere Forscher versuchten systematischer zu erklären, wie Demokratie Frieden schaffen kann (Köchler 1995) und wie Demokratie auch andere Aspekte der Außenbeziehungen wie Allianzen und Zusammenarbeit beeinflussen könnte (Ray 2003).

Seit diesen Pionierarbeiten gibt es zahlreiche weitere Studien auf diesem Gebiet. ^[7] Die meisten Studien haben festgestellt, dass eine Form von demokratischem Frieden existiert, obwohl weder methodologische Streitigkeiten noch zweifelhafte Fälle vollständig gelöst sind (Kinsella 2005).

Definitionen [ edit ]

Die Erforschung der demokratischen Friedenstheorie muss "Demokratie" und "Frieden" (oder häufiger "Krieg") definieren.

Definition der Demokratie [ edit ]

Demokratien wurden von verschiedenen Theoretikern und Forschern unterschiedlich definiert; Dies erklärt einige der Unterschiede in ihren Befunden. Einige Beispiele:

Small und Singer (1976) definieren Demokratie als eine Nation, die (1) regelmäßig Wahlen abhält, bei denen die Oppositionsparteien ebenso frei wie Regierungsparteien sind, (2) mindestens 10% der erwachsenen Bevölkerung wählen lässt, und (3) hat ein Parlament, das entweder die Exekutive der Regierung kontrolliert oder mit ihm übereinstimmt.

Doyle (1983) verlangt (1), dass "liberale Regime" Markt- oder Privateigentumsökonomie haben, (2) eine Politik haben, die intern souverän ist, (3) sie Bürger mit juristischen Rechten haben und (4) über sie verfügen repräsentative Regierungen. Entweder konnten 30% der erwachsenen Männer wählen, oder es war jedem Mann möglich, Stimmrechte zu erwerben, indem er genügend Eigentum erwarb. Er lässt vererbten Monarchen größere Macht zu als andere Forscher; er hält beispielsweise die Herrschaft von Louis-Philippe von Frankreich als liberales Regime.

Ray (1995) verlangt, dass mindestens 50% der erwachsenen Bevölkerung wählen dürfen und dass mindestens eine friedliche, verfassungsmäßige Übertragung von Exekutivgewalt von einer unabhängigen politischen Partei an eine andere durch Wahlen stattgefunden hat. Diese Definition schließt lange Perioden aus, die oft als demokratisch angesehen werden. Zum Beispiel waren die Vereinigten Staaten bis 1800, Indien von der Unabhängigkeit bis 1979 und Japan bis 1993 alle unter einer Einparteienherrschaft und würden daher nicht unter diese Definition gezählt (Ray 1995, S. 100).

Rummel (1997) stellt fest: "Unter Demokratie ist liberale Demokratie zu verstehen, bei der diejenigen, die an der Macht sind, in einer geheimen Wahl und einem breiten Wahlrecht (lose verstanden als mindestens zwei Drittel der erwachsenen Männer) gewählt werden; es gibt Rede-, Religions- und Organisationsfreiheit sowie einen verfassungsrechtlichen Rechtsrahmen, dem die Regierung unterstellt ist und der gleiche Rechte garantiert. "

Nicht-binäre Klassifikationen [ edit ]

Die obigen Definitionen sind binär und klassifizieren Nationen entweder in Demokratien oder Nicht-Demokratien. Viele Forscher haben stattdessen feinkörnigere Schuppen verwendet. Ein Beispiel ist die Polity-Datenreihe, in der jeder Staat seit 1800 auf zwei Skalen bewertet wird, eine für Demokratie und eine für Autokratie. sowie mehrere andere. ^[8] Die Verwendung der Polity-Daten war unterschiedlich. Einige Forscher haben Korrelationen zwischen der Demokratieskala und der Kriegsführung gemacht; andere haben es als eine binäre Klassifikation behandelt, indem (wie sein Hersteller) alle Staaten mit einem hohen Demokratiescore und einem niedrigen Autokratiescore Demokratien ruft; Wieder andere haben die Differenz zwischen den beiden Punkten verwendet und dies manchmal zu einer binären Klassifizierung gemacht (Gleditsch 1992).

Junge Demokratien [ edit ]

Mehrere Forscher haben festgestellt, dass viele der möglichen Ausnahmen vom demokratischen Frieden aufgetreten sind, als mindestens eine der beteiligten Demokratien sehr jung war. Viele von ihnen haben daher ein Qualifikationsmerkmal hinzugefügt, das normalerweise besagt, dass die Friedlichkeit für Demokratien gilt, die älter als drei Jahre sind (Doyle 1983, Russett 1993, Rummel 1997, Weart 1998). Rummel (1997) argumentiert, dass dies genug Zeit ist, "um demokratische Verfahren zu akzeptieren und demokratische Kultur sich niederzulassen". Darüber hinaus kann dies dazu führen, dass andere Staaten tatsächlich zur Anerkennung des Staates als Demokratie kommen.

Mansfield und Snyder (2002, 2005) erklären zwar, dass es zwischen den reifen liberalen Demokratien keine Kriege gegeben hat, dass Länder, die sich im Übergang zur Demokratie befinden, besonders wahrscheinlich in Kriege verwickelt sind. Sie stellen fest, dass die demokratisierenden Länder noch kriegerischer sind als stabile Demokratien, stabile Autokratien oder sogar Länder, die sich im Übergang zur Autokratie befinden. Sie schlagen daher vor, diese Kriege aus der Analyse auszuschließen, da dies einen negativen Aspekt des Demokratisierungsprozesses verbergen könnte. ^[9] Eine Reanalyse der statistischen Ergebnisse der früheren Studie (Braumoeller 2004) betont, dass das oben genannte Verhältnis zwischen Demokratisierung und Krieg besteht Es kann nur gesagt werden, dass dies für die demokratisierenden Länder gilt, in denen die Exekutive nicht über ausreichende Macht, Unabhängigkeit und institutionelle Stärke verfügt. Eine Übersicht (Ray 2003) zitiert mehrere andere Studien, die feststellen, dass die Erhöhung des Kriegsrisikos in den Demokratisierungsländern nur dann eintritt, wenn viele oder die meisten umliegenden Nationen undemokratisch sind. Wenn Kriege zwischen jungen Demokratien in die Analyse einbezogen werden, finden mehrere Studien und Überprüfungen immer noch genügend Beweise für die stärkere Behauptung, dass alle Demokratien, ob jung oder etabliert, seltener miteinander in den Krieg ziehen (Ray 1998), (Ray 2003). (Hegre 2004), andere dagegen nicht (Schwartz & Skinner 2002).

Krieg definieren [ edit ]

Quantitative Untersuchungen zu internationalen Kriegen definieren Krieg normalerweise als einen militärischen Konflikt, bei dem in einem Jahr mehr als 1000 Menschen in der Schlacht gefallen sind. Diese Definition wird im Correlates of War-Projekt verwendet, das auch die Daten für viele Kriegsstudien lieferte. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die meisten der fraglichen militärischen Konflikte deutlich über oder unter dieser Schwelle liegen (Ray 1995, S. 103).

Einige Forscher haben unterschiedliche Definitionen verwendet. Zum Beispiel definiert Weart (1998) Krieg als mehr als 200 Todesopfer. Russett (1993, S. 50) erfordert, wenn man sich das antike Griechenland anschaut, nur ein echtes Gefecht, das auf beiden Seiten Kräfte unter staatlicher Genehmigung einschließt.

Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) in der Correlates of War-Projektklassifizierung sind weniger Konflikte als Kriege. Ein solcher Konflikt kann nicht mehr als militärische Gewaltanwendung ohne Kampftod sein. MIDs und Kriege sind zusammen "militarisierte Konflikte" oder MICs. MIDs beinhalten die Konflikte, die einem Krieg vorausgehen; Daher kann der Unterschied zwischen MIDs und MICs geringer sein, als es scheint.

Statistische Analysen und Bedenken hinsichtlich der Freiheitsgrade sind die Hauptgründe für die Verwendung von MID anstelle von tatsächlichen Kriegen. Kriege sind relativ selten. Ein durchschnittliches Verhältnis von 30 MIDs zu einem Krieg stellt ein reichhaltigeres statistisches Umfeld für die Analyse bereit. ^[10]

Monadischer vs. dyadischer Frieden [ edit ]

Die meiste Forschung beschäftigt sich mit der dyadischen Frieden, dass Demokratien sich nicht bekämpfen. Nur wenige Forscher haben den Frieden monadisch befürwortet, Demokratien seien im Allgemeinen friedlicher. Es gibt einige neuere Artikel, die einen leichten monadischen Effekt feststellen. Müller und Wolff (2004) stimmen darin überein, "dass Demokratien im Durchschnitt zwar leicht, aber nicht stark, weniger kriegerisch sein sollten als andere Staaten", aber allgemeine "monadische Erklärungen sind weder notwendig noch überzeugend". Sie stellen fest, dass Demokratien in ihrer Kriegsführung gegen Nicht-Demokratien sehr unterschiedlich sind.

Mögliche Ausnahmen [ edit ]

Einige Gelehrte befürworten den demokratischen Frieden aus probabilistischen Gründen: Da viele Kriege seit Beginn der Demokratisierung geführt wurden, könnte man davon ausgehen, dass es eine entsprechende Anzahl von Kriegen gibt zwischen Demokratien aufgetreten sind, wenn sich Demokratien so frei bekämpft hätten wie andere Staatenpaare; Befürworter der demokratischen Friedenstheorie behaupten, dass die Zahl viel geringer ist als erwartet. ^[11] Gegner der Theorie behaupten jedoch, dass dies falsch ist und behaupten, dass es zahlreiche Beispiele für Kriege zwischen Demokratien gibt. ^{[12] [12] ]}

Früher als Ausnahmen angeführte Fälle umfassen die Sizilianische Expedition, den Spanisch-Amerikanischen Krieg und in jüngerer Zeit den Kargil-Krieg. ^[13] Doyle (1983) zitiert den Paquisha-Krieg und die Intervention der libanesischen Luftwaffe in die Sechs Tag Krieg Die Gesamtzahl der in der Literatur vorgeschlagenen Fälle beträgt mindestens 50. Der von Bremer (1993) verwendete Datensatz zeigte eine Ausnahme, den Französisch-Thai-Krieg von 1940; Gleditsch (1995) betrachtet den (etwas technischen) Kriegszustand zwischen Finnland und Großbritannien während des Zweiten Weltkriegs als einen Sonderfall, der wahrscheinlich gesondert behandelt werden sollte: ein zufälliger Kriegszustand zwischen Demokratien während großer multipolarer Kriege (Gowa 1999) Maoz 1997, S. 165). Allerdings hat das Vereinigte Königreich Finnland bombardiert, da der Krieg nicht nur auf dem Papier stand. Page Fortna (2004) diskutiert die türkische Invasion 1974 in Zypern und den Kargil-Krieg als Ausnahmen, wobei letzterer als der bedeutendste gilt. Der Status dieser Länder als wirklich demokratisch ist jedoch umstritten. Zum Beispiel wechselten sich in Spanien 1898 zwei Parteien in einem kontrollierten Prozess in der Regierung ab, der als el turno pacífico bekannt war, und die Caziques, mächtige lokale Persönlichkeiten, wurden verwendet, um Wahlergebnisse zu manipulieren und als Ergebnis Ressentiments Das System entwickelte sich langsam im Laufe der Zeit, und es bildeten sich wichtige nationalistische Bewegungen sowie Gewerkschaften. In ähnlicher Weise erfolgte die türkische Intervention auf Zypern erst, nachdem die von Zypern gewählte Regierung durch einen von der Militärregierung Griechenlands gesponserten Putsch abgeschafft wurde.

Die Beschränkung der Theorie auf nur wirklich stabile und echte Demokratien führt zu einer sehr restriktiven Gruppe sehr wohlhabender Nationen mit geringem Anreiz in bewaffneten Konflikten, die ihre Volkswirtschaften schädigen könnten, in denen erwartet werden könnte, dass die Theorie definitionsgemäß praktisch gilt.

