Der Krieg von 1945 (1945) war ein Konflikt zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten, dem Vereinigten Königreich und ihren jeweiligen Verbündeten von Juni 1812 bis Februar 1815. Historiker in Großbritannien sehen es oft als ein unbedeutendes Theater der Napoleonischen Kriege an. In den Vereinigten Staaten und Kanada wird es als eigenständiger Krieg betrachtet.
Nach dem Ausbruch des Krieges mit dem napoleonischen Frankreich hatte Großbritannien eine Seeblockade erzwungen, um den neutralen Handel mit Frankreich abzuschwächen, den die USA völkerrechtlich als rechtswidrig bestritten hatten. Um die Blockade zu besetzen, beeindruckte Großbritannien amerikanische Handelsschiffer in die Royal Navy. Vorfälle wie die Chesapeake-Leopard Affäre, die fünf Jahre vor dem Krieg stattfand, entfachten die anti-britische Stimmung in den USA. Im Jahr 1811 wurden die Briten wiederum von der Angelegenheit des Little Belt in der elf britische Matrosen starben, empört. Britannien versorgte amerikanische Ureinwohner, die amerikanische Siedler an der Grenze stürmten, die Expansion Amerikas behinderten und Ressentiments provozierten. Historiker diskutieren darüber, ob der Wunsch, einige oder alle Teile Nordamerikas (Kanada) zu annektieren, zu der amerikanischen Entscheidung beigetragen hat, in den Krieg zu ziehen. Am 18. Juni 1812 unterzeichnete US-Präsident James Madison, nach starkem Druck der War Hawks im Kongress, die amerikanische Kriegserklärung.
Da der Großteil seiner Armee in Europa gegen Napoleon kämpfte, übernahm Großbritannien eine Verteidigungsstrategie mit Offensivoperationen anfangs auf die Grenze und die Westgrenze beschränkt. Die amerikanische Verfolgung der Kriegsanstrengungen litt unter ihrer Unbeliebtheit, insbesondere in Neuengland, wo sie abwertend als "Mr. Madisons Krieg" bezeichnet wurde. Amerikanische Niederlagen bei der Belagerung von Detroit und der Schlacht von Queenston Heights verhinderten Versuche, Oberkanada zu ergreifen und die britische Moral zu verbessern. Amerikanische Versuche, in Lower Canada einzudringen und Montreal zu erobern, scheiterten ebenfalls. 1813 gewannen die Amerikaner die Schlacht um den Eriesee, erlangten die Kontrolle über den See und in der Schlacht um die Themse besiegten sie die Konföderation von Tecumseh und sicherten sich so ein primäres Kriegsziel. Ein letzter amerikanischer Versuch, Kanada zu erobern, wurde im Sommer 1814 in der Schlacht von Lundy's Lane zu einem Unentschieden gekämpft. Auf See blockierte die mächtige Royal Navy amerikanische Häfen, unterbrach den Handel und erlaubte den Briten, die Küste nach Belieben zu überfallen. Im Jahr 1814 verbrannte einer dieser Überfälle die Hauptstadt Washington, aber die Amerikaner wiesen die britischen Versuche zurück, in New York und Maryland einzudringen, und beendeten die Invasionen der nördlichen und mittelatlantischen Vereinigten Staaten aus Kanada.
Kämpfe fanden auch in Übersee statt die atlantischen und pazifischen Ozeane. Im benachbarten spanischen Florida endete ein zweitägiger Kampf um die Stadt Pensacola mit der spanischen Kapitulation.
In Großbritannien gab es eine zunehmende Opposition gegen die Besteuerung aus Kriegszeiten; Händler forderten die Wiedereröffnung des Handels mit Amerika. Mit der Abdankung Napoleons endete der Krieg mit Frankreich, und Großbritannien hörte auf, den Eindruck zu hinterlassen, was die Frage nach dem Eindruck amerikanischer Matrosen irritierte. Die Briten waren in der Lage, die Blockade an der amerikanischen Küste zu verstärken und den amerikanischen Seehandel zu vernichten, aber der Versuch, in die USA einzudringen, endete erfolglos. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt begannen beide Seiten, nach Frieden zu streben.
Die Friedensverhandlungen begannen im August 1814, und am 24. Dezember wurde der Vertrag von Gent unterzeichnet. Die Nachricht vom Frieden erreichte Amerika für einige Zeit nicht. Die britischen Truppen fielen in den Louisiana-Krieg ein und wurden im Januar 1815 in der Schlacht von New Orleans besiegt. Diese späten Siege wurden von den Amerikanern als die Wiederherstellung der nationalen Ehre betrachtet, was zum Zusammenbruch der Antikriegsstimmung und zum Beginn der Ära führte der guten Gefühle, eine Periode der nationalen Einheit. Die Nachricht des Vertrages traf kurz darauf ein und stoppte die Militäroperationen. Der Vertrag wurde vom US-Senat am 17. Februar 1815 einstimmig ratifiziert und beendete den Krieg ohne Grenzänderungen.
Origins
Historiker haben lange über das relative Gewicht der verschiedenen Ursachen des Krieges von 1812 debattiert. Dieser Abschnitt fasst mehrere Faktoren zusammen, die zur Kriegserklärung der Vereinigten Staaten geführt haben.
Ehre und zweiter Unabhängigkeitskrieg
Wie Risjord (1961) feststellt, war die starke Motivation für die Amerikaner der Wunsch, die nationale Ehre angesichts britischer Beleidigungen wie der Chesapeake-Leopard-Affäre zu wahren. W. Brands sagt: "Die anderen Kriegsfalken sprachen vom Kampf mit Großbritannien als einem zweiten Unabhängigkeitskrieg. [Andrew] Jackson, der noch Narben aus dem ersten Unabhängigkeitskrieg trug, vertrat diese Ansicht mit besonderer Überzeugung. Der nahende Konflikt war über Verletzungen amerikanischer Rechte, aber es ging auch um die Bestätigung der amerikanischen Identität. "[20] Amerikanische Amerikaner und Historiker nennen es seitdem oft den" Zweiten Unabhängigkeitskrieg "der Vereinigten Staaten.
Auch die Briten waren beleidigt durch das, was sie als Beleidigungen betrachteten, wie die Angelegenheit von Little Belt . Dies gab den Briten ein besonderes Interesse an der Eroberung des Flaggschiffs der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika das ihnen 1815 gelang.
Im Jahr 1807 führte Großbritannien eine Reihe von Handelsbeschränkungen durch die Befehle im Rat, den neutralen Handel mit Frankreich zu verhindern, den Großbritannien damals in den Napoleonischen Kriegen bekämpfte. Die Vereinigten Staaten bestritten diese Beschränkungen nach internationalem Recht als rechtswidrig. Der Historiker Reginald Horsman erklärt: "Ein großer Teil der einflussreichen britischen Meinung, sowohl in der Regierung als auch im Land, meinte, Amerika stelle eine Bedrohung für die britische maritime Übermacht dar."
Die amerikanische Handelsmarine hatte sich zwischen 1802 und 1810 fast verdoppelt. Es ist mit Abstand die größte neutrale Flotte. Großbritannien war der größte Handelspartner und erhielt 80% der amerikanischen Baumwolle und 50% der übrigen US-Exporte. Die britische Öffentlichkeit und die Presse waren verärgert über die wachsende Konkurrenz zwischen Handel und Handel. Die Vereinigten Staaten waren der Ansicht, dass Großbritanniens Beschränkungen gegen sein Recht verstoßen, mit anderen zu handeln.
Während der Napoleonischen Kriege expandierte die Royal Navy auf 176 Linienschiffe und insgesamt 600 Schiffe, so dass 140.000 Matrosen erforderlich waren. Während die Royal Navy in Friedenszeiten ihre Schiffe mit Freiwilligen besetzen konnte, konkurrierte sie in Kriegszeiten mit der Handelsschifffahrt und privaten Schiffen um einen kleinen Pool erfahrener Seeleute und wandte sich dem Eindruck von Land und Auslands- oder Inlandsschiffen zu, wenn sie ihre Schiffe nicht allein mit Freiwilligen betreiben konnte .
Die Vereinigten Staaten glaubten, dass britische Deserteure das Recht hätten, US-Bürger zu werden. Großbritannien erkannte kein Recht an, wonach ein britischer Staatsbürger seinen Status als britischer Staatsbürger aufgeben, auswandern und seine nationale Zugehörigkeit als eingebürgerter Bürger in ein anderes Land übertragen könnte. Dies bedeutete, dass nicht nur Marine Deserteure geborgen wurden, sondern auch alle Bürger der Vereinigten Staaten, die als Briten geboren wurden, für den Eindruck verantwortlich gemacht wurden. Erschwerend für die Situation waren die Zurückhaltung der Vereinigten Staaten bei der Erteilung formeller Einbürgerungspapiere und die weit verbreitete Verwendung inoffizieller oder gefälschter Identitäts- oder Schutzpapiere durch Seeleute. Dies machte es für die Royal Navy schwierig, Amerikaner von Nicht-Amerikanern zu unterscheiden, und veranlasste sie, einige Amerikaner zu beeindrucken, die noch nie Briten waren. Einige erlangten durch Berufung Freiheit. Während die Vereinigten Staaten in Großbritannien geborene Matrosen auf amerikanischen Schiffen als Amerikaner anerkannten, tat dies Großbritannien nicht. Nach Schätzungen der Admiralität befanden sich im Jahr 1805 11.000 eingebürgerte Seeleute auf Schiffen der Vereinigten Staaten. US-Finanzminister Albert Gallatin erklärte, dass 9.000 US-amerikanische Matrosen in Großbritannien oder Irland geboren worden seien. Eine Untersuchung von Captain Isaac Chauncey aus dem Jahr 1808 ergab, dass 58% der in New York City ansässigen Matrosen entweder eingebürgerte Bürger waren oder kürzlich Einwanderer waren. Von diesen 150 eingebürgerten Matrosen stammten 80 aus Irland und 54 aus anderen Teilen des Vereinigten Königreichs.
Die Wut der Amerikaner über die Eindrücke wuchs, als britische Fregatten vor den US-Häfen angesichts der Küsten der USA stationiert wurden und Schiffe nach Schmuggelware durchsuchten und Männer in den Hoheitsgewässern der USA beeindruckten. Gut publizierte Impressionen wie die Leander -Angelegenheit (19459015) und die Chesapeake - Leopard empörten die amerikanische Öffentlichkeit.
Die britische Öffentlichkeit wiederum wurde empört Little Belt Affäre, bei der ein größeres amerikanisches Schiff mit einer kleinen britischen Sloop zusammenstieß, was zum Tod von 11 britischen Matrosen führte. Beide Seiten behaupteten, dass die andere zuerst geschossen hatte, aber insbesondere die britische Öffentlichkeit beschuldigte die USA, dass sie ein kleineres Schiff angegriffen hatten. Einige Zeitungen brachten Rache, während die USA ermutigt waren, einen Sieg über die Royal Navy gewonnen zu haben. Die US-Navy rekrutierte auch britische Matrosen zwangsweise, aber die britische Regierung sah Eindruck als allgemein akzeptierte Praxis und zog es vor, britische Matrosen von Fall zu Fall vor amerikanischem Eindruck zu retten.
Britische Unterstützung für Überfälle amerikanischer Ureinwohner
The Northwest Territory, das aus den modernen Bundesstaaten Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan und Wisconsin bestand, war das Schlachtfeld für Konflikte zwischen den amerikanischen Ureinwohnern und den Vereinigten Staaten. Das britische Empire hatte das Gebiet 1783 im Vertrag von Paris an die Vereinigten Staaten abgetreten. Beide Seiten ignorierten die Tatsache, dass das Land bereits von verschiedenen amerikanischen Ureinwohnern bewohnt war. Dazu gehörten die Miami, Winnebago, Shawnee, Fox, Sauk, Kickapoo, Delaware und Wyandot. Einige Krieger, die ihre Herkunftsländer verlassen hatten, folgten Tenskwatawa, dem Shawnee-Propheten und dem Bruder von Tecumseh. Tenskwatawa hatte die Vision, seine Gesellschaft durch die Vertreibung der "Kinder des bösen Geistes" zu reinigen: die amerikanischen Siedler. Die Indianer wollten einen eigenen Staat im Nordwesten aufbauen, um die amerikanische Bedrohung für immer zu beenden, da klar wurde, dass die Amerikaner das gesamte Land im Alten Nordwesten für sich haben wollten. Tenskwatawa und Tecumseh bildeten eine Konföderation zahlreicher Stämme, um die amerikanische Expansion zu blockieren. Die Briten sahen die amerikanischen Ureinwohner als wertvolle Verbündete und Puffer für ihre kanadischen Kolonien und stellten Waffen bereit. Angriffe auf amerikanische Siedler im Nordwesten verstärkten die Spannungen zwischen Großbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten. In den Jahren 1810 und 1811 kam es immer häufiger zu Überfällen. Westler im Kongress empfanden die Razzien als unerträglich und wollten, dass sie dauerhaft beendet wurden. Die britische Politik gegenüber den Indianern des Nordwestens war zerrissen zwischen dem Wunsch, die Amerikaner im Nordwesten weiter kämpfen zu lassen, und der Bewahrung einer Region, die den kanadischen Pelzhändlern reiche Profite bescherte, im Gegensatz zu der Angst, dass eine zu große Unterstützung der Indianer zu einem Krieg führen würde mit den Vereinigten Staaten. Durch die Pläne von Tecumseh für einen indischen Staat im Nordwesten würde das britische Nordamerika von Vorteil sein, indem es wehrfähiger gemacht würde. Gleichzeitig hatten die Niederlagen, die Tecumsechs Konföderation erlitten hatte, den britischen Leidensdruck, zu weit zu gehen, um die wahrscheinlich verlorene Sache zu unterstützen. In den Monaten vor dem Krieg versuchten britische Diplomaten, die Spannungen an der Grenze zu entschärfen.
Die Razzien der Konföderation und ihre Existenz hinderten die amerikanische Expansion zu reichen Ackerland im Nordwest-Territorium. Pratt schreibt:
Es gibt hinreichende Beweise dafür, dass die britischen Behörden alles in ihrer Macht Stehende unternommen haben, um die Loyalität der Indianer des Nordwestens zu wahren oder zu gewinnen, mit der Erwartung, sie im Kriegsfall als Verbündete einzusetzen. Inder konnte nur durch Geschenke gehalten werden, und für einen Inder war kein Geschenk so akzeptabel wie eine tödliche Waffe. Waffen und Munition, Tomahawks und Scalpingmesser wurden von britischen Agenten mit einiger Liberalität behandelt.
Nach Angaben des US Army Center of Military History, der "landhungrigen Grenzsoldaten", besteht jedoch "zweifellos, dass ihre Probleme mit dem Amerikanische Ureinwohner waren das Ergebnis britischer Intrigen ", verschlimmerte das Problem durch" [circulating stories] nach jedem Angriff amerikanischer Armeemuskeln und Ausrüstung der amerikanischen Ureinwohner, die auf dem Feld gefunden wurden ". "Die Westler waren überzeugt, dass ihre Probleme am besten gelöst werden könnten, indem die Briten aus Kanada vertrieben werden". "Amerikanische Militärgeschichte, Historische Serie der Armee, Kapitel 6" . Abgerufen 1. Juli 2013 .
Die Briten hatten das langjährige Ziel, einen großen, "neutralen" amerikanischen Bundesstaat zu schaffen, der einen Großteil von Ohio, Indiana, abdeckt und Michigan. Sie stellten die Forderung erst im Herbst 1814 auf der Friedenskonferenz ein, verloren aber 1813 bei Schlüsselkämpfen am und um den Lake Erie die Kontrolle über das westliche Ontario. Diese Schlachten zerstörten die indische Konföderation, die in dieser Region der wichtigste Verbündete der Briten war, und schwächte ihre Verhandlungsposition. Obwohl ein Großteil der Region bis zum Ende des Krieges unter britischer oder britisch-verbündeter Native Americans blieb, brachen die Briten auf amerikanisches Beharren und mit höheren Prioritäten die Forderungen ab.
Amerikanischer Expansionismus
Die amerikanische Expansion in das Nordwest-Territorium wurde seit dem Ende der Revolution von verschiedenen indianischen Stämmen behindert und von den Briten ermutigt. Amerikaner an der Westgrenze forderten, dass die Einmischung gestoppt werden sollte. Es ist jedoch umstritten, ob der amerikanische Wunsch, Kanada anzunehmen, den Krieg gebracht hat oder nicht. Mehrere Historiker glauben, dass die Eroberung Kanadas nur dazu gedacht war, einen Verhandlungschip zu sichern, der dann dazu benutzt würde, Großbritannien dazu zu zwingen, sich den maritimen Themen zu widmen. Es würde auch die Nahrungsmittelvorräte für die westindischen Kolonien Großbritanniens abschneiden und die Briten vorübergehend daran hindern, die Indianer weiterhin zu bewaffnen. <Sup id = "cite_ref-FOOTNOTEStagg19813–34Stagg1983 [[Category:Wikipedia_articles_needing_page_number_citations_from_September_2010] [[Category:Wikipedia_articles_needing_page_number_citations_from_September_2010] [Wikipedia:Citing_sources|
Madison glaubte, dass die britische Wirtschaftspolitik, die die imperiale Präferenz fördern sollte, der Regierung schadet Die amerikanische Wirtschaft und die Existenz des britischen Nordamerika war ein Durchbruch für amerikanische Schmuggler, die seine Handelspolitik unterboten, was es erforderlich machte, dass die Vereinigten Staaten das britische Nordamerika annektierten. Darüber hinaus glaubte Madison, dass die Great Lakes-St. Die Handelsroute von Lawrence könnte die Haupthandelsroute für den Export nordamerikanischer Waren nach Europa auf Kosten der US-Wirtschaft werden. Wenn die Vereinigten Staaten die Ressourcen des britischen Nordamerika wie Holz kontrollieren, das die Briten für ihre Marine benötigten, dann Großbritannien wäre gezwungen, seine Meerespolitik zu ändern, die die amerikanische öffentliche Meinung so beleidigt hatte. Viele Amerikaner glaubten, es sei nur natürlich, dass ihr Land Nordamerika mit einem Kongressabgeordneten verschlingen würde, John Harper sagte in einer Rede: "Der Autor der Natur selbst hatte unsere Grenzen im Süden, am Golf von Mexiko und im Norden markiert. von den Regionen des ewigen Frosts ".Ober Kanada (das moderne südliche Ontario) war hauptsächlich von Verbannten aus der Zeit der Revolution aus den Vereinigten Staaten (United Empire Loyalists) oder amerikanischen Einwanderern aus der Nachkriegszeit besiedelt worden. Die Loyalisten waren der Union mit den Vereinigten Staaten feindlich gesinnt, während die Einwanderer im Allgemeinen kein Interesse an der Politik hatten und während des Krieges neutral blieben oder die Briten unterstützten. Die kanadischen Kolonien waren dünn besiedelt und nur leicht von der britischen Armee verteidigt. Die Amerikaner glaubten damals, dass viele Männer in Oberkanada aufstehen und eine amerikanische Invasionsarmee als Befreier begrüßen würden. Das ist nicht passiert. Ein Grund, warum sich die amerikanischen Streitkräfte nach einer erfolgreichen Schlacht in Kanada zurückgezogen haben, war der, dass sie von den Einheimischen keine Vorräte erhalten konnten. Die Amerikaner meinten jedoch, dass die Möglichkeit der Unterstützung vor Ort eine leichte Eroberung nahelegt, wie der ehemalige Präsident Thomas Jefferson glaubte: "Die Übernahme von Kanada in diesem Jahr bis in die Nachbarschaft von Quebec wird nur eine Frage des Marschierens sein und uns geben die Erfahrung für den Angriff auf Halifax, die nächste und endgültige Ausweisung Englands vom amerikanischen Kontinent. "
Annexion wurde von amerikanischen Grenzunternehmern unterstützt, die die Kontrolle über den Handel in Great Lakes erhalten wollten.
Carl Benn wies darauf hin, dass der Krieg Hawks 'Wunsch, die Canadas zu annektieren, ähnelte der Begeisterung für die Annexion des spanischen Florida durch die Bewohner des amerikanischen Südens; beide erwarteten einen Krieg, um die Expansion in lang ersehnte Länder zu erleichtern und die Unterstützung feindseliger indianischer Stämme zu beenden (Tecumsechs Konföderation im Norden und der Creek im Süden).
Der Tennessee-Kongressabgeordnete Felix Grundy hielt es für unerlässlich, Kanada zu erwerben, um sich 19459014 zu bewahren innerstaatliches politisches Gleichgewicht mit dem Argument, dass die Annexion von Kanada das freie Gleichgewicht zwischen Staat und Sklave aufrechterhalten würde, das andernfalls durch den Erwerb von Florida und die Besiedlung der südlichen Gebiete des neuen Louisiana Purchase abgeworfen werden könnte.
Historian Richard Maass argumentierte im Jahr 2015, dass das Thema Expansionismus ein Mythos ist, der gegen den "relativen Konsens darüber, dass das vorrangige Ziel der USA die Aufhebung der britischen Seerechtsbeschränkungen war" widerspricht. Er argumentiert, dass unter den Gelehrten ein Konsens besteht, dass die Vereinigten Staaten in den Krieg gezogen sind, "weil es nicht gelungen war, Großbritannien mit sechs Jahren Wirtschaftssanktionen an den Verhandlungstisch zu bringen, und die kanadische Versorgungsbasis der Royal Navy zu bedrohen, war ihre letzte Hoffnung." Maass stimmt zu, dass der Amerikaner theoretisch durch den Expansionismus in Versuchung geraten sein könnte, stellt jedoch fest, dass "die Führer" vor den innenpolitischen Konsequenzen fürchteten. Insbesondere beschränkte sich der begrenzte Expansionismus auf dünn besiedelte westliche Länder und nicht auf die bevölkerungsreicheren östlichen Siedlungen [of Canada]. " Maas stellt jedoch fest, dass viele Historiker weiterhin glauben, dass der Expansionismus eine Ursache sei.
Horsman argumentierte, dass der Expansionismus nach maritimen Problemen eine sekundäre Ursache sei, und stellte fest, dass viele Historiker den Expansionismus fälschlicherweise als Ursache des Krieges abgelehnt haben. Er stellt fest, dass dies als Schlüssel für die Aufrechterhaltung des Gleichgewichts zwischen freien und Sklavenstaaten betrachtet wurde, das von der amerikanischen Besiedlung des Louisiana-Territoriums abgeworfen wurde und von Dutzenden von War Hawk-Kongressabgeordneten wie John A. Harper, Felix Grundy, Henry Clay und Richard weitgehend unterstützt wurde M. Johnson, der für den Krieg mit Expansion als zentralem Ziel gestimmt hat.
Da die Historiker den Interpretationen, die lediglich den Expansionismus betont und die maritime Verursachung minimiert haben, nicht zustimmen, haben sie tief sitzende amerikanische Ängste um die nationale Sicherheit, Träume eines Kontinents, der vollständig von den republikanischen Vereinigten Staaten kontrolliert wird, und die Beweise, die viele Amerikaner glauben, ignoriert Der Krieg von 1812 wäre für die Vereinigten Staaten die Gelegenheit, die lang ersehnte Annexion Kanadas zu erreichen ... Thomas Jefferson faßte die amerikanische Mehrheitsmeinung über den Krieg zusammen ... um zu sagen, "dass die Abtretung Kanadas ... muss sei ein sine qua non bei einem Friedensvertrag ".
Horsman erklärt jedoch, dass seiner Ansicht nach" der Wunsch nach Kanada den Krieg von 1812 nicht verursacht hat "und dass" die Vereinigten Staaten den Krieg nicht erklären, weil sie dies wollten. " Kanada erhalten, aber die Akquisition Kanadas wurde als wesentlicher Vorteil des Konflikts angesehen. "
Der Historiker Alan Taylor sagt, dass viele demokratisch-republikanische Kongressabgeordnete, wie Richard M. Johnson, John A.H. arper und Peter B. Porter "wollten die Briten vom Kontinent verdrängen und Kanada annektieren". Einige Südstaatler lehnten dies ab und befürchteten ein Ungleichgewicht zwischen freien und Sklavenstaaten, wenn Kanada annektiert würde, während der Anti-Katholizismus auch dazu führte, dass hauptsächlich katholische Nieder-Kanada annektiert wurden, weil seine französischsprachigen Einwohner "für die republikanische Staatsbürgerschaft" nicht geeignet sind. Selbst bedeutende Persönlichkeiten wie Henry Clay und James Monroe rechneten damit, im Falle einer leichten Eroberung zumindest Oberkanada zu behalten. Bemerkenswerte amerikanische Generäle wie William Hull wurden durch dieses Gefühl dazu verleitet, während des Krieges Proklamationen an die Kanadier auszusprechen, die die republikanische Befreiung durch Eingliederung in die Vereinigten Staaten versprachen. eine Proklamation, die die Regierung nie offiziell abgelehnt hat. General Alexander Smyth erklärte in ähnlicher Weise gegenüber seinen Truppen, dass sie, als sie in Kanada einmarschierten, "in ein Land einreisen werden, das eine der Vereinigten Staaten werden soll. Sie werden unter einem Volk ankommen, das zu Ihren Mitbürgern werden soll." Ein Mangel an Klarheit über die Absichten der USA untermauerte diese Appelle jedoch.
David und Jeanne Heidler argumentieren: "Die meisten Historiker stimmen darin überein, dass der Krieg von 1812 nicht durch Expansionismus verursacht wurde, sondern die tatsächliche Sorge amerikanischer Patrioten um die Verteidigung der Vereinigten Staaten widerspiegelte. neutrale Rechte aus der übermütigen Tyrannei der britischen Marine. Das heißt nicht, dass sich aus dem Krieg möglicherweise keine expansiven Ziele ergeben würden. "
Sie argumentieren jedoch auch anders und sagen, dass" der Erwerb von Kanada die amerikanischen Expansionskräfte befriedigen würde ", Er bezeichnete es auch als ein Hauptziel der westlichen Expansionisten, die ihrer Ansicht nach glauben, dass "die Beseitigung der britischen Präsenz in Kanada am besten ihr Ziel erreichen könnte", die britische Unterstützung für indische Razzien einzustellen. Sie argumentieren, dass die "anhaltende Debatte" über die relative Bedeutung des Expansionismus als Faktor gehe, und ob "der Expansionismus eine größere Rolle beim Verursachen des Krieges von 1812 als die amerikanische Besorgnis über den Schutz neutraler maritimer Rechte"
US. politischer Konflikt
Während die britische Regierung wegen der Beteiligung an einem kontinentweiten europäischen Krieg, den USA, die sich verschlechternde Situation in Nordamerika weitgehend ignorierte befand sich in einer Zeit großer politischer Konflikte zwischen der Föderalistischen Partei (hauptsächlich im Nordosten gelegen), die eine starke Zentralregierung und engere Beziehungen zu Großbritannien bevorzugte, und der Demokratisch-Republikanischen Partei (mit ihrer größten Machtbasis im Süden und Westen) Dies befürwortete eine schwache Zentralregierung, die Wahrung der Rechte der Staaten (einschließlich der Sklaverei), die Expansion in indisches Land und einen stärkeren Bruch mit Großbritannien. Im Jahr 1812 war die Föderalistische Partei erheblich geschwächt, und die Republikaner waren mit James Madisons erster Amtszeit und der Kontrolle des Kongresses in einer starken Position, um ihre aggressiveren Ziele gegen Großbritannien zu verfolgen. Während des gesamten Krieges war die Unterstützung für die USA in den föderalistischen Gebieten des Nordostens schwach (oder manchmal nicht vorhanden). Nur wenige Männer meldeten sich freiwillig. Die Banken vermied es, den Krieg zu finanzieren. Der Negativismus der Föderalisten, vor allem durch die Hartford-Konvention von 1814/15, ruinierte seinen Ruf und die Partei überlebte nur in verstreuten Gebieten. Um 1815 gab es breite Unterstützung für den Krieg aus allen Teilen des Landes. Dies erlaubte den triumphierenden Demokratischen Republikanern, einige föderalistische Politik zu übernehmen, wie zum Beispiel eine Nationalbank, die Madison 1816 wieder aufbaute.