Ein Befürworter des demokratischen Friedens erklärt, dass sein Grund, eine Definition der Demokratie zu wählen, die hinreichend restriktiv ist, um alle Kriege zwischen den Demokratien auszuschließen, was "möglicherweise abwertend bezeichnet werden kann Public Relations ": Studenten und Politiker werden von einer solchen Behauptung eher beeindruckt sein als von Behauptungen, dass Kriege zwischen Demokratien weniger wahrscheinlich sind.

Statistische Schwierigkeiten aufgrund der Neuheit der Demokratie [ edit

Anzahl der Nationen 1800–2003 mit 8 oder mehr Punkten auf der Polity IV-Skala. Es gab keine Kriege, und in Waymans (2002) Auflistung interliberaler MID gab es keinen Konflikt, der zu Gefechtstoten zwischen diesen Nationen führte.

Ein Problem bei der Kriegsforschung ist das, wie der Realist Mearsheimer (1990, S. 50) formuliert "In den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten gab es nur wenige Demokratien, und daher gab es kaum Möglichkeiten, wo Demokratien in der Lage waren, sich gegenseitig zu bekämpfen". Demokratien waren bis vor kurzem sehr selten. Selbst lockere Definitionen der Demokratie, wie die von Doyle, finden vor dem späten 19. Jahrhundert nur ein Dutzend Demokratien statt, von denen viele nur von kurzer Dauer oder mit eingeschränkter Franchise sind (Doyle 1983) (Doyle 1997, S. 261). Freedom House findet 1900 keinen unabhängigen Staat mit allgemeinem Wahlrecht. ^[15]

Wayman (1998), ein Befürworter der Theorie, erklärt: "Wenn wir uns nur darauf verlassen, ob es Dem demokratischen Krieg wird es noch viele Jahrzehnte des Friedens dauern, um unser Vertrauen in die Stabilität des demokratischen Friedens aufzubauen. "

Studium weniger Konflikte [ edit ]

Viele Forscher haben auf diese Einschränkung reagiert, indem sie stattdessen weniger Konflikte untersuchten, da sie weitaus häufiger waren. Es hat viel mehr MIDs als Kriege gegeben; Das Correlates of War-Projekt zählt in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten mehrere Tausend. Eine Übersicht (Ray 2003) listet viele Studien auf, nach denen demokratische Staatenpaare weniger wahrscheinlich an MID beteiligt sind als andere Staatenpaare.

Eine andere Studie (Hensel, Goertz & Diehl 2000) stellt fest, dass nach dem demokratischen Zustand beider Staaten die Wahrscheinlichkeit für MIDs innerhalb eines Jahres abnimmt und diese innerhalb von fünf Jahren fast auf Null sinkt.

Bei einer detaillierteren Untersuchung der interliberalen MIDs stellt eine Studie (Wayman 2002) fest, dass sie weniger wahrscheinlich Dritte einbeziehen und dass das Ziel der Feindseligkeit weniger wahrscheinlich ist, wenn das Ziel die Antwort erwidert ist in der Regel proportional zur Provokation, und es ist weniger wahrscheinlich, dass die Auseinandersetzungen den Tod verursachen. Die häufigste Maßnahme war "Beschlagnahme von Material oder Personal".

Studien belegen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Streitigkeiten zwischen Staaten friedlich beigelegt werden, durch den Grad der Demokratie positiv beeinflusst wird, den der weniger demokratische Staat zeigt, der an diesem Streit beteiligt ist. Streitigkeiten zwischen demokratischen Staaten sind wesentlich kürzer als Streitigkeiten, an denen mindestens ein undemokratischer Staat beteiligt ist. Demokratische Staaten sind eher für Mediation durch Dritte zugänglich, wenn sie in Streitigkeiten miteinander verwickelt sind (Ray 2003).

In internationalen Krisen, die die Androhung oder Anwendung militärischer Gewalt beinhalten, stellt eine Studie fest, dass, wenn die Parteien Demokratien sind, die relative militärische Stärke keinen Einfluss darauf hat, wer gewinnt. Dies ist anders als bei Nichtmokratien. Diese Ergebnisse sind auch dann gleich, wenn es sich bei den Konfliktparteien um formelle Verbündete handelt (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001). Eine Studie über das Verhalten von Staaten, die sich an militarisierten Streitigkeiten beteiligt haben, zeigt, dass Macht nur für Autokratien wichtig ist: Demokratien scheinen ihre Ausrichtung nicht an der Macht der Konfliktparteien zu orientieren (Werner & Lemke 1997).

Einleitung eines Konflikts [ edit ]

Laut einer Übersichtsstudie aus dem Jahr 2017 "gibt es genügend Anhaltspunkte, um zu schließen, dass Demokratie zumindest Frieden zwischen Demokratien verursacht, dass die beobachtete Korrelation zwischen der Demokratie besteht und Frieden ist nicht unecht. " ^[16]

Die meisten Studien haben nur untersucht, wer an den Konflikten beteiligt ist, und die Frage, wer den Konflikt initiierte, ignorierte. In vielen Konflikten argumentieren beide Seiten, dass die andere Seite Initiator war. Mehrere Forscher, wie in (Gleditsch, Christiansen & Hegre 2004) beschrieben, haben argumentiert, dass das Studium der Konfliktinitiierung von begrenztem Wert ist, da vorhandene Daten über die Konfliktinitiierung besonders unzuverlässig sein können. Trotzdem haben mehrere Studien dies untersucht. Reiter und Stam (2003) argumentieren, Autokratien würden häufiger Konflikte gegen Demokratien auslösen als Demokratien gegen Autokratien. Quackenbush und Rudy (2006) bestätigen zwar die Ergebnisse von Reiter und Stam, stellen jedoch fest, dass Demokratien häufiger Kriege gegen Nicht-Demokratien auslösen als Nicht-Demokratien einander. Mehrere nachfolgende Studien (Peceny & Beer 2003), (Peceny & Butler 2004), (Lai & Slater 2006) haben untersucht, wie unterschiedliche Arten von Autokratien mit unterschiedlichen Institutionen hinsichtlich der Initiierung von Konflikten variieren. Personalistische und militärische Diktaturen können im Vergleich zu anderen Arten von Autokratie, wie zum Beispiel Einparteienstaaten, besonders anfällig für Konfliktinitiierung sein, werden aber auch häufiger in einem Krieg mit anderen Initiatoren angegriffen.

Eine Studie von 2017 fand heraus, dass Demokratien nicht weniger wahrscheinlich sind, Grenzstreitigkeiten friedlich beizulegen als Nicht-Demokratien. ^[17]

Innere Gewalt und Völkermord [ edit

Die meisten Beiträge dieses Artikels werden diskutiert Erforschung der Beziehungen zwischen Staaten. Es gibt jedoch auch Hinweise darauf, dass Demokratien weniger interne systematische Gewalt haben. Eine Studie stellt beispielsweise fest, dass die demokratischsten und autoritärsten Staaten nur wenige Bürgerkriege und die meisten Zwischenregime haben. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Bürgerkriegs steigt auch durch den politischen Wandel, unabhängig davon, ob zu einer größeren Demokratie oder zu einer größeren Autokratie. Zwischenregime sind nach wie vor am stärksten anfällig für einen Bürgerkrieg, unabhängig von der Zeit seit der politischen Wende. Langfristig, da Zwischenregime weniger stabil sind als Autokratien, die wiederum weniger stabil sind als Demokratien, ist dauerhafte Demokratie der wahrscheinlichste Endpunkt des Demokratisierungsprozesses (Hegre et al. 2001). Die Studie von Abadie (2004) stellt fest, dass die demokratischsten Nationen den geringsten Terrorismus haben. Harff (2003) stellt fest, dass Völkermord und Politizid in Demokratien selten sind. Rummel (1997) stellt fest, dass je demokratischer ein Regime ist, desto weniger demokratisch. Er stellt fest, dass der Demokrat sechsmal so viele Menschen getötet hat wie Schlachten.

Davenport und Armstrong (2004) führen mehrere andere Studien und Zustände auf: "Es wurde immer wieder festgestellt, dass demokratische politische Systeme politische Verbote, Zensur, Folter, Verschwindenlassen und Massentötung abbauen, wobei dies linear und über verschiedene Messmethoden hinweg abläuft , Zeiträume, Länder und Kontexte. " Es kommt zu dem Schluss: "Über alle Maßnahmen und methodischen Techniken hinweg hat sich herausgestellt, dass die Demokratie unter einer bestimmten Ebene keinen Einfluss auf die Menschenrechtsverletzungen hat, aber oberhalb dieser Ebene beeinflusst die Demokratie die Repression negativ und in etwa linear." Davenport und Armstrong (2003) stellen fest, dass statistische Untersuchungen im Wert von dreißig Jahren ergeben haben, dass nur zwei Variablen Menschenrechtsverletzungen verringern: politische Demokratie und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung.

Abulof und Ogen fügen einen Vorbehalt hinzu und konzentrieren sich auf den heutigen Nahen Osten und Nordafrika (MENA). Statistisch gesehen macht eine MENA-Demokratie ein Land anfälliger für den Beginn und die Häufigkeit eines Bürgerkriegs. Je demokratischer ein MENA-Staat ist, desto wahrscheinlicher ist es, dass es zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen kommt. Außerdem scheinen Anokratien weder weltweit noch in MENA für einen Bürgerkrieg prädisponiert zu sein. Auf der Suche nach Kausalität jenseits der Korrelation legen sie nahe, dass die beruhigende Wirkung der Demokratie zum Teil durch gesellschaftliches Eintreten für Selbstbestimmung und Volkssouveränität vermittelt wird. Dies kann den "Demokratisierungs-Nationalismus" zu einer langfristigen Voraussetzung und nicht nur zu einem unmittelbaren Hindernis für Frieden und Demokratie machen. ^[18]

Erklärungen [ edit

Diese Theorien werden traditionell kategorisiert in zwei Gruppen: Erklärungen, die sich auf demokratische Normen konzentrieren, und Erklärungen, die sich auf demokratische konzentrieren
politische Strukturen (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001), (Braumoeller 1997). Beachten Sie, dass sie normalerweise als Erklärung für geringe Gewalt zwischen Demokratien gedacht sind, nicht für ein geringes Maß an innerer Gewalt in Demokratien.

Einige dieser Mechanismen können auch für Länder ähnlicher Systeme gelten. Das Buch Never at War findet Beweise für einen oligarchischen Frieden. Ein Beispiel ist das polnisch-litauische Commonwealth, in dem der Sejm den meisten königlichen Kriegsvorschlägen ^[19] widersprach und ein Veto einlegte, wie das von Wladyslaw IV. Vasa.

Demokratische Normen [ edit ]

Ein Beispiel aus der ersten Gruppe ist, dass die liberal-demokratische Kultur die Führer an Verhandlungen und Kompromisse gewöhnen kann (Weart 1998), (Müller & Wolff 2004) ). Ein anderer, dass der Glaube an die Menschenrechte die Menschen in Demokratien zögerlich machen könnte, in den Krieg zu ziehen, insbesondere gegen andere Demokratien. Der Rückgang des Kolonialismus, auch durch Demokratien, kann mit einer veränderten Wahrnehmung außereuropäischer Völker und ihrer Rechte zusammenhängen (Ravlo & Gleditsch 2000).

Bruce Russett (1993, S. 5–11, 35, 59–62, 73–4) argumentiert auch, dass die demokratische Kultur die Art und Weise beeinflusst, wie Führer Konflikte lösen. Außerdem ist er der Ansicht, dass sich gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts eine soziale Norm herausgebildet hat. dass Demokratien nicht gegeneinander kämpfen sollten, was sich verstärkte, als die demokratische Kultur und der Grad der Demokratie zunahmen, zum Beispiel durch die Ausweitung des Wahlrechts. Die Erhöhung der demokratischen Stabilität ermöglichte es den außenpolitischen Partnern, eine Nation als zuverlässig demokratisch wahrzunehmen. Die Allianzen zwischen Demokratien während der beiden Weltkriege und des Kalten Krieges verstärkten auch die Normen. In der griechischen Antike sieht er weniger wirksame Spuren dieser Norm.