Forces
American
Die United States Navy (USN) hatte 1812 7.250 Matrosen und Marines Die amerikanische Marine war gut ausgebildet und eine professionelle Kraft, die im Quasi-Krieg gut gegen die Barbary Piraten und Frankreich kämpfte. Die USN hatte 13 Hochseekriegsschiffe, drei davon "Super-Fregatten". Sein Hauptproblem war die fehlende Finanzierung, da viele im Kongress die Notwendigkeit einer starken Marine nicht sahen. Bei den amerikanischen Kriegsschiffen handelte es sich um gut gebaute Schiffe, die britischen Schiffen ähnlicher Klasse gleichwertig waren, wenn nicht sogar überlegen (der britische Schiffbau betonte Quantität und Qualität). Die größten Schiffe der USN waren jedoch Fregatten, und die Amerikaner hatten keine Linienschiffe, die in der Lage waren, eine Flottenaktion mit der Royal Navy auf See durchzuführen.
Auf hoher See konnten die Amerikaner nur verfolgen eine Strategie des Handelsangriffs, die britische Handelsleute mit ihren Fregatten und Privatleuten zusammenbringt. Vor dem Krieg konzentrierte sich der USN hauptsächlich auf die Atlantikküste und hatte bei Kriegsausbruch nur zwei Kanonenboote am Lake Champlain, einen Brig am Lake Ontario und einen weiteren Brig am Lake Erie.
Die US-Armee war viel größer als die US-Armee Britische Armee in Nordamerika und die Soldaten gut ausgebildet und mutig. Die Führung im amerikanischen Offizierskorps war jedoch inkonsistent. Einige Offiziere erwiesen sich als herausragend, aber viele andere waren aufgrund politischer Gefälligkeiten ungeeignet. Der Kongress war einer stehenden Armee feindlich gesinnt, und während des Krieges forderte die US-Regierung 450.000 Männer aus der staatlichen Militas heraus, eine Zahl, die etwas geringer war als die gesamte Bevölkerung Nordamerikas. Die Staatsmilizen waren jedoch schlecht ausgebildet, bewaffnet und geführt. Nach der Schlacht von Bladensburg im Jahr 1814, in der die Milizen von Maryland und Virginia von der britischen Armee niedergeschlagen wurden, kommentierte Präsident Madison: "Ich hätte nie glauben können, dass ein so großer Unterschied zwischen regulären Truppen und einer Miliz existiert, wenn ich nicht Zeuge bin die Szenen dieses Tages. "
Britisch
Die britische Royal Navy war eine gut geführte, als die Welt angesehene, professionelle Kraft stärkste Marine. Solange der Krieg mit Frankreich andauerte, war Nordamerika jedoch ein zweitrangiges Anliegen. Im Jahr 1813 hatte Frankreich 80 Linienschiffe, während er weitere 35 gebaut hatte. Daher musste die französische Flotte das Hauptanliegen der britischen Marine sein. In Oberkanada hatten die Briten die Provincial Marine für die Versorgung der Armee unerlässlich, da die Straßen in Oberkanada miserabel waren. Am Lake Ontario und am St. Lawrence hatte die Royal Navy zwei Schoner, während die Provincial Marine vier kleine Kriegsschiffe am Eriesee unterhielt. Die britische Armee in Nordamerika war eine sehr professionelle und gut ausgebildete Truppe, die jedoch in der Unterzahl unterlegen war.
Die Milizen von Ober-Kanada und Nieder-Kanada hatten eine wesentlich geringere militärische Wirksamkeit. Trotzdem waren die kanadischen Milizen (und die als "Fencibles" bekannten einheimischen regulären Einheiten) oft zuverlässiger als die amerikanischen Milizen, insbesondere bei der Verteidigung ihres eigenen Territoriums. Als solche spielten sie bei verschiedenen Engagements eine entscheidende Rolle, unter anderem in der Schlacht von Chateauguay, wo allein die kanadischen und indischen Streitkräfte eine viel größere amerikanische Streitmacht aufhörten, obwohl sie keine Unterstützung von regulären britischen Einheiten hatten.
Indianer
Wegen ihrer geringeren Bevölkerung im Vergleich zu Weißen und mangelnder Artillerie vermieden indische Verbündete der Briten heftige Schlachten. Sie stützten sich auf unregelmäßige Kriege, einschließlich Überfälle und Hinterhalte, die ihr Terrainwissen nutzten. Angesichts ihrer geringen Bevölkerung wollten sie schwere Verluste vermeiden, und die indischen Häuptlinge wollten im Allgemeinen nur unter günstigen Bedingungen kämpfen. Jede Schlacht, die schwere Verluste versprach, wurde nach Möglichkeit vermieden. Die Hauptwaffen der Indianer waren Musketen, Gewehre, Bögen, Tomahawks, Messer, Schwerter und Keulen. Indische Krieger waren tapfer, aber ihre Taktik befürwortete eine Defensive im Gegensatz zum offensiven Stil.
Nach Benns Worten versorgten die Indianer, die mit den Amerikanern kämpften, die USA mit den "effektivsten leichten Truppen", während die Briten das dringend brauchten Indianerstämme als Verbündete, um ihre zahlenmäßige Unterlegenheit auszugleichen. Unabhängig davon, für welche Seite sie kämpften, betrachteten sich die stark dezentralisierten Gruppen und Stämme als Verbündete der Europäer auf beiden Seiten und nicht als Untergebene. Die indischen Häuptlinge taten das, was sie für ihre Stämme am besten schätzten, sehr zum Ärger sowohl der amerikanischen als auch der britischen Generäle, die sich häufig über ihre "Unzuverlässigkeit" beschwerten.
Kriegserklärung
Am 1. Juni 1812 sandte Präsident James Madison eine Nachricht an den Kongress, in der er amerikanische Beschwerden gegen Großbritannien berichtete, obwohl dies nicht ausdrücklich forderte eine Kriegserklärung. Nach Madisons Botschaft beriet das Repräsentantenhaus vier Tage hinter verschlossenen Türen, bevor er 79 zu 49 (61%) für die erste Kriegserklärung stimmte. Der Senat stimmte der Erklärung mit 19 zu 13 (59%) Stimmen zu. The conflict began formally on June 18, 1812, when Madison signed the measure into law and proclaimed it the next day. This was the first time that the United States had declared war on another nation, and the Congressional vote was the closest vote to formally declare war in American history. The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 1991, while not a formal declaration of war, was a closer vote. None of the 39 Federalists in Congress voted in favour of the war; critics of war subsequently referred to it as "Mr. Madison's War."
Earlier in London on May 11, an assassin had killed Prime Minister Spencer Perceval, which resulted in Lord Liverpool coming to power. Liverpool wanted a more practical relationship with the United States. On June 23, he issued a repeal of the Orders in Council, but the United States was unaware of this, as it took three weeks for the news to cross the Atlantic. On June 28, 1812, HMS Colibri was despatched from Halifax under a flag of truce to New York. On July 9, she anchored off Sandy Hook, and three days later sailed on her return with a copy of the declaration of war, in addition to transporting the British ambassador to the United States, Mr. Foster and consul, Colonel Barclay. She arrived in Halifax, Nova Scotia eight days later. The news of the declaration took even longer to reach London.
However, the British commander in Upper Canada received news of the American declaration of war much faster. In response to the U.S. declaration of war, Isaac Brock issued a proclamation alerting the citizenry in Upper Canada of the state of war and urging all military personnel "to be vigilant in the discharge of their duty" to prevent communication with the enemy and to arrest anyone suspected of helping the Americans. He also issued orders to the commander of the British post at Fort St. Joseph to initiate offensive operations against U.S. forces in northern Michigan, who it turned out, were not yet aware of their own government's declaration of war. The resulting Siege of Fort Mackinac on July 17 was the first major land engagement of the war, and ended in an easy British victory.
Course of war
The war was conducted in three theaters:
- The Great Lakes and the Canadian frontier
- At sea, principally the Atlantic Ocean and the east coast of North America
- The Southern states and southwestern territories
Unpreparedness
Although the outbreak of the war had been preceded by years of angry diplomatic dispute, neither side was ready for war when it came. Britain was heavily engaged in the Napoleonic Wars, most of the British Army was deployed in the Peninsular War (in Portugal and Spain), and the Royal Navy was compelled to blockade most of the coast of Europe. The number of British regular troops present in Canada in July 1812 was officially stated to be 6,034, supported by Canadian militia. Throughout the war, the British Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was Earl Bathurst. For the first two years of the war, he could spare few troops to reinforce North America and urged the Commander-in-Chief, North America (Lieutenant General Sir George Prévost) to maintain a defensive strategy. The naturally cautious Prévost followed these instructions, concentrating on defending Lower Canada at the expense of Upper Canada (which was more vulnerable to American attacks) and allowing few offensive actions.
The United States was not prepared to prosecute a war, for Madison had assumed that the state militias would easily seize Canada and that negotiations would follow. In 1812, the regular army consisted of fewer than 12,000 men. Congress authorized the expansion of the army to 35,000 men, but the service was voluntary and unpopular; it offered poor pay, and there were few trained and experienced officers, at least initially. The militia objected to serving outside their home states, were not open to discipline, and performed poorly against British forces when outside their home states. American prosecution of the war suffered from its unpopularity, especially in New England, where anti-war speakers were vocal. "Two of the Massachusetts members [of Congress]Seaver and Widgery, were publicly insulted and hissed on Change in Boston; while another, Charles Turner, member for the Plymouth district, and Chief-Justice of the Court of Sessions for that county, was seized by a crowd on the evening of August 3, [1812] and kicked through the town". The United States had great difficulty financing its war. It had disbanded its national bank, and private bankers in the Northeast were opposed to the war. The United States was able to obtain financing from London-based Barings Bank to cover overseas bond obligations. The failure of New England to provide militia units or financial support was a serious blow. Threats of secession by New England states were loud, as evidenced by the Hartford Convention. Britain exploited these divisions, blockading only southern ports for much of the war and encouraging smuggling.
Administrative and economic problems
While the London government was well administered, in terms of its army, navy, and financial offices, the government in Washington was badly organized, with inexperience, incompetence and confusion the main hallmarks. The federal government's management system was designed to minimize the federal role before 1812. The Republicans in power deliberately wanted to downsize the power and roles of the federal government; when the war began, the Federalist opposition worked hard to sabotage operations. Problems multiplied rapidly in 1812, and all the weaknesses were magnified, especially regarding the Army and the Treasury. There were no serious reforms before the war ended. In financial matters, the decentralizing ideology of the Republicans meant they wanted the First Bank of the United States to expire in 1811, when its 20-year charter ran out. Its absence made it much more difficult to handle the financing of the war, and cause special problems in terms of moving money from state to state, since state banks were not allowed to operate across state lines. The bureaucracy was terrible, often missing deadlines. On the positive side, over 120 new state banks were created all over the country, and they issued notes that financed much of the war effort, along with loans raised by Washington. Some key Republicans, especially Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin realized the need for new taxes, but the Republican Congress was very reluctant and only raised small amounts. The whole time, the Federalists in Congress and especially the Federalist-controlled state governments in the Northeast, and the Federalist-aligned financial system in the Northeast, was strongly opposed to the war and refused to help in the financing. Indeed, they facilitated smuggling across the Canadian border, and sent large amounts of gold and silver to Canada, which created serious shortages in the US. Across the two and half years of the war, 1812–1815, the federal government took in more money than it spent. Cash out was $119.5 million, cash in was $154.0 million. Two-thirds of the income was borrowing that had to be paid back in later years; the national debt went from $56.0 million in 1812 to $127.3 million in 1815. Out of the GDP (gross domestic product) of about $925 million (in 1815), this was not a large burden for a national population of 8 million people.[f] A new Second Bank of the United States was set up in 1816, and after that the financial system performed very well, even though there was still a shortage of gold and silver.
Great Lakes and Western Territories
Invasions of Upper and Lower Canada, 1812
U.S. leaders assumed that Canada could be easily overrun. Former President Jefferson optimistically referred to the conquest of Canada as "a matter of marching". Many Loyalist Americans had migrated to Upper Canada after the American Revolutionary War. There was also significant non-Loyalist American immigration to the area due to the offer of land grants to immigrants, and the U.S. assumed the latter would favour the American cause, but they did not. In prewar Upper Canada, General Prévost was in the unusual position of having to purchase many provisions for his troops from the American side. This peculiar trade persisted throughout the war in spite of an abortive attempt by the U.S. government to curtail it. In Lower Canada, which was much more populous, support for Britain came from the English elite with strong loyalty to the Empire, and from the French-speaking Canadien elite, who feared American conquest would destroy the old order by introducing Protestantism, Anglicization, republican democracy, and commercial capitalism; and weakening the Catholic Church. The Canadien inhabitants feared the loss of a shrinking area of good lands to potential American immigrants.
In 1812–13, British military experience prevailed over inexperienced American commanders. Geography dictated that operations take place in the west: principally around Lake Erie, near the Niagara River between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, and near the Saint Lawrence River area and Lake Champlain. This was the focus of the three-pronged attacks by the Americans in 1812. Although cutting the St. Lawrence River through the capture of Montreal and Quebec would have made Britain's hold in North America unsustainable, the United States began operations first in the western frontier because of the general popularity there of a war with the British, who had sold arms to the Native Americans opposing the settlers.
The British scored an important early success when their detachment at St. Joseph Island, on Lake Huron, learned of the declaration of war before the nearby American garrison at the important trading post at Mackinac Island in Michigan. A scratch force landed on the island on July 17, 1812, and mounted a gun overlooking Fort Mackinac. After the British fired one shot from their gun, the Americans, taken by surprise, surrendered. This early victory encouraged the natives, and large numbers moved to help the British at Amherstburg. The island totally controlled access to the Old Northwest, giving the British nominal control of this area, and, more vitally, a monopoly on the fur trade.
An American army under the command of William Hull invaded Canada on July 12, with his forces chiefly composed of untrained and ill-disciplined militiamen. Once on Canadian soil, Hull issued a proclamation ordering all British subjects to surrender, or "the horrors, and calamities of war will stalk before you". This led many of the British forces to defect. John Bennett, printer and publisher of the York Gazette & Oracle, was a prominent defector. Andrew Mercer, who had the publication's production moved to his house, lost the press and type destroyed during American occupation, an example of what happened to resisters. He also threatened to kill any British prisoner caught fighting alongside a native. The proclamation helped stiffen resistance to the American attacks. Hull's army was too weak in artillery and badly supplied to achieve its objectives, and had to fight just to maintain its own lines of communication.
The senior British officer in Upper Canada, Major General Isaac Brock, felt that he should take bold measures to calm the settler population in Canada, and to convince the natives who were needed to defend the region that Britain was strong. He moved rapidly to Amherstburg near the western end of Lake Erie with reinforcements and immediately decided to attack Detroit. Hull, fearing that the British possessed superior numbers and that the Indians attached to Brock's force would commit massacres if fighting began, surrendered Detroit without a fight on August 16. Knowing of British-instigated indigenous attacks on other locations, Hull ordered the evacuation of the inhabitants of Fort Dearborn (Chicago) to Fort Wayne. After initially being granted safe passage, the inhabitants (soldiers and civilians) were attacked by Potowatomis on August 15 after travelling only 2 miles (3.2 km) in what is known as the Battle of Fort Dearborn. The fort was subsequently burned.
Brock promptly transferred himself to the eastern end of Lake Erie, where American General Stephen Van Rensselaer was attempting a second invasion. An armistice (arranged by Prévost in the hope the British renunciation of the Orders in Council to which the United States objected might lead to peace) prevented Brock from invading American territory. When the armistice ended, the Americans attempted an attack across the Niagara River on October 13, but suffered a crushing defeat at Queenston Heights. Brock was killed during the battle. While the professionalism of the American forces improved by the war's end, British leadership suffered after Brock's death. A final attempt in 1812 by American General Henry Dearborn to advance north from Lake Champlain failed when his militia refused to advance beyond American territory.
In contrast to the American militia, the Canadian militia performed well. French Canadians, who found the anti-Catholic stance of most of the United States troublesome, and United Empire Loyalists, who had fought for the Crown during the American Revolutionary War, strongly opposed the American invasion. Many in Upper Canada were recent settlers from the United States who had no obvious loyalties to the Crown; nevertheless, while there were some who sympathized with the invaders, the American forces found strong opposition from men loyal to the Empire.
American Northwest, 1813
After Hull's surrender of Detroit, General William Henry Harrison was given command of the U.S. Army of the Northwest. He set out to retake the city, which was now defended by Colonel Henry Procter in conjunction with Tecumseh. A detachment of Harrison's army was defeated at Frenchtown along the River Raisin on January 22, 1813. Procter left the prisoners with an inadequate guard, who could not prevent some of his North American native allies from attacking and killing perhaps as many as sixty Americans, many of whom were Kentucky militiamen. The incident became known as the River Raisin Massacre. The defeat ended Harrison's campaign against Detroit, and the phrase "Remember the River Raisin!" became a rallying cry for the Americans.
In May 1813, Procter and Tecumseh set siege to Fort Meigs in northwestern Ohio. American reinforcements arriving during the siege were defeated by the natives, but the fort held out. The Indians eventually began to disperse, forcing Procter and Tecumseh to return north to Canada. A second offensive against Fort Meigs also failed in July. In an attempt to improve Indian morale, Procter and Tecumseh attempted to storm Fort Stephenson, a small American post on the Sandusky River, only to be repulsed with serious losses, marking the end of the Ohio campaign.
On Lake Erie, American commander Captain Oliver Hazard Perry fought the Battle of Lake Erie on September 10, 1813. His decisive victory at "Put-in-Bay" ensured American military control of the lake, improved American morale after a series of defeats, and compelled the British to fall back from Detroit. This paved the way for General Harrison to launch another invasion of Upper Canada, which culminated in the U.S. victory at the Battle of the Thames on October 5, 1813, in which Tecumseh was killed.
Niagara frontier, 1813
Because of the difficulties of land communications, control of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River corridor was crucial. When the war began, the British already had a small squadron of warships on Lake Ontario and had the initial advantage. To redress the situation, the Americans established a Navy yard at Sackett's Harbor in northwestern New York. Commodore Isaac Chauncey took charge of the large number of sailors and shipwrights sent there from New York; they completed the second warship built there in a mere 45 days. Ultimately, almost 3,000 men worked at the naval shipyard, building eleven warships and many smaller boats and transports. Having regained the advantage by their rapid building program, Chauncey and Dearborn attacked York, on the northern shore of the lake, the capital of Upper Canada, on April 27, 1813. The Battle of York was a "pyrrhic" American victory, marred by looting and the burning of the small Provincial Parliament buildings and a library (resulting in a spirit of revenge by the British/Canadians led by Governor General George Prévost, who later demanded satisfaction encouraging the British Admiralty to issue orders to their officers later operating in the Chesapeake Bay region to exact similar devastation on the American Federal capital village of Washington the following year). However, Kingston was strategically much more valuable to British supply and communications routes along the St. Lawrence corridor. Without control of Kingston, the U.S. Navy could not effectively control Lake Ontario or sever the British supply line from Lower Canada.
On May 25, 1813 the guns of the American Lake Ontario squadron joined by Fort Niagara began bombarding Fort George. On May 27, 1813, an American amphibious force from Lake Ontario assaulted Fort George on the northern end of the Niagara River and captured it without serious losses. The British also abandoned Fort Erie and headed towards the Burlington Heights. With the British position in Upper Canada on the verge of collapse, the Iroquois Indians living along the banks of the Grand River considered changing sides and ignored a British appeal to come to their aid. The retreating British forces were not pursued, however, until they had largely escaped and organized a counteroffensive against the advancing Americans at the Battle of Stoney Creek on June 5. With Upper Canada on the line, the British launched a surprise attack at Stoney Creek at 2:00 am, leading to much confused fighting. Through tactically a draw, the battle was a strategic British victory as the Americans pulled back to Forty Mile Creek rather than continuing their advance into Upper Canada. At this point, the Six Nations living on the Grand River began to come out to fight for the British as an American victory no longer seemed inevitable. The Iroquis ambushed an American patrol at Forty Mile Creek while the Royal Navy squadron based in Kingston came to bombard the American camp, leading to General Dearborn to retreat to Fort George as he now mistakenly believed he was outnumbered and outgunned. The British commander, Brigadier General John Vincent was heartened by the fact that more and more First Nations warriors were now arriving to assist him, providing about 800 additional men. On June 24, with the help of advance warning by Laura Secord, another American force was forced to surrender by a much smaller British and native force at the Battle of Beaver Dams, marking the end of the American offensive into Upper Canada. The British commander Major General Francis de Rottenberg did not have the strength to retake Fort George, so he instituted a blockade, hoping to starve the Americans into surrender. Meanwhile, Commodore James Lucas Yeo had taken charge of the British ships on the lake and mounted a counterattack, which was nevertheless repulsed at the Battle of Sackett's Harbor. Thereafter, Chauncey and Yeo's squadrons fought two indecisive actions, neither commander seeking a fight to the finish.
Late in 1813, the Americans abandoned the Canadian territory they occupied around Fort George. They set fire to the village of Newark (now Niagara-on-the-Lake) on December 10, 1813, incensing the Canadians and politicians in control. Many of the inhabitants were left without shelter, freezing to death in the snow. This led to British retaliation following the Capture of Fort Niagara on December 18, 1813. Early the next morning on December 19, the British and their native allies stormed the neighbouring town of Lewiston, New York, torching homes and buildings and killing about a dozen civilians. As the British were chasing the surviving residents out of town, a small force of Tuscarora natives intervened and stopped the pursuit, buying enough time for the locals to escape to safer ground. It is notable in that the Tuscaroras defended the Americans against their own Iroquois brothers, the Mohawks, who sided with the British. Later, the British attacked and burned Buffalo on December 30, 1813.
In 1814, the contest for Lake Ontario turned into a building race. Naval superiority shifted between the opposing fleets as each built new, bigger ships. However, neither was able to bring the other to battle when in a position of superiority, leaving the Engagements on Lake Ontario a draw. At the war's end, the British held the advantage with the 112-gun HMS St Lawrencewith two more ship of the lines laid down, HMS Wolfeand HMS Canada. In response, the Americans had laid down two even larger ships, Chippewa and New Orleans. The majority of these ships never saw action and were decommissioned after the war.
St. Lawrence and Lower Canada, 1813
The British were potentially most vulnerable over the stretch of the St. Lawrence where it formed the frontier between Upper Canada and the United States. During the early days of the war, there was illicit commerce across the river. Over the winter of 1812 and 1813, the Americans launched a series of raids from Ogdensburg on the American side of the river, which hampered British supply traffic up the river. On February 21, Sir George Prévost passed through Prescott on the opposite bank of the river with reinforcements for Upper Canada. When he left the next day, the reinforcements and local militia attacked. At the Battle of Ogdensburg, the Americans were forced to retire.
For the rest of the year, Ogdensburg had no American garrison, and many residents of Ogdensburg resumed visits and trade with Prescott. This British victory removed the last American regular troops from the Upper St. Lawrence frontier and helped secure British communications with Montreal. Late in 1813, after much argument, the Americans made two thrusts against Montreal. Taking Montreal would have cut off the British forces in Upper Canada and thus potentially changed the war. The plan eventually agreed upon was for Major General Wade Hampton to march north from Lake Champlain and join a force under General James Wilkinson that would embark in boats and sail from Sackett's Harbor on Lake Ontario and descend the St. Lawrence. Hampton was delayed by bad roads and supply problems and also had an intense dislike of Wilkinson, which limited his desire to support his plan. On October 25, his 4,000-strong force was defeated at the Chateauguay River by Charles de Salaberry's smaller force of Canadian Voltigeurs and Mohawks. Salaberry's force of Lower Canada militia and Indians numbered only 339, but had a strong defensive position. Wilkinson's force of 8,000 set out on October 17, but was also delayed by bad weather. After learning that Hampton had been checked, Wilkinson heard that a British force under Captain William Mulcaster and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Wanton Morrison was pursuing him, and by November 10, he was forced to land near Morrisburg, about 150 kilometres (90 mi) from Montreal. On November 11, Wilkinson's rear guard, numbering 2,500, attacked Morrison's force of 800 at Crysler's Farm and was repulsed with heavy losses. After learning that Hampton could not renew his advance, Wilkinson retreated to the U.S. and settled into winter quarters. He resigned his command after a failed attack on a British outpost at Lacolle Mills. Had the Americans taken Montreal as planned, Upper Canada would have certainly been lost and the failure of the campaign ended in the greatest British defeat in the Canadas during the war.[107]
Niagara and Plattsburgh Campaigns, 1814
Rather than trying to take Montreal or Kingston, the Americans chose again to invade the Niagara frontier to take Upper Canada. The Americans had occupied southwestern Upper Canada after their victory in Moraviantown, and they believed taking the rest of the province would force the British to cede it to them. The end of the war in Europe in April 1814 meant the British could now redeploy their Army to North America, so the Americans were anxious to secure Upper Canada to negotiate from a position of strength. They planned to invade via the Niagara frontier while sending another force to recapture Mackinac; the British were supplying the Indians in the Old Northwest from Montreal via Mackinac. By the middle of 1814, American generals, including Major Generals Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott, had drastically improved the fighting abilities and discipline of the army. The Americans renewed their attack on the Niagara peninsula and quickly captured Fort Erie on July 3, 1814, with the garrison of 170 quickly surrendering to the 5,000 Americans. General Phineas Riall rushed towards the frontier and, unaware of Fort Erie's fall or the size of the American force, chose to engage in battle. Winfield Scott then gained a victory over an inferior British force at the Battle of Chippawa on July 5. The Americans brought out overwhelming firepower against the attacking British, who lost about 600 dead to the 350 dead on the American side. An attempt to advance further ended with a hard-fought but inconclusive Battle of Lundy's Lane on July 25. Both sides stood their ground, but after the battle, the American commander, General Jacob Brown, pulled back to Fort George and the British did not pursue them.
The outnumbered Americans withdrew but withstood a prolonged Siege of Fort Erie. The British tried to storm Fort Erie on August 14, 1814, but suffered heavy losses, losing 950 killed, wounded and captured compared to only 84 dead and wounded on the American side. The British were further weakened by exposure and shortage of supplies in their siege lines. Eventually they raised the siege, but American Major General George Izard took over command on the Niagara front and followed up only halfheartedly. An American raid along the Grand River destroyed many farms and weakened British logistics. In October 1814 the Americans advanced into Upper Canada and engaged in skirmishes at Cook's Mill, but pulled back when they heard that the new British warship, HMS St. Lawrence – armed with 104 guns and launched in Kingston that September – was on its way. The Americans lacked provisions, and eventually destroyed the Fort Erie and retreated across the Niagara.
Meanwhile, following the abdication of Napoleon, 15,000 British troops were sent to North America under four of Wellington's ablest brigade commanders. Fewer than half were veterans of the Peninsula and the rest came from garrisons. Prévost was ordered to neutralize American power on the lakes by burning Sackets Harbor to gain naval control of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the Upper Lakes, and to defend Lower Canada from attack. He did defend Lower Canada but otherwise failed to achieve his objectives. Given the late season, he decided to invade New York State. His army outnumbered the American defenders of Plattsburgh, but he was worried about his flanks, so he decided he needed naval control of Lake Champlain. On the lake, the British squadron under Captain George Downie and the Americans under Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough were more evenly matched.