Hans Köchler (1995) bezieht die Frage der transnationalen Demokratie auf die Stärkung des Einzelnen durch die Einbeziehung der Bürger durch Verfahren der direkten Demokratie in die internationalen Angelegenheiten eines Landes und fordert eine Umstrukturierung der Organisation der Vereinten Nationen nach demokratischen Normen . Er verweist insbesondere auf die schweizerische Praxis der partizipativen Demokratie.

Mousseau (2000, 2005) argumentiert, dass marktorientierte Entwicklungen die Normen und Werte schaffen, die sowohl Demokratie als auch Frieden erklären. In weniger entwickelten Ländern sind Einzelpersonen häufig auf soziale Netzwerke angewiesen, die die Einhaltung von Normen und Überzeugungen innerhalb der Gruppe sowie die Loyalität zu Gruppenführern auferlegen. Wenn auf dem Markt jedoch genügend Arbeitsplätze vorhanden sind, sind die Betroffenen wie in marktorientierten Industrieländern von einem starken Staat abhängig, der Verträge gleichermaßen erzwingt. Kognitive Routinen ergeben sich daraus, dass man sich an staatliche Gesetze hält und nicht wie bei Gruppenleitern, und wie bei Verträgen Unterschiede zwischen Individuen toleriert. Wähler in marktwirtschaftlichen Demokratien akzeptieren daher nur unparteiische "liberale" Regierungen und zwingen die Führer, ihre Interessen zu verfolgen, gleichberechtigten Zugang zu den Weltmärkten zu gewährleisten und sich gegen diejenigen zu wehren, die diesen Zugang mit Gewalt verzerren. Marktplatz-Demokratien teilen somit gemeinsame außenpolitische Interessen in der Überlegenheit - und Vorhersagbarkeit - des Völkerrechts über die Politik der rohen Gewalt und gleichen und offenen globalen Handel über geschlossenen Handel und imperiale Präferenzen. Wenn Streitigkeiten zwischen marktwirtschaftlichen Demokratien entstehen, ist es weniger wahrscheinlich, dass sie zu Gewalt eskalieren als andere, da beide Staaten, selbst die stärkeren, größere langfristige Interessen an der Übermacht des Rechts über die Machtpolitik wahrnehmen.

(Braumoeller 1997) argumentiert, dass liberale Normen der Konfliktlösung variieren, weil der Liberalismus viele Formen annimmt. Durch die Untersuchung der Umfrageergebnisse aus den neuen unabhängigen Staaten der ehemaligen Sowjetunion zeigt der Autor, dass der Liberalismus in dieser Region dem liberalen Nationalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts stärker ähnelt als dem Universalismus, dem von demokratischen Friedenstheoretikern beschriebenen Wilsonismus, und so weiter Infolgedessen sind Liberale in der Region mehr, nicht weniger aggressiv als Nichtliberale.

Demokratische politische Strukturen [ edit ]

Der Fall für institutionelle Zwänge geht auf Kant (1795) zurück, der schrieb:

"[I] Wenn die Zustimmung der Bürger erforderlich ist, um zu entscheiden, dass der Krieg erklärt werden soll (und in dieser Verfassung kann es nicht anders sein), ist nichts natürlicher, als dass sie sehr vorsichtig wären Solch ein armseliges Spiel, das alle Katastrophen des Krieges für sich selbst erlassen hat, darunter auch: kämpfen zu müssen, die Kosten des Krieges aus eigenen Mitteln bezahlen zu müssen, die Zerstörung, die der Krieg hinterlassen hat, mühsam zu reparieren und zu füllen das Maß des Bösen hochzuschreiben, sich mit einer schweren Staatsverschuldung zu belasten, die den Frieden selbst bitter machen würde und die wegen ständiger Kriege in der Zukunft niemals liquidiert werden kann "

Die Demokratie gibt somit denjenigen Einfluss, die am wahrscheinlichsten getötet oder verwundet werden Kriege und ihre Angehörigen und Freunde (und diejenigen, die den Großteil der Kriegssteuern zahlen) Russett (1993, S. 30). Diese monadische Theorie muss jedoch erklären, warum Demokratien nichtdemokratische Staaten angreifen. Eine Erklärung ist, dass diese Demokratien von den nichtdemokratischen Staaten bedroht oder auf andere Weise provoziert wurden. Doyle (1997, S. 272) argumentierte, dass das Fehlen eines monadischen Friedens nur zu erwarten sei: Dieselben Ideologien, die liberale Staaten miteinander in Frieden bringen, inspirieren idealistische Kriege mit den Illiberalen, sei es, um unterdrückte ausländische Minderheiten zu verteidigen oder zu verteidigen Rache Landsleute im Ausland niedergelassen. Doyle stellt auch fest (S. 292), dass liberale Staaten verdeckte Operationen gegeneinander durchführen; Die verdeckte Natur der Operation verhindert jedoch, dass die sonst für einen freien Staat charakteristische Werbung auf die Frage angewandt wird

Studien zeigen, dass demokratische Staaten die Kriege mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit als autokratische Staaten gewinnen. Eine Erklärung ist, dass Demokratien aus internen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Gründen über größere Ressourcen verfügen. Dies könnte bedeuten, dass es nicht wahrscheinlich ist, dass demokratische Führer andere demokratische Staaten als Ziele auswählen, weil sie sie als besonders starke Gegner empfinden. Eine Studie stellt fest, dass zwischenstaatliche Kriege wichtige Auswirkungen auf das Schicksal politischer Regime haben und dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein politischer Führer nach einem verlorenen Krieg an die Macht kommt, in demokratischen Staaten besonders hoch ist (Ray 1998).

Wie in (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001) beschrieben, wurde in mehreren Studien argumentiert, dass liberale Führer institutionalisierten Beschränkungen gegenüberstehen, die ihre Fähigkeit beeinträchtigen, die Ressourcen des Staates für den Krieg ohne die Zustimmung eines breiten Spektrums von Interessen zu mobilisieren. Umfrageergebnisse, die die Einstellungen von Bürgern und Eliten in den sowjetischen Nachfolgestaaten vergleichen, stimmen mit diesem Argument überein (Braumoeller 1997). Darüber hinaus sind diese Einschränkungen für andere Staaten leicht erkennbar und können von Führungskräften nicht manipuliert werden. So senden Demokratien glaubwürdige Signale an eine Abneigung gegen Gewaltanwendung. Diese Signale ermöglichen es demokratischen Staaten, Konflikte untereinander zu vermeiden, aber sie können Aggressionen von nicht-demokratischen Staaten anziehen. Demokratien können dazu gedrängt werden, auf solche Aggressionen - vielleicht sogar präventiv - mit Gewalt zu reagieren. Wie auch in (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001) beschrieben, wurde in Studien argumentiert, dass, wenn demokratische Führer sich für die Eskalation internationaler Krisen entscheiden, ihre Bedrohung als sehr glaubwürdig erachtet wird, da für diese Maßnahmen eine relativ große öffentliche Meinung vorhanden sein muss. In Streitigkeiten zwischen liberalen Staaten erlaubt ihnen die Glaubwürdigkeit ihrer Verhandlungssignale, vor der Mobilmachung eine friedliche Lösung auszuhandeln.

Eine der Spieltheorie ähnliche Erklärung, die den beiden letzten beiden ähnlich ist, besagt, dass die Beteiligung der Öffentlichkeit und die offene Debatte klare und verlässliche Informationen über die Absichten von Demokratien an andere Staaten vermitteln. Im Gegensatz dazu ist es schwierig zu wissen, welche Absichten nicht-demokratische Führer haben, welche Auswirkungen Konzessionen haben und ob Versprechen gehalten werden. Daher wird es Misstrauen und Unwillen geben, Zugeständnisse zu machen, wenn mindestens eine der Streitparteien eine Nichtdemokratie ist (Levy & Razin 2004).

The risk factors for certain types of state have, however, changed since Kant's time. In the quote above, Kant points to the lack of popular support for war – first that the populace will directly or indirectly suffer in the event of war – as a reason why republics will not tend to go to war. The number of American troops killed or maimed versus the number of Iraqi soldiers and civilians maimed and killed in the American-Iraqi conflict is indicative. This may explain the relatively great willingness of democratic states to attack weak opponents: the Iraq war was, initially at least, highly popular in the United States. The case of the Vietnam War might, nonetheless, indicate a tipping point where publics may no longer accept continuing attrition of their soldiers (even while remaining relatively indifferent to the much higher loss of life on the part of the populations attacked).

Coleman (2002) uses economic cost-benefit analysis to reach conclusions similar to Kant's. Coleman examines the polar cases of autocracy and liberal democracy. In both cases, the costs of war are assumed to be borne by the people. In autocracy, the autocrat receives the entire benefits of war, while in a liberal democracy the benefits are dispersed among the people. Since the net benefit to an autocrat exceeds the net benefit to a citizen of a liberal democracy, the autocrat is more likely to go to war. The disparity of benefits and costs can be so high that an autocrat can launch a welfare-destroying war when his net benefit exceeds the total cost of war. Contrarily, the net benefit of the same war to an individual in a liberal democracy can be negative so that he would not choose to go to war. This disincentive to war is increased between liberal democracies through their establishment of linkages, political and economic, that further raise the costs of war between them. Therefore, liberal democracies are less likely to go war, especially against each other. Coleman further distinguishes between offensive and defensive wars and finds that liberal democracies are less likely to fight defensive wars that may have already begun due to excessive discounting of future costs.

Criticism[edit]

There are several logically distinguishable classes of criticism.^[4] Note that they usually apply to no wars or few MIDs between democracies, not to little systematic violence in established democracies. (But see List of wars between democracies.)

Statistical significance[edit]

One study (Schwartz & Skinner 2002) has argued that there have been as many wars between democracies as one would expect between any other couple of states. However, its authors include wars between young and dubious democracies, and very small wars.

Others (Spiro 1994), (Gowa 1999), (Small & Singer 1976) state that, although there may be some evidence for democratic peace, the data sample or the time span may be too small to assess any definitive conclusions. For example, Gowa finds evidence for democratic peace to be insignificant before 1939, because of the too small number of democracies, and offers an alternate explanation for the following period (see the section on Realist Explanations). Gowa's use of statistics has been criticized, with several other studies and reviews finding different or opposing results (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001), (Ray 2003). However, this can be seen as the longest-lasting criticism to the theory; as noted earlier, also some supporters (Wayman 1998) agree that the statistical sample for assessing its validity is limited or scarce, at least if only full-scale wars are considered.

According to one study, (Ray 2003) which uses a rather restrictive definition of democracy and war, there were no wars between jointly democratic couples of states in the period from 1816 to 1992. Assuming a purely random distribution of wars between states, regardless of their democratic character, the predicted number of conflicts between democracies would be around ten. So, Ray argues that the evidence is statistically significant, but that it is still conceivable that, in the future, even a small number of inter-democratic wars would cancel out such evidence.^[20]

Peace comes before democracy[edit]

Douglas M. Gibler and Andrew Owsiak in their study argued peace almost always comes before democracy and that states do not develop democracy until all border disputes have been settled. These studies indicate that there is strong evidence that peace causes democracy but little evidence that democracy causes peace.^[21]Azar Gat (2017) argues that it is not democracy in itself that leads to peace but other aspects of modernization, such as economic prosperity and lower population growth.

The hypothesis that peace causes democracy is supported by psychological and cultural theories. Christian Welzel's human empowerment theory posits that existential security leads to emancipative cultural values and support for a democratic political organization.^[22] This is in agreement with theories based on evolutionary psychology.

Wars against non-democracies[edit]

Several studies fail to confirm that democracies are less likely to wage war than autocracies if wars against non-democracies are included.^[23]

Definitions, methodology and data[edit]

Some authors criticize the definition of democracy by arguing that states continually reinterpret other states' regime types as a consequence of their own objective interests and motives, such as economic and security concerns (Rosato 2003). For example, one study (Oren 1995) reports that Germany was considered a democratic state by Western opinion leaders at the end of the 19th century; yet in the years preceding World War I, when its relations with the United States, France and Britain started deteriorating, Germany was gradually reinterpreted as an autocratic state, in absence of any actual regime change. Shimmin (Shimmin 1999) moves a similar criticism regarding the western perception of Milosevic's Serbia between 1989 and 1999. Rummel (Rummel 1999) replies to this criticism by stating that, in general, studies on democratic peace do not focus on other countries' perceptions of democracy; and in the specific case of Serbia, by arguing that the limited credit accorded by western democracies to Milosevic in the early '90s did not amount to a recognition of democracy, but only to the perception that possible alternative leaders could be even worse.

Some democratic peace researchers have been criticized for post hoc reclassifying some specific conflicts as non-wars or political systems as non-democracies without checking and correcting the whole data set used similarly. Supporters and opponents of the democratic peace agree that this is bad use of statistics, even if a plausible case can be made for the correction (Bremer 1992), (Gleditsch 1995), (Gowa 1999). A military affairs columnist of the newspaper Asia Times has summarized the above criticism in a journalist's fashion describing the theory as subject to the no true Scotsman problem: exceptions are explained away as not being between "real" democracies or "real" wars.^[24]

Some democratic peace researchers require that the executive result from a substantively contested election. This may be a restrictive definition: For example, the National Archives of the United States notes that "For all intents and purposes, George Washington was unopposed for election as President, both in 1789 and 1792". (Under the original provisions for the Electoral College, there was no distinction between votes for President and Vice-President: each elector was required to vote for two distinct candidates, with the runner-up to be Vice-President. Every elector cast one of his votes for Washington,^[25] John Adams received a majority of the other votes; there were several other candidates: so the election for Vice President was contested.)

Spiro (1994) made several other criticisms of the statistical methods used. Russett (1995) and a series of papers described by Ray (2003) responded to this, for example with different methodology.

Sometimes the datasets used have also been criticized. For example, some authors have criticized the Correlates of War data for not including civilian deaths in the battle deaths count, especially in civil wars (Sambanis 2001). Weeks and Cohen (2006) argue that most fishing disputes, which include no deaths and generally very limited threats of violence, should be excluded even from the list of military disputes. Gleditsch (2004) made several criticisms to the Correlates of War data set, and produced a revised set of data. Maoz and Russett (1993) made several criticisms to the Polity I and II data sets, which have mostly been addressed in later versions. These criticisms are generally considered minor issues.^{[citation needed]}

The most comprehensive critique points out that "democracy" is rarely defined, never refers to substantive democracy, is unclear about causation, has been refuted in more than 100 studies, fails to account for some 200 deviant cases, and has been promoted ideologically to justify one country seeking to expand democracy abroad (Haas 2014). Most studies treat the complex concept of "democracy" is a bivariate variable rather than attempting to dimensionalize the concept. Studies also fail to take into account the fact that there are dozens of types of democracy, so the results are meaningless unless articulated to a particular type of democracy or claimed to be true for all types, such as consociational or economic democracy, with disparate datasets.

Microfoundations[edit]

Recent work into the democratic norms explanations shows that the microfoundations on which this explanation rest do not find empirical support. Within most earlier studies, the presence of liberal norms in democratic societies and their subsequent influence on the willingness to wage war was merely assumed, never measured. Moreover, it was never investigated whether or not these norms are absent within other regime-types. Two recent studies measured the presence of liberal norms and investigated the assumed effect of these norms on the willingness to wage war. The results of both studies show that liberal democratic norms are not only present within liberal democracies, but also within other regime-types. Moreover, these norms show are not of influence on the willingness to attack another state during an interstate conflict at the brink of war (Bakker 2017, 2018).^[26][27]

Limited consequences[edit]

The peacefulness may have various limitations and qualifiers and may not actually mean very much in the real world.

Democratic peace researchers do in general not count as wars conflicts which do not kill a thousand on the battlefield; thus they exclude for example the bloodless Cod Wars. However, as noted earlier, research has also found a peacefulness between democracies when looking at lesser conflicts.

Democracies were involved in more colonial and imperialistic wars than other states during the 1816–1945 period. On the other hand, this relation disappears if controlling for factors like power and number of colonies. Liberal democracies have less of these wars than other states after 1945. This might be related to changes in the perception of non-European peoples, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ravlo & Glieditsch 2000).

Related to this is the human rights violations committed against native people, sometimes by liberal democracies. One response is that many of the worst crimes were committed by nondemocracies, like in the European colonies before the nineteenth century, in King Leopold II of Belgium's privately owned Congo Free State, and in Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union. The United Kingdom abolished slavery in British territory in 1833, immediately after the Reform Act 1832 had significantly enlarged the franchise. (Of course, the abolition of the slave trade had been enacted in 1807; and many DPT supporters would deny that the UK was a liberal democracy in 1833 when examining interstate wars.)

Hermann and Kegley (1995) argue that interventions between democracies are more likely to happen than projected by an expected model.^[28] They further argue (1996) that democracies are more likely to intervene in other liberal states than against countries that are non-democracies.^[29] Finally, they argue that these interventions between democracies have been increasing over time and that the world can expect more of these interventions in the future.^[28][29][30] The methodology used has been criticized and more recent studies have found opposing results (Gleditsch, Christiansen & Hegre 2004).^{[citation needed]}

Rummel argues that the continuing increase in democracy worldwide will soon lead to an end to wars and democide, possibly around or even before the middle of this century.^[31] The fall of Communism and the increase in the number of democratic states were accompanied by a sudden and dramatic decline in total warfare, interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and the number of refugees and displaced persons.^[32] One report claims that the two main causes of this decline in warfare are the end of the Cold War itself and decolonization; but also claims that the three Kantian factors have contributed materially.^[33]

Historical periods[edit]

Economic historians Joel Mokyr and Hans-Joachim Voth argue that democratic states may have been more vulnerable to conquest because the rulers in those states were too heavily constrained. Absolutist rulers in other states could however operate more effectively.^[34]

Academic relevance and derived studies[edit]

Democratic peace theory is a well established research field with more than a hundred authors having published articles about it.^[35] Several peer-reviewed studies mention in their introduction that most researchers accept the theory as an empirical fact.^[36]

Imre Lakatos suggested that what he called a "progressive research program" is better than a "degenerative" one when it can explain the same phenomena as the "degenerative" one, but is also characterized by growth of its research field and the discovery of important novel facts. In contrast, the supporters of the "degenerative" program do not make important new empirical discoveries, but instead mostly apply adjustments to their theory in order to defend it from competitors. Some researchers argue that democratic peace theory is now the "progressive" program in international relations. According to these authors, the theory can explain the empirical phenomena previously explained by the earlier dominant research program, realism in international relations; in addition, the initial statement that democracies do not, or rarely, wage war on one another, has been followed by a rapidly growing literature on novel empirical regularities. (Ray 2003), (Chernoff 2004), (Harrison 2005).

Other examples are several studies finding that democracies are more likely to ally with one another than with other states, forming alliances which are likely to last longer than alliances involving nondemocracies (Ray 2003); several studies including (Weart 1998) showing that democracies conduct diplomacy differently and in a more conciliatory way compared to nondemocracies; one study finding that democracies with proportional representation are in general more peaceful regardless of the nature of the other party involved in a relationship (Leblang & Chan 2003); and another study reporting that proportional representation system and decentralized territorial autonomy is positively associated with lasting peace in postconflict societies (Binningsbø 2005).

Coup by provoking a war[edit]

Many democracies become non-democratic by war, as being aggressed or as aggressor (quickly after a coup), sometimes the coup leader worked to provoke that war.

Schmitt (1922) wrote on how to overrule a Constitution: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."

Schmitt (1927) again on the need for internal (and foreign) enemies because they are useful to persuade the people not to trust anyone more than the Leader: “As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy. Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy.” Whatever opposition will be pictured and intended as the actual foreign enemy's puppet.

Other explanations[edit]

Political similarity[edit]

One general criticism motivating research of different explanations is that actually the theory cannot claim that "democracy causes peace", because the evidence for democracies being, in general, more peaceful is very slight or non existent; it only can support the claim that "joint democracy causes peace". According to Rosato (2003), this casts doubts on whether democracy is actually the cause because, if so, a monadic effect would be expected.

Perhaps the simplest explanation to such perceived anomaly (but not the one the Realist Rosato prefers, see the section on Realist explanations below) is that democracies are not peaceful to each other because they are democratic, but rather because they are similar. This line of thought started with several independent observations of an "Autocratic Peace" effect, a reduced probability of war (obviously no author claims its absence) between states which are both non-democratic, or both highly so (Raknerud & Hegre 1997), (Beck & Jackman 1998), This has led to the hypothesis that democratic peace emerges as a particular case when analyzing a subset of states which are, in fact, similar (Werner 2000). Or, that similarity in general does not solely affect the probability of war, but only coherence of strong political regimes such as full democracies and stark autocracies.

Autocratic peace and the explanation based on political similarity is a relatively recent development, and opinions about its value are varied. Henderson (2002) builds a model considering political similarity, geographic distance and economic interdependence as its main variables, and concludes that democratic peace is a statistical artifact which disappears when the above variables are taken into account. Werner (2000) finds a conflict reducing effect from political similarity in general, but with democratic dyads being particularly peaceful, and noting some differences in behavior between democratic and autocratic dyads with respect to alliances and power evaluation. Beck, King and Zeng (2004) use neural networks to show two distinct low probability zones, corresponding to high democracy and high autocracy.^[37] Petersen (2004) uses a different statistical model and finds that autocratic peace is not statistically significant, and that the effect attributed to similarity is mostly driven by the pacifying effect of joint democracy. Ray (2005) similarly disputes the weight of the argument on logical grounds, claiming that statistical analysis on "political similarity" uses a main variable which is an extension of "joint democracy" by linguistic redefinition, and so it is expected that the war reducing effects are carried on in the new analysis. Bennett (2006) builds a direct statistical model based on a triadic classification of states into "democratic", "autocratic" and "mixed". He finds that autocratic dyads have a 35% reduced chance of going into any type of armed conflict with respect to a reference mixed dyad. Democratic dyads have a 55% reduced chance. This effect gets stronger when looking at more severe conflicts; for wars (more than 1000 battle deaths), he estimates democratic dyads to have an 82% lower risk than autocratic dyads. He concludes that autocratic peace exists, but democratic peace is clearly stronger. However, he finds no relevant pacifying effect of political similarity, except at the extremes of the scale.

To summarize a rather complex picture, there are no less than four possible stances on the value of this criticism:

1. Political similarity, plus some complementary variables, explains everything. Democratic peace is a statistical artifact. Henderson subscribes to this view.


2. Political similarity has a pacifying effect, but democracy makes it stronger. Werner would probably subscribe to this view.


3. Political similarity in general has little or no effect, except at the extremes of the democracy-autocracy scale: a democratic peace and an autocratic peace exist separately, with the first one being stronger, and may have different explanations. Bennett holds this view, and Kinsella mentions this as a possibility


4. Political similarity has little or no effect and there is no evidence for autocratic peace. Petersen and Ray are among defendants of this view.

Economic factors[edit]

World GDP/capita 1–2003 AD. The increase in the number of democratic nations has occurred at the same time as the increase in economic wealth.