Upon reaching Plattsburgh, Prévost delayed the assault until the arrival of Downie in the hastily completed 36-gun frigate HMS Confiance. Prévost forced Downie into a premature attack, but then unaccountably failed to provide the promised military backing. Downie was killed and his naval force defeated at the naval Battle of Plattsburgh in Plattsburgh Bay on September 11, 1814. The Americans now had control of Lake Champlain; Theodore Roosevelt later termed it "the greatest naval battle of the war". The successful land defence was led by Alexander Macomb. To the astonishment of his senior officers, Prévost then turned back, saying it was too hazardous to remain on enemy territory after the loss of naval supremacy. Prévost was recalled and in London, a naval court-martial decided that defeat had been caused principally by Prévost's urging the squadron into premature action and then failing to afford the promised support from the land forces. Prévost died suddenly, just before his own court-martial was to convene. Prévost's reputation sank to a new low, as Canadians claimed that their militia under Brock did the job and he failed. Recently, however, historians have been more kindly, measuring him not against Wellington but against his American foes. They judge Prévost's preparations for defending the Canadas with limited means to be energetic, well-conceived, and comprehensive; and against the odds, he had achieved the primary objective of preventing an American conquest.
To the east, the northern part of Massachusetts, soon to be Maine, was invaded. Fort Sullivan at Eastport was taken by Sir Thomas Hardy on July 11. Castine, Hampden, Bangor, and Machias were taken, and Castine became the main British base till April 15, 1815, when the British left, taking £10,750 in tariff duties, the "Castine Fund" which was used to found Dalhousie University. Eastport was not returned to the United States till 1818.
American West, 1813–15
The Mississippi River valley was the western frontier of the United States in 1812. The territory acquired in the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 contained almost no U.S. settlements west of the Mississippi except around Saint Louis and a few forts and trading posts. Fort Belle Fontaine, an old trading post converted to a U.S. Army post in 1804, served as regional headquarters. Fort Osage, built in 1808 along the Missouri was the western-most U.S. outpost, it was abandoned at the start of the war.Fort Madison, built along the Mississippi in what is now Iowa, was also built in 1808, and had been repeatedly attacked by British-allied Sauk since its construction. In September 1813 Fort Madison was abandoned after it was attacked and besieged by natives, who had support from the British. This was one of the few battles fought west of the Mississippi. Black Hawk played a leadership role.
Little of note took place on Lake Huron in 1813, but the American victory on Lake Erie and the recapture of Detroit isolated the British there. During the ensuing winter, a Canadian party under Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall established a new supply line from York to Nottawasaga Bay on Georgian Bay. When he arrived at Fort Mackinac with supplies and reinforcements, he sent an expedition to recapture the trading post of Prairie du Chien in the far west. The Siege of Prairie du Chien ended in a British victory on July 20, 1814.
Earlier in July, the Americans sent a force of five vessels from Detroit to recapture Mackinac. A mixed force of regulars and volunteers from the militia landed on the island on August 4. They did not attempt to achieve surprise, and at the brief Battle of Mackinac Island, they were ambushed by natives and forced to re-embark. The Americans discovered the new base at Nottawasaga Bay, and on August 13, they destroyed its fortifications and the schooner Nancy that they found there. They then returned to Detroit, leaving two gunboats to blockade Mackinac. On September 4, the gunboats were taken unawares and captured by British boarding parties from canoes and small boats. These Engagements on Lake Huron left Mackinac under British control.
The British garrison at Prairie du Chien also fought off another attack by Major Zachary Taylor. U.S. troops retreating from the Battle of Credit Island on the upper Mississippi attempted to make a stand at Fort Johnson, but the fort was soon abandoned, along with most of the upper Mississippi valley. In this distant theater, the British retained the upper hand until the end of the war, through the allegiance of several indigenous tribes that received British gifts and arms, enabling them to take control of parts of what is now Michigan and Illinois, as well as the whole of modern Wisconsin.
After American forces were driven from the Upper Mississippi region, they held on to eastern Missouri and the St. Louis area. Two notable battles fought against the Sauk were the Battle of Cote Sans Dessein, in April 1815, at the mouth of the Osage River in the Missouri Territory, and the Battle of the Sink Hole, in May 1815, near Fort Cap au Gris.
[verification needed]
At the conclusion of peace, Mackinac and other captured territory was returned to the United States. Some British officers and Canadians objected to handing back Prairie du Chien and especially Mackinac under the terms of the Treaty of Ghent. However, the Americans retained the captured post at Fort Malden, near Amherstburg, until the British complied with the treaty.
Fighting between Americans, the Sauk, and other indigenous tribes continued through 1817, well after the war ended in the east.
Atlantic theater
Opening strategies
In 1812, Britain's Royal Navy was the world's largest, with over 600 cruisers in commission and some smaller vessels. Although most of these were involved in blockading the French navy and protecting British trade against (usually French) privateers, the Royal Navy still had 85 vessels in American waters, counting all British Navy vessels in North American and the Caribbean waters.[g] However, the Royal Navy's North American squadron based in Halifax, Nova Scotia (which bore the brunt of the war), numbered one small ship of the line, seven frigates, nine smaller sloops and brigs along with five schooners. By contrast, the United States Navy comprised 8 frigates, 14 smaller sloops and brigs, and no ships of the line. The U.S. had embarked on a major shipbuilding program before the war at Sackets Harbor, New York and continued to produce new ships. Three of the existing American frigates were exceptionally large and powerful for their class, larger than any British frigate in North America. Whereas the standard British frigate of the time was rated as a 38 gun ship, usually carrying up to 50 guns, with its main battery consisting of 18-pounder guns; USS ConstitutionPresidentand United Statesin comparison, were rated as 44-gun ships, carrying 56–60 guns with a main battery of 24-pounders.
The British strategy was to protect their own merchant shipping to and from Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the West Indies, and to enforce a blockade of major American ports to restrict American trade. Because of their numerical inferiority, the American strategy was to cause disruption through hit-and-run tactics, such as the capture of prizes and engaging Royal Navy vessels only under favourable circumstances. Days after the formal declaration of war, however, it put out two small squadrons, including the frigate President and the sloop Hornet under Commodore John Rodgers, and the frigates United States and Congresswith the brig Argus under Captain Stephen Decatur. These were initially concentrated as one unit under Rodgers, who intended to force the Royal Navy to concentrate its own ships to prevent isolated units being captured by his powerful force.
Large numbers of American merchant ships were returning to the United States with the outbreak of war, and if the Royal Navy was concentrated, it could not watch all the ports on the American seaboard. Rodgers' strategy worked, in that the Royal Navy concentrated most of its frigates off New York Harbor under Captain Philip Broke, allowing many American ships to reach home. But, Rodgers' own cruise captured only five small merchant ships, and the Americans never subsequently concentrated more than two or three ships together as a unit.
Single-ship actions
Both American and British naval honour had been challenged in the leadup to the war. The Chesapeake–Leopard affair had left the United States insulted by the Royal Navy's impressment of sailors. Given that honour was at stake, the appropriate method for the United States Navy to redeem itself was by duelling. Similarly, British honour was challenged in the Little Belt affair where the British sloop HMS Little Belt was fired upon by the United States frigate President after President had mistaken Little Belt for the British frigate HMS Guerriere. Captain James Dacres of Guerriere began a cycle of frigate duels by challenging USS President to a single ship duel to avenge the losses aboard Little Belt. Commodore John Rodgers of USS President declined the challenge because he feared the intervention of the rest of British squadron under Commodore Philip Broke that Guerriere was part of.
Meanwhile, USS Constitutioncommanded by Captain Isaac Hull, sailed from the Chesapeake Bay on July 12. On July 17, Commodore Broke's British squadron which included Guerriere gave chase off New York, but Constitution evaded her pursuers after two days. Constitution briefly called at Boston to replenish water. Commodore Borke detached Guerriere from his squadron to seek out repairs as Guerriere being a French-built ship had weak scantlings (beams fastened with a thickened clamp rather than vertical and horizontal knees[verification needed]) and had, therefore, become leaky and rotten. Furthermore, she had been struck by lightning severely damaging her masts.Constitution encountered and engaged engaged Guerriere in a duel to redeem American honour. Captain Dacres was eager to engage the American frigate as Constitution was the sister ship of President and would serve equally well as ship to duel against to redeem British honour. USS Constitution had nearly 50 percent more men, more firepower, heavier tonnage and heavier scantlings (which determine how much damage enemy shot does to a ship) than Guerriere. Unsurprisingly, Constitution emerged the victor. After a 35-minute battle, Guerriere had been dis-masted and captured, and was later burned. Constitution earned the nickname "Old Ironsides" following this battle as many of the British cannonballs were seen to bounce off her hull due to Constitution's heavy scantlings. Hull returned to Boston with news of this significant victory.
Similarly, On October 25, USS United Statescommanded by Captain Decatur, captured the British frigate HMS Macedonianwhich he then carried back to port. At the close of the month, Constitution sailed south, now under the command of Captain William Bainbridge. On December 29, off Bahia, Brazil, she met the British frigate HMS Java. After a battle lasting three hours, Java struck her colors and was burned after being judged unsalvageable. Constitutionat first seemed relatively undamaged in the battle, but it was later determined that Java had successfully hit Constitution's masts with 18-pounder shot, but the mast hadn't fallen due to its immense diameter. Constitution's fell while she was docked. United StatesConstitution and President were all almost 50 percent larger by tonnage, crew, firepower, and scantling size than the MacedonianGuerriere and Java (Guerriere was rotten and had lightning damage as well as being weakly built as a French ship; Java had extra marines onboard making the disparity in crew more similar although she too was a French-built ship; Macedonian fitted the 50 percent statistic near perfectly).
The United States Navy's sloops had also won several victories over Royal Navy sloops of approximately equal armament. The American sloops HornetWasp (1807), PeacockWasp (1813), and Frolic were all ship-rigged while the British Cruizer-class sloops they encountered were brig-rigged, which gave the Americans a significant advantage. Ship rigged vessels are more maneuverable in battle because they have a wider variety of sails thus being more resistant to damage. Ship-rigged vessels can back sail, literally backing up or heave to (stop). More significantly, if some spars are shot away on a brig because it is more difficult to wear, the brig loses the ability to steer, while a ship could adjust its more diverse canvas as if to wear to compensate for the imbalance caused by damage in battle. Furthermore, ship-rigged vessels which three masts simply have more masts to shoot away than brigs with two masts before the vessel is unmanagable. In addition While the American ships had experienced and well-drilled volunteer crews, the enormous size of the overstretched Royal Navy meant that many ships were shorthanded and the average quality of crews suffered and the constant sea duties of those serving in North America interfered with their training and exercises. The only engagement between two brig-sloops was between the British Cruizer-class brig Pelican (1812) and the United States' Argus where Pelican emerged the victor as she had greater firepower and tonnage, despite having fewer crew. Although not a sloop, the gun-brig Boxer was taken by the brig-sloop Enterprise in a bloody battle where Enterprise emerged the victor again due to superior force.
It was clear that in single ship battles, superior force was the most significant factor. In response to the majority of the American ships being of greater force than the British ships of the same class, Britain constructed five 40-gun, 24-pounder heavy frigates and two "spar-decked" frigates (the 60-gun HMS Leander and HMS Newcastle) and to razee three old 74-gun ships of the line to convert them to heavy frigates. To counter the American sloops of war, the British constructed the Cyrus-class ship-sloops of 22 guns. The British Admiralty also instituted a new policy that the three American heavy frigates should not be engaged except by a ship of the line or frigates in squadron strength.
Commodore Philip Broke had lost Guerriere to Constitution from his very own squadron. He knew that Dacres of Guerriere intended to duel the American frigate to avenge the losses on Little Belt caused by USS President in 1811. Since, Constitution had taken GuerriereBroke intended to redeem Dacres' honour by taking Constitutionwhich was undergoing repairs in Boston in early 1813. Broke found that Constitution was not ready for sea. Instead, he decided to challenge Chesapeake as Broke was short on water and provisions and could not wait for Constitution. Captain James Lawrence of Chesapeake was misguided by propaganda intended to boost American morale (and successfully did) that claimed that the three frigate duels of 1812 were of equal force leading Lawrence to believe taking Broke's Shannon (1806) would be easy. Lawrence even went to the extent of preemptively arranging for a banquet to be held for his victorious crew. Broke, on the other hand, had spent years training his crew and developing artillery innovations on his ship, making Shannon particularly well prepared for battle. On June 1, 1813, Shannon took Chesapeake in a battle that lasted less than fifteen minutes in Boston Harbor. Lawrence was mortally wounded and famously cried out, "Tell the men to fire faster! Don't give up the ship!" The two frigates were of near-identical armament and length. Chesapeake's crew was larger, had greater tonnage and was of greater scantling strength (which led to the British claiming she was overbuilt[verification needed]), but many of her crew had not served or trained together. Shannon had been at sea for a long time, and her hull had begun to rot, further exaggerating the disparity in scantling strength. Nevertheless, this engagement proved to the only single-ship action where both ships were of essentially equal force during the War of 1812. British citizens reacted with celebration and relief that the run of American victories had ended. Notably, this action was by ratio one of the bloodiest contests recorded during this age of sail due to the close-range engagement, the boarding (hand-to-hand combat) and Broke's philosophy of artillery being "Kill the men and the ship is yours", with more dead and wounded than HMS Victory suffered in four hours of combat at Trafalgar. Captain Lawrence was killed, and Captain Broke was so badly wounded that he never again held a sea command. The Americans then did as the British had done in 1812 and banned single-ship duels after this engagement.
In January 1813, the American frigate Essexunder the command of Captain David Porter, sailed into the Pacific to harass British shipping. Many British whaling ships carried letters of marque allowing them to prey on American whalers, and they nearly destroyed the industry. Essex challenged this practice. She inflicted considerable damage on British interests.
Essex consort USS Essex Junior (armed with twenty guns) were captured off Valparaíso, Chile, by the British frigate HMS Phoebe and the sloop HMS Cherub on March 28, 1814 in what statistically appeared to be a battle of equal force as Essex and Phoebe were of similar tonnage, scantling, and broadside weight as well as Cherub and Essex Junior (with the exception of scantling, which Essex Junior was much more lightly built than Cherub). Once again the Americans had more men. Nevertheless, Phoebe was armed with long guns which none of the other ships engaged had. Furthermore, Captain Hillyar had used Phillip Broke's methods of artillery on Phoebe and Cherub with tangent and dispart sights.[verification needed] This gave the British ships a significant advantage at the range at which the battle was fought. Once again proving that superior force was the deciding factor.