The capitalist peace, or capitalist peace theory, posits that according to a given criteria for economic development (capitalism), developed economies have not engaged in war with each other, and rarely enter into low-level disputes. These theories have been proposed as an explanation for the democratic peace by accounting for both democracy and the peace among democratic nations. The exact nature of the causality depends upon both the proposed variable and the measure of the indicator for the concept used.

A majority of researchers on the determinants of democracy agree that economic development is a primary factor which allows the formation of a stable and healthy democracy (Hegre, 2003; Weede, 2004). Thus, some researchers have argued that economic development also plays a factor in the establishment of peace.

Mousseau argues that a culture of contracting in advanced market-oriented economies may cause both democracy and peace (2000; 2002; 2003; 2005). These studies indicate that democracy, alone, is an unlikely cause of the democratic peace. A low level of market-oriented economic development may hinder development of liberal institutions and values. Hegre (2000) and Souva (2003) confirmed these expectations. Mousseau (2005) finds that democracy is a significant factor only when both democracies have levels of economic development well above the global median. In fact, the poorest 21% of the democracies studied, and the poorest 4–5% of current democracies, are significantly more likely than other kinds of countries to fight each other. Mousseau, Hegre & Oneal (2003) confirm that if at least one of the democracies involved has a very low level of economic development, democracy is ineffective in preventing war; however, they find that when also controlling for trade, 91% of all the democratic pairs had high enough development for the pacifying effect of democracy to be important during the 1885–1992 period and all in 1992. The difference in results of Mousseau (2005) and Mousseau, Hegre & Oneal (2003) may be due to sampling: Mousseau (2005) observed only neighboring states where poor countries actually can fight each other. In fact, fully 89% of militarized conflicts between less developed countries from 1920 and 2000 were among directly contiguous neighbors (Mousseau 2005:68–69). He argues that it is not likely that the results can be explained by trade: Because developed states have large economies, they do not have high levels of trade interdependence (2005:70 and footnote 5; Mousseau, Hegre & Oneal 2003:283). In fact, the correlation of developed democracy with trade interdependence is a scant 0.06 (Pearson's r – considered substantively no correlation by statisticians)(2005:77).

Both World Wars were fought between countries which can be considered economically developed. Mousseau argues that both Germany and Japan – like the USSR during the Cold War and Saudi Arabia today – had state-managed economies and thus lacked his market norms (Mousseau 2002–03:29). Hegre (2003) finds that democracy is correlated with civil peace only for developed countries, and for countries with high levels of literacy. Conversely, the risk of civil war decreases with development only for democratic countries.

Gartzke (2005) argues that economic freedom (a quite different concept from Mousseau's market norms) or financial dependence (2007) explains the developed democratic peace, and these countries may be weak on these dimensions too.^[38] Rummel (2005) criticizes Gartzke's methodology and argues that his results are invalid.^[39]

Several studies find that democracy, more trade causing greater economic interdependence, and membership in more intergovernmental organizations reduce the risk of war. This is often called the Kantian peace theory since it is similar to Kant's earlier theory about a perpetual peace; it is often also called "liberal peace" theory, especially when one focuses on the effects of trade and democracy. (The theory that free trade can cause peace is quite old and referred to as Cobdenism.) Many researchers agree that these variables positively affect each other but each has a separate pacifying effect. For example, in countries exchanging a substantial amount of trade, economic interest groups may exist that oppose a reciprocal disruptive war, but in democracy such groups may have more power, and the political leaders be more likely to accept their requests. (Russett & Oneal 2001), (Lagazio & Russett 2004), (Oneal & Russett 2004). Weede (2004) argues that the pacifying effect of free trade and economic interdependence may be more important than that of democracy, because the former affects peace both directly and indirectly, by producing economic development and ultimately, democracy. Weede also lists some other authors supporting this view. However, some recent studies find no effect from trade but only from democracy (Goenner 2004), (Kim & Rousseau 2005).

None of the authors listed argues that free trade alone causes peace. Even so, the issue of whether free trade or democracy is more important in maintaining peace may have potentially significant practical consequences, for example on evaluating the effectiveness of applying economic sanctions and restrictions to autocratic countries.

It was Michael Doyle (1983, 1997) who reintroduced Kant's three articles into democratic peace theory. He argued that a pacific union of liberal states has been growing for the past two centuries. He denies that a pair of states will be peaceful simply because they are both liberal democracies; if that were enough, liberal states would not be aggressive towards weak non-liberal states (as the history of American relations with Mexico shows they are). Rather, liberal democracy is a necessary condition for international organization and hospitality (which are Kant's other two articles)—and all three are sufficient to produce peace. Other Kantians have not repeated Doyle's argument that all three in the triad must be present, instead stating that all three reduce the risk of war.

Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that it is the global capitalist system that creates shared interests among the dominant parties, thus inhibiting potentially harmful belligerence.(Satana 2010, p. 231)

Negri and Hardt take a similar stance, arguing that the intertwined network of interests in the global capitalism leads to the decline of individual nation states, and the rise of a global Empire which has no outside, and no external enemies. As a result, they write, "The era of imperialist, interimperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over. (...) we have entered the era of minor and internal conflicts. Every imperial war is a civil war, a police action." (Hardt & Negri 2000).

Other explanations[edit]

Many studies, as those discussed in (Ray 1998), (Ray 2005), (Oneal & Russett 2004), supporting the theory have controlled for many possible alternative causes of the peace. Examples of factors controlled for are geographic distance, geographic contiguity, power status, alliance ties, militarization, economic wealth and economic growth, power ratio, and political stability. These studies have often found very different results depending on methodology and included variables, which has caused criticism. It should be noted that DPT does not state democracy is the only thing affecting the risk of military conflict. Many of the mentioned studies have found that other factors are also important. However, a common thread in most results is an emphasis on the relationship between democracy and peace.^{[citation needed]}

Several studies have also controlled for the possibility of reverse causality from peace to democracy. For example, one study (Reuveny & Li 2003) supports the theory of simultaneous causation, finding that dyads involved in wars are likely to experience a decrease in joint democracy, which in turn increases the probability of further war. So they argue that disputes between democratizing or democratic states should be resolved externally at a very early stage, in order to stabilize the system. Another study (Reiter 2001) finds that peace does not spread democracy, but spreading democracy is likely to spread peace. A different kind of reverse causation lies in the suggestion that impending war could destroy or decrease democracy, because the preparation for war might include political restrictions, which may be the cause for the findings of democratic peace. However, this hypothesis has been statistically tested in a study (Mousseau & Shi 1999) whose authors find, depending on the definition of the pre-war period, no such effect or a very slight one. So, they find this explanation unlikely. Note also that this explanation would predict a monadic effect, although weaker than the dyadic one^{[dubious – discuss]}.

Weart (1998) argues that the peacefulness appears and disappears rapidly when democracy appears and disappears. This in his view makes it unlikely that variables that change more slowly are the explanation. Weart, however, has been criticized for not offering any quantitative analysis supporting his claims (Ray, 2000).

Wars tend very strongly to be between neighboring states. Gleditsch (1995) showed that the average distance between democracies is about 8000 miles, the same as the average distance between all states. He believes that the effect of distance in preventing war, modified by the democratic peace, explains the incidence of war as fully as it can be explained.

Realist explanations[edit]

Supporters of realism in international relations in general argue that not democracy or its absence, but considerations and evaluations of power, cause peace or war. Specifically, many realist critics claim that the effect ascribed to democratic, or liberal, peace, is in fact due to alliance ties between democratic states which in turn are caused, one way or another, by realist factors.

For example, Farber and Gowa (1995) find evidence for peace between democracies to be statistically significant only in the period from 1945 on, and consider such peace an artifact of the Cold War, when the threat from the communist states forced democracies to ally with one another. Mearsheimer (1990) offers a similar analysis of the Anglo-American peace before 1945, caused by the German threat. Spiro (1994) finds several instances of wars between democracies, arguing that evidence in favor of the theory might be not so vast as other authors report, and claims that the remaining evidence consists of peace between allied states with shared objectives. He acknowledges that democratic states might have a somewhat greater tendency to ally with one another, and regards this as the only real effect of democratic peace. Rosato (2003) argues that most of the significant evidence for democratic peace has been observed after World War II; and that it has happened within a broad alliance, which can be identified with NATO and its satellite nations, imposed and maintained by American dominance (see Pax Americana). One of the main points in Rosato's argument is that, although never engaged in open war with another liberal democracy during the Cold War, the United States intervened openly or covertly in the political affairs of democratic states several times, for example in the Chilean coup of 1973, the 1953 coup in Iran and 1954 coup in Guatemala; in Rosato's view, these interventions show the United States' determination to maintain an "imperial peace".

The most direct counter arguments to such criticisms have been studies finding peace between democracies to be significant even when controlling for "common interests" as reflected in alliance ties (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001), (Ray 2003). Regarding specific issues, Ray (1998) objects that explanations based on the Cold War should predict that the Communist bloc would be at peace within itself also, but exceptions include the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the Cambodian-Vietnamese War, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. Ray also argues that the external threat did not prevent conflicts in the Western bloc when at least one of the involved states was a nondemocracy, such as the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus (against Greek Junta supported Cypriot Greeks), the Falklands War, and the Football War. Also, one study (Ravlo & Gleditsch 2000) notes that the explanation "goes increasingly stale as the post-Cold War world accumulates an increasing number of peaceful dyad-years between democracies". Rosato's argument about American dominance has also been criticized for not giving supporting statistical evidence (Slantchev, Alexandrova & Gartzke 2005).

Some realist authors also criticize in detail the explanations first by supporters of democratic peace, pointing to supposed inconsistencies or weaknesses.

Rosato (2003) criticizes most explanations to how democracy might cause peace. Arguments based on normative constraints, he argues, are not consistent with the fact that democracies do go to war no less than other states, thus violating norms preventing war; for the same reason he refutes arguments based on the importance of public opinion. Regarding explanations based on greater accountability of leaders, he finds that historically autocratic leaders have been removed or punished more often than democratic leaders when they get involved in costly wars. Finally, he also criticizes the arguments that democracies treat each other with trust and respect even during crises; and that democracy might be slow to mobilize its composite and diverse groups and opinions, hindering the start of a war, drawing support from other authors. Another realist, Layne (1994), analyzes the crises and brinkmanship that took place between non-allied democratic great powers, during the relatively brief period when such existed. He finds no evidence either of institutional or cultural constraints against war; indeed, there was popular sentiment in favor of war on both sides. Instead, in all cases, one side concluded that it could not afford to risk that war at that time, and made the necessary concessions.

Rosato's objections have been criticized for claimed logical and methodological errors, and for being contradicted by existing statistical research (Kinsella 2005). Russett (1995) replies to Layne by re-examining some of the crises studied in his article, and reaching different conclusions; Russett argues that perceptions of democracy prevented escalation, or played a major role in doing so. Also, a recent study (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001) finds that, while in general the outcome of international disputes is highly influenced by the contenders' relative military strength, this is not true if both contenders are democratic states; in this case the authors find the outcome of the crisis to be independent of the military capabilities of contenders, which is contrary to realist expectations. Finally, both the realist criticisms here described ignore new possible explanations, like the game-theoretic one discussed below.^[40]

Nuclear deterrent[edit]

A different kind of realist criticism (see (Jervis 2002) for a discussion) stresses the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining peace. In realist terms, this means that, in the case of disputes between nuclear powers, respective evaluation of power might be irrelevant because of Mutual assured destruction preventing both sides from foreseeing what could be reasonably called a "victory". The 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan has been cited as a counterexample to this argument (Page Fortna, 2004).

Some supporters of the democratic peace do not deny that realist factors are also important (Russett 1995). Research supporting the theory has also shown that factors such as alliance ties and major power status influence interstate conflict behavior (Ray 2003).

Influence[edit]

The democratic peace theory has been extremely divisive among political scientists. It is rooted in the idealist and classical liberalist traditions and is opposed to the previously dominant theory of realism. However, democratic peace theory has come to be more widely accepted and has in some democracies effected policy change.^{[citation needed]}

In the United States, presidents from both major parties have expressed support for the theory. In his 1994 State of the Union address, then-President Bill Clinton, a member of the Democratic Party, said: "Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other."^[41] In a 2004 press conference, then-President George W. Bush, a member of the Republican Party, said: "And the reason why I'm so strong on democracy is democracies don't go to war with each other. And the reason why is the people of most societies don't like war, and they understand what war means.... I've got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that's why I'm such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy."^[42][43]

In a 1999 speech, Chris Patten, the then-European Commissioner for External Relations, said: "Inevitable because the EU was formed partly to protect liberal values, so it is hardly surprising that we should think it appropriate to speak out. But it is also sensible for strategic reasons. Free societies tend not to fight one another or to be bad neighbours."^[44] The A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy states: "The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states."^[45]Tony Blair has also claimed the theory is correct.^[46]

As justification for initiating war[edit]

Some fear that the democratic peace theory may be used to justify wars against nondemocracies in order to bring lasting peace, in a democratic crusade (Chan 1997, p. 59). Woodrow Wilson in 1917 asked Congress to declare war against Imperial Germany, citing Germany's sinking of American ships due to unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmermann telegram, but also stating that "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations" and "The world must be made safe for democracy."^[47]R. J. Rummel is a notable proponent of war for the purpose of spreading democracy, based on this theory.

Some point out that the democratic peace theory has been used to justify the 2003 Iraq War, others argue that this justification was used only after the war had already started (Russett 2005). Furthermore, Weede (2004) has argued that the justification is extremely weak, because forcibly democratizing a country completely surrounded by non-democracies, most of which are full autocracies, as Iraq was, is at least as likely to increase the risk of war as it is to decrease it (some studies show that dyads formed by one democracy and one autocracy are the most warlike, and several find that the risk of war is greatly increased in democratizing countries surrounded by nondemocracies).^{[citation needed]} According to Weede, if the United States and its allies wanted to adopt a rationale strategy of forced democratization based on democratic peace, which he still does not recommend, it would be best to start intervening in countries which border with at least one or two stable democracies, and expand gradually. Also, research shows that attempts to create democracies by using external force has often failed. Gleditsch, Christiansen and Hegre (2004) argue that forced democratization by interventionism may initially have partial success, but often create an unstable democratizing country, which can have dangerous consequences in the long run. Those attempts which had a permanent and stable success, like democratization in Austria, West Germany and Japan after World War II, mostly involved countries which had an advanced economic and social structure already, and implied a drastic change of the whole political culture. Supporting internal democratic movements and using diplomacy may be far more successful and less costly. Thus, the theory and related research, if they were correctly understood, may actually be an argument against a democratic crusade (Weart 1998), (Owen 2005), (Russett 2005).

Michael Haas has written perhaps the most trenchant critique of a hidden normative agenda (Haas 1997). Among the points raised: Due to sampling manipulation, the research creates the impression that democracies can justifiably fight nondemocracies, snuff out budding democracies, or even impose democracy. And due to sloppy definitions, there is no concern that democracies continue undemocratic practices yet remain in the sample as if pristine democracies.

This criticism is confirmed by David Keen(2006) who finds that almost all historical attempts to impose democracy by violent means have failed.

Other factors related to democracies being more peaceful[edit]

According to Azar Gat's War in Human Civilizationthere are several related and independent factors that contribute to democratic societies being more peaceful than other forms of governments:^[48]

1. Wealth and comfort: Increased prosperity in democratic societies has been associated with peace because civilians are less willing to endure hardship of war and military service due to a more luxurious life at home than in pre-modern times. Increased wealth has worked to decrease war through comfort (Gat, 597–598).


2. Metropolitan service society: The majority of army recruits come from the country side or factory workers. Many believe that these types of people are suited for war. But as technology progressed the army turned more towards advanced services in information that rely more on computerized data which urbanized people are recruited more for this service (Gat 600–602).


3. Sexual revolution: The availability of sex due to the pill and women joining the labor market could be another factor that has led to less enthusiasm for men to go to war. Young men are more reluctant leave behind the pleasures of life for the rigors and chastity of the army (Gat 603- 604).


4. Fewer young males: There is greater life expectancy which leads to fewer young males. Young males are the most aggressive and the ones that join the army the most. With fewer younger males in developed societies could help explain more pacificity (Gat 604–605).


5. Fewer Children per Family (lower fertility rate): During pre modern times it was always hard for families to lose a child but in modern times it has become more difficult due to more families having only one or two children. It has become even harder for parents to risk the loss of a child in war. However, Gat recognizes that this argument is a difficult one because during pre modern times the life expectancy was not high for children and bigger families were necessary(Gat 605–606).


6. Women's franchise: Women are less overtly aggressive than men. Therefore, women are less inclined to serious violence and do not support it as much as men do. In liberal democracies women have been able to influence the government by getting elected. Electing more women could have an effect on whether liberal democracies take a more aggressive approach on certain issues (Gat 606- 607).


7. Nuclear weapons: Nuclear weapons could be the reason for not having a great power war. Many believe that a nuclear war would result in mutually assured destruction (MAD) which means that both countries involved in a nuclear war have the ability to strike the other until both sides are wiped out. This results in countries not wanting to strike the other for fear of being wiped out (608–609).

Related theories[edit]

The European peace[edit]

There is significant debate over whether the lack of any major European general wars since 1945, is due to cooperation and integration of liberal-democratic European states themselves (as in the European Union or Franco-German cooperation), an enforced peace due to intervention of the Soviet Union and the United States until 1989 and the United States alone thereafter,^[49] or a combination of both.^[50]

The debate over this theory was thrust in the public eye, when the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European Union, for its role in creating peace in Europe.^[51]

See also[edit]

Sources[edit]

• Abadie, Alberto (2004). "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism" (PDF). NBER Working Paper Series. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 6, 2005.


• Archibugi, Daniele. The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2008.


• Babst, Dean V. "Elective Governments—A Force For Peace." The Wisconsin Sociologist 3 (1, 1964): 9–14.


• Babst, Dean V.. "A Force For Peace." Industrial Research (April 1972): 55–58.


• Bakker, Femke E. (2017) "Do liberal norms matter? A cross-regime experimental investigation of the normative explanation of the democratic peace thesis in China and The Netherland" Acta Politica 52(4) 521-543. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41269-016-0002-4.


• Bakker, Femke E. (2018) "Hawks and Doves. Democratic Peace Theory Revisited" Leiden University https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/62051.


• Beck, Nathaniel, Gary King, and Langche Zeng (2004). "Theory and Evidence in International Conflict: A Response to de Marchi, Gelpi, and Grynaviski" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 98 (2): 379–389. doi:10.1017/s0003055404001212.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link).


• Beck, Nathaniel; Jackman, Simon (1998). "Beyond Linearity by Default: Generalized Additive Models". American Journal of Political Science. 42: 596–627. doi:10.2307/2991772.


• Beck, N.; Tucker R (1998). "Democracy and Peace: General Law or Limited Phenomenon?". Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Link failed 22 January 2006.


• Bennett, Scott D. (2006). "Toward a Continuous Specification of the Democracy-Autocracy Connection". International Studies Quarterly. 50 (2): 313–338. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00404.x.


• Binningsbø, Helga Malmin (2005). "Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace after Civil War?" (PDF). Paper prepared for presentation at the 13th Annual National Political Science Conference, Hurdalsjøen, Norway, 5–7 January 2005.


• Braumoeller, Bear F (2004). "Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms" (PDF). International Organization. 58 (4): 807–820. doi:10.1017/s0020818304040251.^{[dead link]}


• Braumoeller, Bear F (1997). "Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States". International Studies Quarterly. 41 (3): 375–402. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00049. JSTOR 2600789.


• Bremer, Stuart A. (June 1992). "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965". The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 36 (2): 309–341. doi:10.1177/0022002792036002005. JSTOR 174478.CS1 maint: Date and year (link)


• Bremer, Stuart A. (1993). "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816–1965". International Interactions. 18 (3): 231–249.


• Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. ISBN 0-262-52213-6.


• Cashman, Greg (2013). What Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield.


• Cederman, Lars-Erik (1 March 2001). "Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process". American Political Science Review. 95.


• Chan, Steve (1997). "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise". Mershon International studies review. 41 (1): 59. doi:10.2307/222803. JSTOR 222803.


• Chernoff, Fred (2004). "The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Relations". International Studies Review. 6 (1): 1079–1760. doi:10.1111/j.1079-1760.2004.00372.x.


• Cohen, Dara K.; Weeks, Jessica (2006). "Red Herings? Fishing Disputes, Regime Type, and Interstate Conflict" (PDF). Presented at the Stanford International Relations Workshop. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 21, 2006.


• Coleman, Charles D. (2002). "Why Don't Democracies Go to War?" (PDF). Tullock Festschrift..


• Davenport, Christian; Armstrong II, David A (2003). "Peace by Piece: Towards an Understanding of Exactly How Democracy Reduces State Repression" (PDF). Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, 61st Annual Meeting, Chicago. April 3–6, 2003. Archived from the original (PDF) on October 25, 2005.


• Davenport, Christian; Armstrong II, David A (2004). "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996" (PDF). American Journal of Political Science. 48 (3). doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00086.x. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 4, 2006.


• Davenport, Christian. 2007. "State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace." New York: Cambridge University Press.


• Davoodi, Schoresch & Sow, Adama: Democracy and Peace in Zimbabwe in: EPU Research Papers: Issue 12/08, Stadtschlaining 2008


• Doyle, Michael W. (Summer 1983). "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 12 (3): 205–235. JSTOR 2265298.CS1 maint: Date and year (link)


• Doyle, Michael W. (Autumn 1983). "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 12 (4): 323–353. JSTOR 2265377.CS1 maint: Date and year (link)


• Doyle, Michael W. Ways of War and Peace. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. ISBN 0-393-96947-9.


• Fog, Agner (2017). Warlike and Peaceful Societies: The Interaction of Genes and Culture. Open Book Publishers. doi:10.11647/OBP.0128.


• Gartzke, Erik (2007). "The Capitalist Peace". American Journal of Political Science. 51 (1): 166–191. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00244.x.


• Gat, Azar (2017). The Causes of War and the Spread of Peace: Will War Rebound?. Oxford University Press.


• Gelpi, Christopher F.; Griesdorf, Michael (2001). "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 95 (3): 633–647. doi:10.1017/s0003055401003148. Archived from the original (PDF) on February 13, 2005. Retrieved January 30, 2019.


• George, Alexander L.; Andrew Bennett (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. Cambridge, Mass .: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-57222-2.


• Gibler, Douglas M.; Owsiak, Andrew (2017). "Democracy and the Settlement of International Borders, 1919–2001". Journal of Conflict Resolution. doi:10.1177/0022002717708599.


• Gleditsch, Nils P. (1992). "Democracy and Peace". Journal of Peace Research. 29 (4): 369–376. doi:10.1177/0022343392029004001. JSTOR 425538.


• Gleditsch, Nils P (1995). "Geography, democracy and peace". International Interactions. 20: 297–314. doi:10.1080/03050629508434853.


• Gleditsch, Nils Petter. Christiansen, Lene Siljeholm. Hegre, Håvard (2005). "Democratic Jihad? Military Intervention and Democracy" (PDF). Paper prepared for the 45th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 17–20 March 2004. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 27, 2007.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)


• Goenner, Cullen F (2004). "Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace" (PDF). Journal of Peace Research. 41 (5): 589–605. doi:10.1177/0022343304045977.


• Gowa, Joanne (1999). Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-07022-9.


• Haas, Michael (2007). "Deconstructing the Democratic Peace." In Deconstructing International Relations Theoryed. Michael Haas, pp. 127–148. New York: Norton.


• Haas, Michael (2014). Deconstructing the 'Democratic Peace': How a Research Agenda Boomeranged. Los Angeles, CA: Publishinghouse for Scholars.


• Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio. Empire. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2000. ISBN 0-674-00671-2.