To conclude the cycle of duels cause by the Little Belt affair, USS President was finally captured in January 1815. Unlike the previous engagements, President was not taken in a duel. Following the both Royal Navy's requirements, President was pursued by a squadron consisting of four frigates, one being a 56-gun razee. President was an extremely fast ship and successfully outsailed the fast British squadron with the exception of HMS Endymion which has been regarded as the fastest ship in the age of fighting sail.[verification needed] Captain Henry Hope of Endymion had fitted his ship with Phillip Broke's technology as Captain Hillyar had done on Phoebe. This gave him the slight advantage at range and slowed President. Commodore Decatur on President had the advantage in scantling strength, firepower, crew, and tonnage, but not in maneuverability. Despite having fewer guns, Endymion was armed with 24-pounders just like President. This meant that Endymion shot could pierce the hull of President unlike Guerriere's which bounced of Constitution's hull or Java's that failed to cut through Constitution's mast. Following Broke's philosophy of "Kill the man and the ship is your's", Endymion fired into President's hull severely damaging her (shot holes below the waterline, 10/15 starboard guns on the gundeck disabled, water in the hold, and shot from Endymion found inside President's magazine.). Decatur knew his only hope was to dismantle Endymion and sail away from the rest of the squadron. When he failed, he surrendered his ship to "the captain of the black frigate (Endymion)". Decatur took advantage of the fact Endymion had no boats that were intact and attempted to sneak away under the cover of night, only to be caught up by HMS Pomone. Decatur surrendered without a fight. Decatur had surrendered the United States finest frigate and flagship President to a smaller ship, but part of a squadron of greater force.
Decatur gave unreliable accounts of the battle stating that President was already "severely damaged" by a grounding before the engagement, but undamaged after the engagement with Endymion. He stated Pomone caused "significant" losses aboard Presidentalthough President's crew claim they were below deck gathering their belongings as they had already surrendered. Despite saying "I surrender my ship to the captain of the black frigate", Decatur also writes that he said, "I surrender to the squadron". Nevertheless, many historians such as Ian Toll, Theodore Roosevelt, and William James quote Decatur's remarks to either enforce that Endymion alone took President or that President surrendered to the whole squadron, when actually it was something in-between.
Success in single ship battles raised American morale after the repeated failed invasion attempts in Upper and Lower Canada. However, these victories had no military effect on the war at sea as they did not alter the balance of naval power, impede British supplies and reinforcements, or even raise insurance rates for British trade. During the war, the United States Navy captured 165 British merchantmen (although privateers captured many more), while the Royal Navy captured 1,400 American merchantmen. More significantly, the British blockade of the Atlantic coast caused the majority warships to be unable to put to sea and devastated the United States economy.
Privateering
The operations of American privateers proved a more significant threat to British trade than the U.S. Navy. They operated throughout the Atlantic and continued until the close of the war, most notably from ports such as Baltimore. American privateers reported taking 1300 British merchant vessels, compared to 254 taken by the U.S. Navy, although the insurer Lloyd's of London reported that only 1,175 British ships were taken, 373 of which were recaptured, for a total loss of 802. The Canadian historian Carl Benn wrote that American privateers took 1,344 British ships, of which 750 were retaken by the British. However the British were able to limit privateering losses by the strict enforcement of convoy by the Royal Navy and by capturing 278 American privateers. Due to the massive size of the British merchant fleet, American captures only affected 7.5% of the fleet, resulting in no supply shortages or lack of reinforcements for British forces in North America. Of 526 American privateers, 148 were captured by the Royal Navy and only 207 ever took a prize.
Due to the large size of their navy, the British did not rely as much on privateering. The majority of the 1,407 captured American merchant ships were taken by the Royal Navy. The war was the last time the British allowed privateering, since the practice was coming to be seen as politically inexpedient and of diminishing value in maintaining its naval supremacy. However privateering remained popular in British colonies. It was the last hurrah for privateers in Bermuda who vigorously returned to the practice after experience in previous wars.<sup id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEStrannack1909[[Category:Wikipedia_articles_needing_page_number_citations_from_June_2013]]
Blockade
The naval blockade of the United States began informally in 1812 and expanded to cut off more ports as the war progressed. Twenty ships were on station in 1812 and 135 were in place by the end of the conflict. In March 1813, the Royal Navy punished the Southern states, who were most vocal about annexing British North America, by blockading Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah and New York city was well. However, as additional ships were sent to North America in 1813, the Royal Navy was able to tighten the blockade and extend it, first to the coast south of Narragansett by November 1813 and to the entire American coast on May 31, 1814. In May 1814, following the abdication of Napoleon, and the end of the supply problems with Wellington's army, New England was blockaded.
The British government, having need of American foodstuffs for its army in Spain, benefited from the willingness of the New Englanders to trade with them, so no blockade of New England was at first attempted. The Delaware River and Chesapeake Bay were declared in a state of blockade on December 26, 1812. Illicit trade was carried on by collusive captures arranged between American traders and British officers. American ships were fraudulently transferred to neutral flags. Eventually, the U.S. government was driven to issue orders to stop illicit trading; this put only a further strain on the commerce of the country. The overpowering strength of the British fleet enabled it to occupy the Chesapeake and to attack and destroy numerous docks and harbours.
The blockade of American ports later tightened to the extent that most American merchant ships and naval vessels were confined to port. The American frigates USS United States and USS Macedonian ended the war blockaded and hulked in New London, Connecticut. USS United States and USS Macedonian attempted to set sail to raid British shipping in the Caribbean, but were forced to turn back when confronted with a British squadron, and by the end of the war, the United States had six frigates and four ships-of-the-line sitting in port. Some merchant ships were based in Europe or Asia and continued operations. Others, mainly from New England, were issued licences to trade by Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, commander in chief on the American station in 1813. This allowed Wellington's army in Spain to receive American goods and to maintain the New Englanders' opposition to the war. The blockade nevertheless resulted in American exports decreasing from $130 million in 1807 to $7 million in 1814. Most of these were food exports that ironically went to supply their enemies in Britain or British colonies. The blockade had a devastating effect on the American economy with the value of American exports and imports falling from $114 million in 1811 down to $20 million by 1814 while the US Customs took in $13 million in 1811 and $6 million in 1814, despite the fact that Congress had voted to double the rates. The British blockade further damaged the American economy by forcing merchants to abandon the cheap and fast coastal trade to the slow and more expensive inland roads. In 1814, only 1 out of 14 American merchantmen risked leaving port as a high probability that any ship leaving port would be seized.
As the Royal Navy base that supervised the blockade, Halifax profited greatly during the war. From that base British privateers seized many French and American ships and sold their prizes in Halifax.
Freeing and recruiting slaves
The British Royal Navy's blockades and raids allowed about 4,000 African Americans to escape slavery by fleeing American plantations to find freedom aboard British ships, migrants known, as regards those who settled in Canada, as the Black Refugees. The blockading British fleet in Chesapeake Bay received increasing numbers of enslaved black Americans during 1813. By British government order they were treated as free persons when reaching British hands. Alexander Cochrane's proclamation of April 2, 1814, invited Americans who wished to emigrate to join the British, and though not explicitly mentioning slaves was taken by all as addressed to them. About 2,400 of the escaped slaves and their families who were carried on ships of the Royal Navy following their escape settled in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick during and after the war. From May 1814, younger men among the volunteers were recruited into a new Corps of Colonial Marines. They fought for Britain throughout the Atlantic campaign, including the Battle of Bladensburg and the attacks on Washington, D.C. and Battle of Baltimore, later settling in Trinidad after rejecting British government orders for transfer to the West India Regiments, forming the community of the Merikins. The slaves who escaped to the British represented the largest emancipation of African Americans before the American Civil War.
Occupation of Maine
Maine, then part of Massachusetts, was a base for smuggling and illegal trade between the U.S. and the British. Until 1813 the region was generally quiet except for privateer actions near the coast. In September 1813, there was a notable naval action when the U.S. Navy's brig Enterprise fought and captured the Royal Navy brig Boxer off Pemaquid Point. The first British assault came in July 1814, when Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy took Moose Island (Eastport, Maine) without a shot, with the entire American garrison of Fort Sullivan—which became the British Fort Sherbrooke—surrendering. Next, from his base in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in September 1814, Sir John Coape Sherbrooke led 3,000 British troops in the "Penobscot Expedition". In 26 days, he raided and looted Hampden, Bangor, and Machias, destroying or capturing 17 American ships. He won the Battle of Hampden (losing two killed while the Americans lost one killed). Retreating American forces were forced to destroy the frigate Adams. The British occupied the town of Castine and most of eastern Maine for the rest of the war, re-establishing the colony of New Ireland. The Treaty of Ghent returned this territory to the United States, though Machias Seal Island has remained in dispute. The British left in April 1815, at which time they took ₤10,750 obtained from tariff duties at Castine. This money, called the "Castine Fund", was used to establish Dalhousie University, in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
Chesapeake campaign and "The Star-Spangled Banner"
The strategic location of the Chesapeake Bay near America's new national capital, Washington, D.C. on the major tributary of the Potomac River, made it a prime target for the British. Starting in March 1813, a squadron under Rear Admiral George Cockburn started a blockade of the mouth of the Bay at Hampton Roads harbour and raided towns along the Bay from Norfolk, Virginia, to Havre de Grace, Maryland.
On July 4, 1813, Commodore Joshua Barney, a Revolutionary War naval hero, convinced the Navy Department to build the Chesapeake Bay Flotilla, a squadron of twenty barges powered by small sails or oars (sweeps) to defend the Chesapeake Bay. Launched in April 1814, the squadron was quickly cornered in the Patuxent River, and while successful in harassing the Royal Navy, they were powerless to stop the British campaign that ultimately led to the "Burning of Washington". This expedition, led by Cockburn and General Robert Ross, was carried out between August 19 and 29, 1814, as the result of the hardened British policy of 1814. As part of this, Admiral Warren had been replaced as commander in chief by Admiral Alexander Cochrane, with reinforcements and orders to coerce the Americans into a favourable peace.
A force of 2,500 soldiers under General Ross had just arrived in Bermuda aboard HMS Royal Oakthree frigates, three sloops and ten other vessels. Released from the Peninsular War by victory, the British intended to use them for diversionary raids along the coasts of Maryland and Virginia. In response to Prévost's request, they decided to employ this force, together with the naval and military units already on the station, to strike at the national capital.
On August 24, U.S. Secretary of War John Armstrong Jr. insisted that the British were going to attack Baltimore rather than Washington, even when British army and naval units were obviously on their way to Washington. The inexperienced state militia was easily routed in the Battle of Bladensburg, opening the route to Washington. While First Lady Dolley Madison saved valuables from what is now the "White House", senior officials fled to Virginia. Secretary of the Navy William Jones ordered setting fire to the Washington Navy Yard to prevent the capture of supplies. The nation's public buildings were destroyed by the British (and by a furious thunderstorm that ruined a great deal of property, although it did quench the flames). American morale was challenged, and many Federalists swung around and rallied to a patriotic defense of their homeland.
The British moved on to their major target, the heavily fortified major city of Baltimore. They delayed their movement allowing Baltimore an opportunity to strengthen the fortifications and bring in new federal troops and state militia units. The "Battle for Baltimore" began with the British landing on September 12, 1814, at North Point, where they were met by American militia further up the "Patapsco Neck" peninsula. An exchange of fire began, with casualties on both sides. The British Army commander Major Gen. Robert Ross was killed by snipers. The British paused, then continued to march northwestward to face the stationed Maryland and Baltimore City militia units at "Godly Wood." The Battle of North Point was fought for several afternoon hours in a musketry and artillery duel. The British also planned to simultaneously attack Baltimore by water on the following day, September 13, to support their military facing the massed, heavily dug-in and fortified American units of approximately 15,000 with about a hundred cannon gathered along the eastern heights of the city named "Loudenschlager's Hill" (later "Hampstead Hill" – now part of Patterson Park). The Baltimore defences had been planned in advance and overseen by the state militia commander, Maj. Gen. Samuel Smith. The Royal Navy was unable to reduce Fort McHenry at the entrance to Baltimore Harbor in support of an attack from the northeast by the British Army.
The British naval guns, mortars and new "Congreve rockets" had a longer range than the American cannon onshore. The ships mostly stood out of range of the Americans, who returned very little fire. The fort was not heavily damaged except for a burst over a rear brickwall knocking out some fieldpieces but with few casualties. The British eventually realized that they could not force the passage to attack Baltimore in coordination with the land force. A last ditch night feint and barge attack during a heavy rain storm was led by Capt. Charles Napier around the fort up the Middle Branch of the river to the west. Split and misdirected partly in the storm, it turned back after suffering heavy casualties from the alert gunners of Fort Covington and Battery Babcock. The British called off the attack and sailed downriver to pick up their army, which had retreated from the east side of Baltimore. All the lights were extinguished in Baltimore the night of the attack, and the fort was bombarded for 25 hours. The only light was given off by the exploding shells over Fort McHenry, illuminating the flag that was still flying over the fort. The defence of the fort inspired the American lawyer Francis Scott Key to write "Defence of Fort M'Henry", a poem that was later set to music as "The Star-Spangled Banner".
Southern theater
Because of the region's polyglot population, both the British and the Americans perceived the war in the Gulf South as a fundamentally different conflict from the one occurring in the Lowcountry and Chesapeake.:31
Creek War
Before 1813, the war between the Creeks (or Muscogee) had been largely an internal affair sparked by the ideas of Tecumseh farther north in the Mississippi Valley. A faction known as the Red Sticks, so named for the color of their war stics, had broken away from the rest of the Creek Confederacy, which wanted peace with the United States. The Red Sticks were allied with Tecumseh, who about a year before 1813 had visited the Creeks and encouraged greater resistance to the Americans. The Creek Nation was a trading partner of the United States, actively involved with Spanish and British trade as well. The Red Sticks, as well as many southern Muscogeean people like the Seminole, had a long history of alliance with the Spanish and British Empires. This alliance helped the North American and European powers protect each other's claims to territory in the south.