• Harff, Barbara (2003). "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 97 (1): 57–73. doi:10.1017/S0003055403000522. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 22, 2006.


• Harrison, Ewan (2010). "The Democratic Peace Research Program and System Level Analysis". Journal of Peace Research. 47 (2): 155–165. doi:10.1177/0022343309356490.


• Hayes, Jarrod (2012). "The democratic peace and the new evolution of an old idea". European Journal of International Relations. 18 (4): 767–791. doi:10.1177/1354066111405859.


• Hegre, Havard (2000). "Development and the Liberal Peace: What does it Take to Be a Trading State?". Journal of Peace Research. 37: 5–30. doi:10.1177/0022343300037001001.


• Hegre, Håvard (2004). The Limits of the Liberal Peace (PDF) (Ph.D. Thesis). University of Oslo. Archived from the original (PDF) on July 20, 2007.


• Hegre, Håvard; Ellington, Tanja; Gates, Scott; Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2001). "Towards A Democratic Civil Peace? Opportunity, Grievance, and Civil War 1816–1992". American Political Science Review. 95 (1): 33–48. Archived from the original on April 6, 2004.


• Hegre, Håvard (2003). "Disentangling Democracy and Development as Determinants of Armed Conflict (required)" (PDF). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 27, 2007.


• Henderson, Errol. (2002). Democracy and War, the End of an Illusion? Boulder: Lynne Reiner.


• Hensel, Paul R.; Goertz, Gary; Diehl, Paul F. (2000). "The Democratice Peace and Rivalries" (PDF). Journal of Politics. 64: 1173–88. Archived from the original (PDF) on May 13, 2005.


• Hermann, Margaret G.; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (September 1996). "Ballots, a Barrier Against the Use of Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military Intervention". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 40 (3): 436–460. doi:10.1177/0022002796040003003.


• Hermann, Margaret G.; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (June 1998). "The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record". International Interactions. 24 (2): 91–114. doi:10.1080/03050629808434922.


• Hermann, Margaret G.; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (1995). "Military Intervention and The Democratic Peace". International Interactions. 21 (1): 1–21. doi:10.1080/03050629508434857.


• Hermann, Margaret G.; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (1996). "How Democracies Use Intervention: A Neglected Dimension in Studies of the Democratic Peace". Journal of Peace Research. 33 (3): 309–322. doi:10.1177/0022343396033003005.


• Hermann, Margaret G.; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (February 1997). "Putting Military Intervention into the Democratic Peace: A Research Note". Comparative Political Studies. 30 (1): 78–107. doi:10.1177/0010414097030001004.


• Hermann, Margaret G.; Charles W. Kegley, Jr.; Gregory A. Raymond (Winter–Spring 1998). "The Rise and Fall of the Nonintervention Norm: Some Correlates and Potential Consequences". The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 22 (1): 81–101.


• Hook, Steven W., ed. Democratic Peace in Theory and Practice (Kent State University Press; 2010)


• Huth, Paul K., et al. The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press: 2003. ISBN 0-521-80508-2.


• Ish-Shalom, Piki. (2013) Democratic Peace: A Political Biography (University of Michigan Press; 2013)


• Jervis, Robert (2002). "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 96 (1): 1–14. doi:10.1017/s0003055402004197. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 19, 2005.


• Kim, Hyung Min; Rousseau, David L. (2005). "The Classical Liberals Were Half Right (or Half Wrong): New Tests of the 'Liberal Peace', 1960–88" (PDF). Journal of Peace Research. 42 (5): 523–543. doi:10.1177/0022343305056225. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-09-27. Retrieved December 10, 2013.


• Kant, Immanuel (1795). "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch".


• Keen, David (2006). Endless War? Hidden Functions of the War on Terror. London: Pluto Press.


• Kinsella, David (2005). "No Rest for the Democratic Peace". American Political Science Review. 99: 453–457. doi:10.1017/s0003055405051774.


• Köchler, Hans (1995). Democracy and the International Rule of Law: Propositions for an Alternative World Order. Springer. ISBN 3-211-82764-1.


• Lagazio, Monica; Russett, Bruce (2004). "A Neural Network Analysis of Militarized Disputes, 1885–1992: Temporal Stability and Causal Complexity". In Diehl, Paul. The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem (PDF). University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-472-11395-X.


• Lai, Brian; Slater, Dan (2006). "Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992". American Journal of Political Science. 50 (1): 113–126. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00173.x.


• Layne, Christopher (Autumn 1994). "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace". International Security. 19 (2): 5–49. doi:10.2307/2539195. JSTOR 2539195.CS1 maint: Date and year (link)


• Leblang, David; Chan, Steve (2003). "Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?". Political Research Quarterly. 56: 385–400. doi:10.1177/106591290305600401. Archived from the original on February 12, 2006.


• Levy, Jack S. (1988). "Domestic politics and war". Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 18 (4): 653–73. doi:10.2307/204819. JSTOR 204819.


• Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny (2004). "It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace" (PDF). Journal of the European Economic Association. 2 (1): 1–29. doi:10.1162/154247604323015463.


• Lipson, Charles. Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace. Princeton University Press: 2003. ISBN 0-691-11390-4.


• Mansfield, Edward D.; Snyder, Jack (2002). "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War" (PDF). International Organization. 56 (2): 297–337. doi:10.1162/002081802320005496. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 13, 2006.


• Mansfield, Edward D.; Snyder, Jack (2005). Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-13449-7.


• Maoz, Zeev (Summer 1997). "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?". International Security. 22 (1): 162–198. doi:10.2307/2539333. JSTOR 2539333.CS1 maint: Date and year (link)


• Mearsheimer, John J. (Summer 1990). "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War". International Security. 15 (1): 5–56. doi:10.2307/2538981. JSTOR 2538981.CS1 maint: Date and year (link)


• Mousseau, Michael (2000). "Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 44 (4): 472–507. doi:10.1177/0022002700044004004.


• Mousseau, Michael (2002). "An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation". International Interactions. 28 (April): 137–164. doi:10.1080/03050620212100.


• Mousseau, Michael. "Market Civilization and its Clash with Terror". International Security. 27 (3 (Winter)): 5–29. doi:10.1162/01622880260553615. 2002–03


• Mousseau, Michael (2003). "The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence". International Studies Quarterly. 47 (4): 483–510. doi:10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00276.x.


• Mousseau, Michael (2005). "Comparing New Theory with Prior Beliefs: Market Civilization and the Democratic Peace". Conflict Management and Peace Science. 22 (1): 63–77. doi:10.1080/07388940590915327.


• Mousseau, Michael; Shi, Yuhand (1999). "A Test for Reverse Causality in the Democratic Peace Relationship". Journal of Peace Research. 36 (6): 639–663. doi:10.1177/0022343399036006003.


• Mousseau, Michael; Håvard Hegre; John R. Oneal (2003). "How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace". European Journal of International Relations. 9 (4): 277–314. doi:10.1177/1354066103009002005.


• Müller, Harald; Wolff, Jonas (2004). "Dyadic Democratic Peace Strikes Back" (PDF). Paper prepared for presentation at the 5th Pan-European International Relations Conference the Hague, September 9–11, 2004. Archived from the original (PDF) on June 25, 2006.


• Müller, Harald (2004). "The Antinomy of Democratic Peace". International Politics. 41 (4): 494–520. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800089.


• Owen, John M. (Autumn 1994). "Give Democratic Peace a Chance? How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace". International Security. 19 (2): 87–125. doi:10.2307/2539197. JSTOR 2539197.CS1 maint: Date and year (link)


• Oneal, John R.; Bruce Russett (1999). "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations" (PDF). World Politics. 52 (1): 1–37. doi:10.1017/S0043887100020013. Archived from the original (– ^{Scholar search}) on October 28, 2005.


• Oneal, John R.; Russett, Bruce (2001). "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992" (PDF). Paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 11, 2006.


• Oneal, John R.; Russett, Bruce (2004). "Rule of Three, Let it Be? When More Really Is Better" (PDF). Revised version of paper presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society.


• Owen, John M., IV (Nov.–Dec. 2005). "Iraq and the Democratic Peace". Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on December 21, 2005. CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: Date and year (link)


• Oren, Ido (1995). "The Subjectivity Of The 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions Of Imperial Germany". International Security. 20 (2). doi:10.2307/2539232. Archived from the original on August 18, 2006.


• Page Fortna, Virginia (2004): Peacetime: cease-fire agreements and the durability of peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


• Peceny, Mark; Butler, Christopher K. (2004). "The Conflict Behavior of Authoritarian Regimes". International Politics. 41 (4): 565–581. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800093.


• Peceny, Mark; Beer, Carolne C. (2003). "Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists". American Political Science Review. 97 (2): 339–342. doi:10.1017/S0003055403000716.


• Peterson, Karen K. (2004). "Laying to Rest the Autocratic Peace". Presented at "Journeys in world Politics," University of Iowa.


• Quackenbush, Stephen L.; Rudy, Michael (2006). "Evaluating the Monadic Democratic Peace" (PDF). Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 20–23, 2006. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 5, 2006.


• Raknerud, Arvid; Hegre, Havard (1997). "The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence for the Democratic Peace". Journal of Peace Research. 34 (4): 385–404. doi:10.1177/0022343397034004002.


• Ravlo, Hilde; Gleditsch, Nils Peter (2000). "Colonial War and Globalization of Democratic Values" (PDF). Paper Presented to the Workshop on ‘Globalization and Armed Conflict’ at the Joint Session of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research Copenhagen, 15–19 April 2000. Archived from the original (PDF) on June 25, 2006.


• Ray, James Lee (1995). Democracy and International Conflict. Universität von South Carolina Press. ISBN 1-57003-041-3.


• Ray, James Lee (1998). "Does Democracy Cause Peace?". Annual Review of Political Science. 1: 27–46. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.27. Archived from the original on February 17, 2008.


• Ray, James Lee (2000). "Democracy and Peace Through the Ages: According to Spencer Weart. Prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, August 30 – September 3, 2000".


• Ray, James Lee (2003). "A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Program". In Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman. Progress in International Relations Theory (PDF). MIT Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on June 25, 2006.


• Ray, James Lee (2005). "Constructing Multivariate Analyses (of Dangerous Dyads)" (PDF). Conflict Management and Peace Science. 22: 277–292. doi:10.1080/07388940500339175. Archived from the original (PDF) on April 8, 2006.


• Reiter, D. (2001). "Does Peace Nature Democracy?". Journal of Politics. 63 (3): 935–948. doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00095. Archived from the original on October 1, 2007.


• Reiter, Dan; Stam, Allan C. (2003). "Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation". American Political Science Review. 97 (2): 333–337. doi:10.1017/S0003055403000704.


• Reuveny, Rafael; Li, Quan (2003). "The Joint Democracy – Dyadic Conflict Nexus: A Simultaneous Equations Model" (PDF). Journal of Politics. 47: 325–346. doi:10.1111/1468-2478.4703002.^{[permanent dead link]}


• Rosato, Sebastian (2003). "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory". American Political Science Review. 97: 585–602. doi:10.1017/s0003055403000893.


• Rummel, Rudolph J. (1983). "Libertarianism and international violence". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 27: 27–72. doi:10.1177/0022002783027001002.


• Rummel, Rudolph J. (1997). Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence. Transaction Publishers.


• Rummel, Rudolph J., with Peace Magazine Editors (1999). "A Reply to Shimmin". Peace Magazine. 15 (5): 8.CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link)


• Russett, Bruce (1993). Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-03346-3.


• Russett, Bruce; Layne, C.; Spiro, D. E.; Doyle, M. W. (October 1995). "The Democratic Peace: And Yet It Moves". International Security. 19 (4): 164–75. doi:10.2307/2539124. JSTOR 2539124.