The Battle of Burnt Corn, between Red Sticks and U.S. troops, occurred in the southern parts of Alabama on July 27, 1813. It prompted the state of Georgia as well as the Mississippi territory militia to immediately take major action against Creek offensives. The Red Sticks chiefs gained power in the east along the Alabama, Coosa, and Tallapoosa Rivers – Upper Creek territory. The Lower Creek lived along the Chattahoochee River. Many Creeks tried to remain friendly to the United States, and some were organized by federal Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins to aid the 6th Military District under General Thomas Pinckney and the state militias. The United States combined forces were large. At its peak the Red Stick faction had 4,000 warriors, only a quarter of whom had muskets.
On August 30, 1813, Red Sticks, led by chiefs Red Eagle and Peter McQueen, attacked Fort Mimms, north of Mobile, the only American-held port in the territory of West Florida. The attack on Fort Mimms resulted in the death of 400 settlers and became an ideological rallying point for the Americans.
The Indian frontier of western Georgia was the most vulnerable but was partially fortified already. From November 1813 to January 1814, Georgia's militia and auxiliary Federal troops – from the Creek and Cherokee Indian nations and the states of North Carolina and South Carolina – organized the fortification of defences along the Chattahoochee River and expeditions into Upper Creek territory in present-day Alabama. The army, led by General John Floyd, went to the heart of the "Creek Holy Grounds" and won a major offensive against one of the largest Creek towns at Battle of Autosee, killing an estimated two hundred people. In November, the militia of Mississippi with a combined 1200 troops attacked the "Econachca" encampment ("Battle of Holy Ground") on the Alabama River. Tennessee raised a militia of 5,000 under Major General Andrew Jackson and Brigadier General John Coffee and won the battles of Tallushatchee and Talladega in November 1813.
Jackson suffered enlistment problems in the winter. He decided to combine his force with that of the Georgia militia. However, from January 22–24, 1814, while on their way, the Tennessee militia and allied Muscogee were attacked by the Red Sticks at the Battles of Emuckfaw and Enotachopo Creek. Jackson's troops repelled the attackers, but outnumbered, were forced to withdraw to his base at Fort Strother.
In January Floyd's force of 1,300 state militia and 400 Creek Indians moved to join the U.S. forces in Tennessee, but were attacked in camp on the Calibee Creek by Tukabatchee Indians on the 27th.
Jackson's force increased in numbers with the arrival of U.S. Army soldiers and a second draft of Tennessee state militia and Cherokee and Creek allies swelled his army to around 5,000. In March 1814 they moved south to attack the Creek. On March 27, Jackson decisively defeated the Creek Indian force at Horseshoe Bend, killing 800 of 1,000 Creeks at a cost of 49 killed and 154 wounded out of approximately 2,000 American and Cherokee forces.
The American army moved to Fort Jackson on the Alabama River. On August 9, 1814, the Upper Creek chiefs and Jackson's army signed the "Treaty of Fort Jackson". The most of western Georgia and part of Alabama was taken from the Creeks to pay for expenses borne by the United States. The Treaty also "demanded" that the "Red Stick" insurgents cease communicating with the Spanish or British, and only trade with U.S.-approved agents.
British aid to the Red Sticks arrived after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in April 1814 and after Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane assumed command from Admiral Warren in March. The Creek promised to join any body of 'troops that should aid them in regaining their lands, and suggesting an attack on the tower off Mobile.' In April 1814 the British established an outpost on the Apalachicola River (see Prospect Bluff Historic Sites). Cochrane sent a company of Royal Marines, the vessels HMS Hermes and HMS Carroncommanded by Edward Nicolls, and further supplies to meet the Indians. In addition to training the Indians, Nicolls was tasked to raise a force from escaped slaves, as part of the Corps of Colonial Marines.
In July 1814, General Jackson complained to the Governor of Pensacola, Mateo González Manrique, that combatants from the Creek War were being harboured in Spanish territory, and made reference to the British presence on Spanish soil. Although he gave an angry reply to Jackson, Manrique was alarmed at the weak position he found himself in. He appealed to the British for help, with Woodbine arriving on July 28, and Nicolls arriving at Pensacola on August 24.
The first engagement of the British and their Creek allies against the Americans on the Gulf Coast was the attack on Fort Bowyer September 14, 1814. Captain William Percy tried to take the U.S. fort, hoping to then move on Mobile and block U.S. trade and encroachment on the Mississippi. After the Americans repulsed Percy's forces, the British established a military presence of up to 200 Marines at Pensacola. In November, Jackson's force of 4,000 men took the town. This underlined the superiority of numbers of Jackson's force in the region. The U.S. force moved to New Orleans in late 1814. Jackson's army of 1,000 regulars and 3,000 to 4,000 militia, pirates and other fighters, as well as civilians and slaves built fortifications south of the city.
Gulf Coast
American forces under General James Wilkinson, who was himself earning $4,000 per year as a Spanish secret agent, took the Mobile area—formerly part of West Florida—from the Spanish in March 1813; this was the only territory permanently gained by the U.S. during the war. The Americans built Fort Bowyer, a log and earthenwork fort with 14 guns, on Mobile Point.[182]
At the end of 1814, the British launched a double offensive in the South weeks before the Treaty of Ghent was signed. On the Atlantic coast, Admiral George Cockburn was to close the Intracoastal Waterway trade and land Royal Marine battalions to advance through Georgia to the western territories. On the Gulf coast, Admiral Alexander Cochrane moved on the new state of Louisiana and the Mississippi Territory. Admiral Cochrane's ships reached the Louisiana coast December 9, and Cockburn arrived in Georgia December 14.
On January 8, 1815, a British force of 8,000 under General Edward Pakenham attacked Jackson's defences in New Orleans. The Battle of New Orleans was an American victory, as the British failed to take the fortifications on the East Bank. The British suffered high casualties: 291 dead, 1262 wounded, and 484 captured or missing whereas American casualties were 13 dead, 39 wounded, and 19 missing. It was hailed as a great victory across the U.S., making Jackson a national hero and eventually propelling him to the presidency. The American garrison at Fort St. Philip endured ten days of bombardment from Royal Navy guns, which was a final attempt to invade Louisiana; British ships sailed away from the Mississippi River on January 18. However, it was not until January 27, 1815, that the army had completely rejoined the fleet, allowing for their departure.
After New Orleans, the British tried to take Mobile a second time; General John Lambert laid siege for five days and took the fort, winning the Second Battle of Fort Bowyer on February 12, 1815. HMS Brazen brought news of the Treaty of Ghent the next day, and the British abandoned the Gulf coast.
In January 1815, Admiral Cockburn succeeded in blockading the southeastern coast by occupying Camden County, Georgia. The British quickly took Cumberland Island, Fort Point Peter, and Fort St. Tammany in a decisive victory. Under the orders of his commanding officers, Cockburn's forces relocated many refugee slaves, capturing St. Simons Island as well, to do so. During the invasion of the Georgia coast, an estimated 1,485 people chose to relocate in British territories or join the military. In mid-March, several days after being informed of the Treaty of Ghent, British ships finally left the area.
Treaty of Ghent
Factors leading to the peace negotiations
By 1814, both sides had either achieved their main war goals or were weary of a costly war that offered little but stalemate. They both sent delegations to a neutral site in Ghent, Flanders (now part of Belgium). The negotiations began in early August and concluded on December 24, when a final agreement was signed; both sides had to ratify it before it could take effect. Meanwhile, both sides planned new invasions.
In 1814 the British began blockading the United States, and brought the federal treasury to long delays in paying its bills, and forcing it to rely on loans for the rest of the war. American foreign trade was reduced to a trickle. The parlous American economy was thrown into chaos with prices soaring and unexpected shortages causing hardship in New England which was considering secession. The Hartford Convention led to widespread fears that the New England states might attempt to leave the Union, which was exaggerated as most New Englanders did not wish to leave the Union and merely wanted an end to a war which was bringing much economic hardship, suggested that the continuation of the war might threaten the union. But also to a lesser extent British interests were hurt in the West Indies and Canada that had depended on that trade. Although American privateers found chances of success much reduced, with most British merchantmen now sailing in convoy, privateering continued to prove troublesome to the British, as shown by high insurance rates. British landowners grew weary of high taxes, and colonial interests and merchants called on the government to reopen trade with the U.S. by ending the war.
Negotiations and peace
At last in August 1814, peace discussions began in the neutral city of Ghent. Both sides began negotiations warily.[h] The British diplomats stated their case first, demanding the creation of an Indian barrier state in the American Northwest Territory (the area from Ohio to Wisconsin). It was understood the British would sponsor this Indian state. The British strategy for decades had been to create a buffer state to block American expansion. Britain demanded naval control of the Great Lakes and access to the Mississippi River. The Americans refused to consider a buffer state and the proposal was dropped. Although Article IX of the treaty included provisions to restore to Natives "all possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to in 1811", the provisions were unenforceable; the British did not try and the Americans simply broke the treaty. The Americans (at a later stage) demanded damages for the burning of Washington and for the seizure of ships before the war began.
American public opinion was outraged when Madison published the demands; even the Federalists were now willing to fight on. The British had planned three invasions. One force burned Washington but failed to capture Baltimore, and sailed away when its commander was killed. In northern New York State, 10,000 British veterans were marching south until a decisive defeat at the Battle of Plattsburgh forced them back to Canada.[i] Nothing was known of the fate of the third large invasion force aimed at capturing New Orleans and southwest. The Prime Minister wanted the Duke of Wellington to command in Canada and take control of the Great Lakes. Wellington said that he would go to America but he believed he was needed in Europe. Wellington emphasized that the war was a draw and the peace negotiations should not make territorial demands:
I think you have no right, from the state of war, to demand any concession of territory from America ... You have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory on the point of attack. You cannot on any principle of equality in negotiation claim a cessation of territory except in exchange for other advantages which you have in your power ... Then if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the uti possidetis? You can get no territory: indeed, the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any.
The Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, aware of growing opposition to wartime taxation and the demands of Liverpool and Bristol merchants to reopen trade with America, realized Britain also had little to gain and much to lose from prolonged warfare especially after the growing concern about the situation in Europe. After months of negotiations, against the background of changing military victories, defeats and losses, the parties finally realized that their nations wanted peace and there was no real reason to continue the war. The main focus on British foreign policy was the Congress of Vienna, during which British diplomats had clashed with Russian and Prussian diplomats over the terms of the peace with France, and there were fears at the Britain might have go to war with Russia and Prussia. Now each side was tired of the war. Export trade was all but paralyzed and after Napoleon fell in 1814 France was no longer an enemy of Britain, so the Royal Navy no longer needed to stop American shipments to France, and it no longer needed to impress more seamen. It had ended the practices that so angered the Americans in 1812. The British were preoccupied in rebuilding Europe after the apparent final defeat of Napoleon.
British negotiators were urged by Lord Liverpool to offer a status quo and dropped their demands for the creation of an Indian barrier state, which was in any case hopeless after the collapse of Tecumseh's alliance. This allowed negotiations to resume at the end of October. British diplomats soon offered the status quo to the U.S. negotiators, who accepted them. Prisoners were to be exchanged and captured slaves returned to the United States or paid for by Britain. At this point, the number of slaves was approximately 6,000. Britain eventually refused the demand, allowing many to either emigrate to Canada or Trinidad.[citation needed]
On December 24, 1814 the diplomats had finished and signed the Treaty of Ghent. The treaty was ratified by the British three days later on December 27 and arrived in Washington on February 17, where it was quickly ratified and went into effect, thus finally ending the war. The terms called for all occupied territory to be returned, the prewar boundary between Canada and the United States to be restored, and the Americans were to gain fishing rights in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence.
The Treaty of Ghent failed to secure official British acknowledgement of American maritime rights or ending impressment. However, in the century of peace until World War I these rights were not seriously violated. The defeat of Napoleon made irrelevant all of the naval issues over which the United States had fought. The Americans had achieved their goal of ending the Indian threat; furthermore the American armies had scored enough victories (especially at New Orleans) to satisfy honour and the sense of becoming fully independent from Britain.
Losses and compensation
British losses in the war were about 1,160 killed in action and 3,679 wounded; 3,321 British died from disease. American losses were 2,260 killed in action and 4,505 wounded. While the number of Americans who died from disease is not known, it is estimated that about 15,000 died from all causes directly related to the war. These figures do not include deaths among Canadian militia forces or losses among native tribes.
There have been no estimates of the cost of the American war to Britain, but it did add some £25 million to the national debt. In the U.S., the cost was $105 million, about the same as the cost to Britain. The national debt rose from $45 million in 1812 to $127 million by the end of 1815, although by selling bonds and treasury notes at deep discounts—and often for irredeemable paper money due to the suspension of specie payment in 1814—the government received only $34 million worth of specie.Stephen Girard, the richest man in America at the time, was one of those who personally funded the United States government involvement in the war.
In addition, at least 3,000 American slaves escaped to the British lines. Many other slaves simply escaped in the chaos of war and achieved their freedom on their own. The British settled some of the newly freed slaves in Nova Scotia. Four hundred freedmen were settled in New Brunswick. The Americans protested that Britain's failure to return the slaves violated the Treaty of Ghent. After arbitration by the Tsar of Russia the British paid $1,204,960 in damages to Washington,<sup id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTELindsay1920[[Category:Wikipedia_articles_needing_page_number_citations_from_July_2013]]
In the United States, the economy grew every year 1812–1815, despite a large loss of business by East Coast shipping interests. Prices were 15% higher—inflated—in 1815 compared to 1812, an annual rate of 4.8%. The national economy grew 1812–1815 at the rate of 3.7% a year, after accounting for inflation. Per capita GDP grew at 2.2% a year, after accounting for inflation. Hundreds of new banks were opened; they largely handled the loans that financed the war since tax revenues were down. Money that would have been spent on foreign trade was diverted to opening new factories, which were profitable since British factory-made products were not for sale. This gave a major boost to the Industrial Revolution in the U.S., as typified by the Boston Associates. The Boston Manufacturing Company, built the first integrated spinning and weaving factory in the world at Waltham, Massachusetts, in 1813.
Long-term consequences
Neither side lost territory in the war,[j] nor did the treaty that ended it address the original points of contention—and yet it changed much between the United States of America and Britain.