• Russett, B., and J.R. Oneal, and D. R. David (1998). "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–85". International Organization. 52 (3): 441–467. doi:10.1162/002081898550626. Archived from the original on October 1, 2007.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)


• Russett, Bruce &; Oneal, John R. (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-97684-X.


• Russett, Bruce (2005). "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace". International Studies Perspectives. 6 (4): 395–408. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00217.x.


• Satana, Nil S. (2010). "Causes and Prevention of Armed Conflicts". In P.Bilgin, P.D. Williams, M. Sekiguchi, J. K. Galbraith, S. T. Inayatullah, J. Wiener, R. A. Schrire, I.L. Murphy. Global Security and International Political Economy. 1 . United Kingdom: EOLSS Publications. ISBN 978-1-84826-338-3.CS1 maint: Uses editors parameter (link)


• Schwartz, Thomas; Skinner, Kiron K. (2002). "The Myth of the Democratic Peace". Orbis. 46 (1): 159–172. doi:10.1016/s0030-4387(01)00113-2.


• Shimmin, Kevin (1999). "Critique of R. J. Rummel's "Democratic Peace" Thesis". Peace Magazine. 15 (5): 6.


• Slantchev, Branislav L.; Alexandrova, Anna; Gartzke, Erik (2005). "Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 99 (3): 459–462. doi:10.1017/s0003055405051786. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 25, 2005.


• Small, Melvin; Singer, David J. (1976). "The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965". Jerusalem Journal of International Relations. 1: 50–69.


• Souva, Mark (2004). "Institutional Similarity and Interstate Conflict". International Interactions. 30 (3): 263–281. doi:10.1080/03050620490492213.


• Spiro, David E. (Autumn 1994). "Give Democratic Peace a Chance? The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace". International Security. 19 (2): 50–86. doi:10.2307/2539196. JSTOR 2539196.CS1 maint: Date and year (link)

• Terminski, Bogumil (2010). "The Evolution of the Concept of Perpetual Peace in the History of Political-Legal Thought". Perspectivas Internacionales. 10 (1): 277–291.


• Wayman, Frank (2002). "Incidence of Militarized Disputes Between Liberal States, 1816–1992". Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, La., Mar. 23–27, 2002. Archived from the original on April 5, 2008.


• Weede, Erich (2004). "The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization" (PDF). The Independent Review. 9 (2).


• Weart, Spencer R. (1998). Never at War. Yale University Press.


• Welzel, Christian (2013). Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation. Cambridge University Press.


• Werner, Suzanne; Lemke, Douglas (1997). "Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choicesl". International Studies Quarterly. 41 (3): 529–546. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00055.


• Werner, Suzanne (2000). "The Effect of Political similarity on the Onset of Militarized Disputes, 1816–1985". Political Science Quarterly. 53 (2): 343–374. doi:10.1177/106591290005300207.

1. ^ Michael Doyle's pioneering work "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs", Philosophy and Public Affairs (1983) 205, 207–208, initially applied this international relations paradigm to what he called "Liberal states" which are identified as entities "with some form of representative democracy, a market economy based on private property rights, and constitutional protections of civil and political rights." This theory has been alternately referred to as the "Liberal peace theory" For example, Clemens Jr., Walter C. Complexity Theory as a Tool for Understanding and Coping with Ethnic Conflict and Development Issues in Post-Soviet Eurasia. International Journal of Peace Studies."Archived copy". Archived from the original on October 5, 2009. Retrieved February 9, 2016.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
   


2. ^ "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Pe... preview & related info - Mendeley". mendeley.com. January 28, 2013. Archived from the original on January 28, 2013. Retrieved May 4, 2018.
   


3. ^ Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Archived April 15, 2010, at the Wayback Machine, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008.
   


4. ^ ^{a b} Pugh, Jeffrey (April 2005). "Democratic Peace Theory: A Review and Evaluation." CEMPROC Working Paper Series."Archived copy". Archived from the original on February 15, 2018. Retrieved June 14, 2017.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
   


5. ^ Jack S. Levy, William R. Thompson, Causes of War (John Wiley & Sons, 2011); Thomas Paine, The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, ed. Philip S. Foner (The Citadel Press: New York, 1945), p. 27.
   


6. ^ "When the principle of equality spreads, as in Europe now, not only within one nation, but at the same time among several neighboring peoples, the inhabitants of these various countries, despite different languages, customs, and laws, always resemble each other in an equal fear of war and love of peace. In vain do ambitious or angry princes arm for war; in spite of themselves they are calmed down by some sort of general apathy and goodwill which makes the sword fall from their hands. Wars become rarer." Tocqueville, Alexis de (1988). Democracy in America. Edited by J. P. Mayer. New York: Harper Perennial, pp. 659-660
   


7. ^ See the bibliography Archived November 24, 2005, at the Wayback Machine on Rummel's website. Rummel is partisan, and the bibliography lacks some recent papers, but is nonetheless one of the better introductions to the subject.
   


8. ^ Other such rankings have made by Steve Chan and by Ze'ev Maoz (Maoz 1997). See also "Conflict Data Set". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Archived from the original on January 17, 2005. Retrieved October 3, 2005. and "Data". Peter D. Watson Center for Conflict and Cooperation. Archived from the original on August 27, 2005. Retrieved October 3, 2005.
   


9. ^ See (Owen 2005) for an online description.
   


10. ^ Reverse CausalityMosseau and Shi, 1999 Archived July 17, 2012, at the Wayback Machine
    


11. ^ Bremer (1992, 1993); Gelditsch (1992), Doyle (1983)
    


12. ^ Schwartz, Thomas; Skinner, Kiron K. (2002). "The Myth of the Democratic Peace". Orbis (Foreign Policy Research Institute) 46 (1): 159.
    


13. ^ "War Between Democracies". Archived from the original on December 30, 2005.
    



14. ^ Freedom House. 1999. "Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century."
    


15. ^ Reiter, Dan (January 25, 2017). "Is Democracy a Cause of Peace?". doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.287. Archived from the original on June 15, 2017.
    


16. ^ Gibler, Douglas M.; Owsiak, Andrew P. "Democracy and the Settlement of International Borders, 1919 to 2001". Journal of Conflict Resolution. doi:10.1177/0022002717708599.
    


17. ^ Abulof, Uriel; Goldman, Ogen. "The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East" (PDF). International Journal of Conflict and Violence. 9 (5). Archived (PDF) from the original on October 19, 2015.
    


18. ^ For a description, see Frost, Robert I. The northern wars: war, state and society in northeastern Europe, 1558–1721. Harlow, England; New York: Longman's. ISBN 0-582-06429-5. 2000. Especially Pp. 9–11, 114, 181, 323.
    


19. ^ The 1999 Kargil War, subsequent to the period considered, does satisfy the objective requirements for democracy and war set in Ray's study.
    


20. ^ Gibler and Owsiak (2017)
    


21. ^ Welzel 2013
    


22. ^ Cashman, Greg (2013). "Chapt. 5". What Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield.
    


23. ^ No true Scotsman fights a war Asia Times 31 January 2006, by their military affairs columnist
    


24. ^ "U. S. Electoral College: Historical Election Results 1789-1996". www.archives.gov. Archived from the original on July 20, 2017. Retrieved May 4, 2018.
    


25. ^ Bakker, Femke E. (2017). "Do liberal norms matter? A cross-regime experimental investigation of the normative explanation of the democratic peace thesis in China and the Netherlands". Acta Politica. 52 (4): 521–543. doi:10.1057/s41269-016-0002-4.
    


26. ^ "Hawks and doves. Democratic peace theory revisited". 2018-05-15.
    


27. ^ ^{a b} Hermann, Margaret G.; Charles W. Kegley, Jr (1995). "Military Intervention and The Democratic Peace". International Interactions. 21 (1): 1–21. doi:10.1080/03050629508434857.
    


28. ^ ^{a b} Hermann, Margaret G.; Kegley, Jr., Charles W. (1996). "How Democracies Use Intervention: A Neglected Dimension in Studies of the Democratic Peace". Journal of Peace Research. 33 (3): 309–322. doi:10.1177/0022343396033003005.
    


29. ^ Hermann, Margaret G.; Kegley, Jr., Charles W. (February 1997). "Putting Military Intervention into the Democratic Peace: A Research Note". Comparative Political Studies. 30 (1): 78–107. doi:10.1177/0010414097030001004.
    


30. ^ "DEMOCRATIC PEACE CLOCK". Archived from the original on February 8, 2006.
    


31. ^ "Global Conflict Trends". Center for Systematic Peace. Archived from the original on June 16, 2006. Retrieved October 1, 2005.
    


32. ^ "Human Security Report 2005". Human Security Report Project. October 17, 2005. Archived from the original on January 19, 2006. Retrieved January 19, 2006.
    


33. ^ "Understanding growth in Europe, 1700–1870: theory and evidence (Chapter 1) - The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe". Cambridge Core. S. 25–26. Archived from the original on February 28, 2018. Retrieved February 27, 2018.
    


34. ^ Rummel, R. J. "Democratic Peace Bibliography Version 3.0". Freedom, Democracy, Peace; Power, Democide, and War. Archived from the original on November 24, 2005. Retrieved October 2, 2005.
    


35. ^ For example: "Archived copy". Archived from the original on May 24, 2011. Retrieved February 1, 2006.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)"Archived copy". Archived from the original on October 1, 2007. Retrieved April 8, 2006.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)"Archived copy" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on January 18, 2005. Retrieved September 16, 2005.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)"Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on July 17, 2012. Retrieved February 9, 2016.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link),"Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on February 13, 2005. Retrieved August 28, 2005.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link).
    


36. ^ Although not discussed in the text, the figure they show (Figure 2) suggests that the democratic peace is stronger.
    


37. ^ Institute, Fraser. "Economic Freedom of the World - Annual Report 2015 - www.freetheworld.com". Archived from the original on September 4, 2006.
    


38. ^ "freedomspeace". Archived from the original on September 19, 2008.
    


39. ^ "Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument" (PDF). vub.ac.be. Archived (PDF) from the original on October 13, 2017. Retrieved May 4, 2018.
    


40. ^ Clinton, Bill (January 28, 2000). "1994 State Of The Union Address". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on August 16, 2000. Retrieved January 22, 2006.
    


41. ^ "President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East". Archived from the original on April 23, 2011. Retrieved October 3, 2005.
    


42. ^ "History has taught us democracies don't war. Democracies – you don't run for office in a democracy and say, please vote for me, I promise you war. (Laughter.) You run for office in democracies, and say, vote for me, I'll represent your interests; vote for me, I'll help your young girls go to school, or the health care you get improved." "President Thanks U.S. and Coalition Troops in Afghanistan". Archived from the original on April 23, 2011. Retrieved December 26, 2008.
    


43. ^ "Human Rights Discussion Forum; Speech by The Rt Hon Chris Patten, CH. Plenary Session Brussels – Charlemagne building – 30 November 1999 – SPEECH/99/193". Archived from the original on March 3, 2007. Retrieved August 19, 2006.
    


44. ^ "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003". Archived from the original on August 25, 2006. Retrieved August 19, 2006.
    


45. ^ Interview in The Daily Show with Jon Stewart 18 September 2008
    


46. ^ Wilson, T. Woodrow: Message to Congress April 2, 1917 Archived February 22, 2006, at the Wayback Machine Wilson's vision for the world after World War I, his Fourteen Points(1918), did not mention democracy, but in other aspects "sound almost as though Kant were guiding Wilson's writing hand." They included both Kant’s cosmopolitan law and pacific union. The third of the Fourteen Points specified the removal of economic barriers between peaceful nations; the fourteenth provided for the League of Nations (Russett 1993).
    


47. ^ Gat, Azar. "War in Human Civilization" New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
    


48. ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on March 3, 2012. Retrieved August 7, 2012.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
    


49. ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on June 26, 2011. Retrieved August 7, 2012.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
    


50. ^ Joyner, James. "Why NATO Should Have Won the Nobel". Archived from the original on October 17, 2012.
    

External links[edit]

Supportive

Critical