The Treaty of Ghent established the status quo ante bellum; that is, there were no territorial losses by either side. The issue of impressment was made moot when the Royal Navy, no longer needing sailors, stopped impressment after the defeat of Napoleon in spring 1814 ended the war. (Napoleon unexpectedly returned in 1815, after the final end of the war of 1812.) Except for occasional border disputes and some tensions during the American Civil War, relations between the U.S. and Britain remained peaceful for the rest of the 19th century, and the two countries became close allies in the 20th century.
The Rush–Bagot Treaty between the United States and Britain was enacted in 1817. It demilitarized the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain, where many British naval arrangements and forts still remained. The treaty laid the basis for a demilitarized boundary. It remains in effect to this day.
Although Britain had defeated the American invasions she was in no mood to have more conflicts with the United States since her attention was to her growing Indian possessions. Indicative of forbearance, or at least improved relations, Britain never seriously challenged the US over land claims after 1846: she had hoped to keep Texas out of the US and had designs of taking California. From the 1880s, because of the burgeoning industrial power of the US, Britain had designs on getting the US on her side in a hypothetical European war. Border adjustments between the U.S. and British North America were made in the Treaty of 1818. Eastport, Massachusetts, was returned to the U.S. in 1818; it became part of the new State of Maine in 1820. A border dispute along the Maine–New Brunswick border was settled by the 1842 Webster–Ashburton Treaty after the bloodless Aroostook War, and the border in the Oregon Country was settled by splitting the disputed area in half by the 1846 Oregon Treaty. A further dispute about the line of the border through the island in the Strait of Juan de Fuca resulted in another almost bloodless standoff in the Pig War of 1859. The line of the border was finally settled by an international arbitration commission in 1872.
Bermuda
Bermuda had been largely left to the defences of its own militia and privateers before U.S. independence, but the Royal Navy had begun buying up land and operating from there in 1795, as its location was a useful substitute for the lost U.S. ports. It originally was intended to be the winter headquarters of the North American Squadron, but the war saw it rise to a new prominence. As construction work progressed through the first half of the 19th century, Bermuda became the permanent naval headquarters in Western waters, housing the Admiralty and serving as a base and dockyard. The military garrison was built up to protect the naval establishment, heavily fortifying the archipelago that came to be described as the "Gibraltar of the West". Defence infrastructure remained the central leg of Bermuda's economy until after World War II.
British North America (Canada)
Pro-British leaders demonstrated a strong hostility to American influences in western Canada (Ontario) after the war and shaped its policies, including a hostility to American-style republicanism. Immigration from the U.S. was discouraged, and favour was shown to the Anglican Church as opposed to the more Americanized Methodist Church.[224]
The Battle of York showed the vulnerability of Upper and Lower Canada. In the decades following the war, several projects were undertaken to improve the defence of the colonies against the United States. They include work on La Citadelle at Quebec City, Fort Henry at Kingston, and rebuilding Fort York at York. Additionally, work began on the Halifax Citadel to defend the port against foreign navies. From 1826 to 1832, the Rideau Canal was built to provide a secure waterway not at risk from American cannon fire. To defend the western end of the canal, the British Army also built Fort Henry at Kingston.
Indigenous nations
The Native Americans allied to the British lost their cause. The British proposal to create a "neutral" Indian zone in the American West was rejected at the Ghent peace conference and never resurfaced. After 1814 the natives, who lost most of their fur-gathering territory, became an undesirable burden to British policymakers. The latter now looked to the United States for markets and raw materials. The United States further disrupted trade along the northern border by prohibiting British fur traders from operating in the US, whereas before the war, both populations had freely moved back and forth across the border.
British agents in the field continued to meet regularly with their former American Indian partners, but they did not supply arms or encouragement and there were no American Indian campaigns to stop U.S. expansionism in the Midwest. Abandoned by their powerful sponsor, American Great Lakes–area Indians ultimately migrated or reached accommodations with the American authorities and settlers.
United Kingdom
The war is seldom remembered in Great Britain. The massive ongoing conflict in Europe against the French Empire under Napoleon ensured that the British did not consider the War of 1812 against America as more than a sideshow. Britain's blockade of French trade had been entirely successful, and the Royal Navy was the world's dominant nautical power (and remained so for another century). While the land campaigns had contributed to saving Canada, the Royal Navy had shut down American commerce, bottled up the U.S. Navy in port, and widely suppressed privateering. British businesses, some affected by rising insurance costs, were demanding peace so that trade could resume with the U.S. The peace was generally welcomed by the British, though there was disquiet about the rapid growth of the U.S. However, the two nations quickly resumed trade after the end of the war and, over time, a growing friendship.
Hickey argues that for Britain:
the most important lesson of all [was] that the best way to defend Canada was to accommodate the United States. This was the principal rationale for Britain's long-term policy of rapprochement with the United States in the nineteenth century and explains why they were so often willing to sacrifice other imperial interests to keep the republic happy.
United States
The U.S. suppressed the Native American resistance on its western and southern borders. The nation also gained a psychological sense of complete independence as people celebrated their "second war of independence". Nationalism soared after the victory at the Battle of New Orleans. The opposition Federalist Party collapsed, and the Era of Good Feelings ensued.
No longer questioning the need for a strong Navy, the U.S. built three new 74-gun ships of the line and two new 44-gun frigates shortly after the end of the war. (Another frigate had been destroyed to prevent it being captured on the stocks.) In 1816, the U.S. Congress passed into law an "Act for the gradual increase of the Navy" at a cost of $1,000,000 a year for eight years, authorizing nine ships of the line and 12 heavy frigates. The captains and commodores of the U.S. Navy became the heroes of their generation in the U.S. Decorated plates and pitchers of Decatur, Hull, Bainbridge, Lawrence, Perry, and Macdonough were made in Staffordshire, England, and found a ready market in the United States. Several war heroes used their fame to win election to national office. Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison both took advantage of their military successes to win the presidency, while Richard Mentor Johnson used his wartime exploits to help attain the vice presidency.
During the war, New England states became increasingly frustrated over how the war was being conducted and how the conflict was affecting them. They complained that the U.S. government was not investing enough in the states' defences militarily and financially, and that the states should have more control over their militias. The increased taxes, the British blockade, and the occupation of some of New England by enemy forces also agitated public opinion in the states. As a result, at the Hartford Convention (December 1814 – January 1815) Federalist delegates deprecated the war effort and sought more autonomy for the New England states. They did not call for secession but word of the angry anti-war resolutions appeared at the same time that peace was announced and the victory at New Orleans was known. The upshot was that the Federalists were permanently discredited and quickly disappeared as a major political force.
This war enabled thousands of slaves to escape to British lines or ships for freedom, despite the difficulties. The planters' complacency about slave contentment was shocked at the sight of their slaves fleeing, risking so much to be free.[citation needed] The British aided numerous Black Refugees in resettling in New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, where Black Loyalists had also been granted land after the American Revolutionary War.
After the decisive defeat of the Creek Indians at the battle of Horseshoe Bend in 1814, some Creek warriors escaped to join the Seminole in Florida, who had been forming as an ethnic group since the late 18th century. The remaining Creek chiefs signed away about half their lands, comprising 23,000,000 acres, covering much of southern Georgia and two thirds of modern Alabama. The Creek were separated from any future help from the Spanish in Florida, and from the Choctaw and Chickasaw to the west. During the war the United States seized Mobile, Alabama, which was a strategic location as it provided an oceanic outlet for export from the cotton lands to the north. (Most were yet to be developed, but US control of this territory increased pressure on remaining Creek, as European Americans began to migrate in number into the area.
Jackson invaded Florida in 1818, demonstrating to Spain that it could no longer control that territory with a small force. Spain sold Florida to the United States in 1819 under the Adams–Onís Treaty following the First Seminole War. Pratt concludes:
Thus indirectly the War of 1812 brought about the acquisition of Florida.... To both the Northwest and the South, therefore, the War of 1812 brought substantial benefits. It broke the power of the Creek Confederacy and opened to settlement a great province of the future Cotton Kingdom.
Memory and historiography
Popular views
During the 19th century, residents of both the United States and Canada widely believed that their own countries had won the war. Each young country saw its self-perceived victory, and settling of the border between them, as an important foundation of its growing nationhood. The British, on the other hand, who had been preoccupied by Napoleon's challenge in Europe, paid little attention to what was to them a peripheral and secondary dispute, a distraction from the principal task at hand.
American
Today, American popular memory includes the British capture and the burning of Washington in August 1814, which necessitated its extensive renovation. Americans forgot that before the war, many hoped to annex British North America. Instead American popular memory focused on the victories at Baltimore, Plattsburg, and New Orleans to present the war as a successful effort to assert American national honour, the "second war of independence" in which the mighty British empire humbled and humiliated. In a speech before Congress on February 18, 1815, President James Madison proclaimed the war a complete American victory.
This interpretation of the war was and remains the dominant American view of the war The American newspaper the Niles Registerin an editorial on September 14, 1816, announced that the Americans had crushed the British, declaring "...we did virtually dictate the treaty of Ghent to the British". A minority of Americans, mostly associated with the Federalists, considered the war a defeat and an act of folly on Madison's part, caustically asking if the Americans were "dictating" the terms of the treaty of Ghent, why the British Crown did not cede British North America to the United States? However, the Federalist view of the war is not the mainstream American memory of the war. Congressman George Troup, who said in a speech in 1815 that the Treaty of Ghent was "the glorious termination of the most glorious war ever waged by any people", expressed American popular opinion and memory of the war.
Americans also celebrated the successful American defence of Fort McHenry in September 1814, which inspired the lyrics of what was adopted as the U.S. national anthem, "The Star-Spangled Banner". The successful captains of the U.S. Navy became popular heroes, and commemorative plates were produced with the likenesses of Decatur, Issac Hull, Charles Stewart, on them, becoming popular items. Many of these plates were manufactured in England. The navy became a cherished institution, lauded for the victories that it won against all odds. After engagements during the final actions of the war, U.S. Marines had acquired a well-deserved reputation as excellent marksmen, especially in ship-to-ship actions.
Canadian
In British North America, the War of 1812 was seen by Loyalists as a victory, as they had claimed they had successfully defended their country from an American takeover.
A long-term consequence of the Canadian militia's success was the view widely held in Canada at least until the First World War that Canada did not need a regular professional army. While Canadian militia units had played instrumental roles in several engagements, such as at the Battle of the Chateauguay, it was the regular units of the British Army, including its "Fencible" regiments which were recruited within North America, which ensured that Canada was successfully defended.
The U.S. Army had done poorly, on the whole, in several attempts to invade Canada, and the Canadians had fought bravely to defend their territory. But the British did not doubt that the thinly populated territory would remain vulnerable in a third war. "We cannot keep Canada if the Americans declare war against us again," Admiral Sir David Milne wrote to a correspondent in 1817, although the Rideau Canal was built for just such a scenario.
By the 21st century it was a forgotten war in Britain, although still remembered in Canada, especially Ontario. In a 2009 poll, 37% of Canadians said the war was a Canadian victory, 9% said the U.S. won, 15% called it a draw, and 39% said they knew too little to comment. A 2012 poll found that in a list of items that could be used to define Canadians' identity, the belief that Canada successfully repelled an American invasion in the War of 1812 places second (25%).
Historians' views
Historians have differing and complex interpretations of the war. In recent decades the view of the majority of historians has been that the war ended in stalemate, with the Treaty of Ghent closing a war that had become militarily inconclusive. Neither side wanted to continue fighting since the main causes had disappeared and since there were no large lost territories for one side or the other to reclaim by force. Insofar as they see the war's resolution as allowing two centuries of peaceful and mutually beneficial intercourse between the U.S., Britain and Canada, these historians often conclude that all three nations were the "real winners" of the War of 1812. These writers often add that the war could have been avoided in the first place by better diplomacy. It is seen as a mistake for everyone concerned because it was badly planned and marked by multiple fiascoes and failures on both sides, as shown especially by the repeated American failures to seize parts of Canada, and the failed British attack on New Orleans and upstate New York.
However, other scholars hold that the war constituted a British victory and an American defeat. They argue that the British achieved their military objectives in 1812 (by stopping the repeated American invasions of Canada) and retaining their Canadian colonies. By contrast, they say, the Americans suffered a defeat when their armies failed to achieve their war goal of seizing part or all of Canada. Additionally, they argue the U.S. lost as it failed to stop impressment, which the British refused to repeal until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, arguing that the U.S. actions had no effect on the Orders in Council, which were rescinded before the war started.
Historian Troy Bickham, author of The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, the British Empire, and the War of 1812sees the British as having fought to a much stronger position than the United States.
Even tied down by ongoing wars with Napoleonic France, the British had enough capable officers, well-trained men, and equipment to easily defeat a series of American invasions of Canada. In fact, in the opening salvos of the war, the American forces invading Upper Canada were pushed so far back that they ended up surrendering Michigan Territory. The difference between the two navies was even greater. While the Americans famously (shockingly for contemporaries on both sides of the Atlantic) bested British ships in some one-on-one actions at the war's start, the Royal Navy held supremacy throughout the war, blockading the U.S. coastline and ravaging coastal towns, including Washington, D.C. Yet in late 1814, the British offered surprisingly generous peace terms despite having amassed a large invasion force of veteran troops in Canada, naval supremacy in the Atlantic, an opponent that was effectively bankrupt, and an open secessionist movement in New England.
He considers that the British offered the United States generous terms, in place of their initially harsh terms (which included massive forfeiture of land to Canada and the American Indians), because the "reigning Liverpool ministry in Britain held a loose grip on power and feared the war-weary, tax-exhausted public". The war was also technically a British victory "because the United States failed to achieve the aims listed in its declaration of war".
A second minority view is that both the U.S. and Britain won the war—that is, both achieved their main objectives, as the U.S. restored its independence and honour, and opened the way to westward expansion, while Britain defeated Napoleon and ruled the seas. American historian Norman K. Risjord argues that the main motivation was restoring the nation's honour in the face of relentless British Aggression toward American neutral rights on the high seas, and in the Western lands. The results in terms of honour satisfied the War Hawks. American historian Donald Hickey asks, "Did the cost in blood and treasure justify the U.S. decision to go to war? Most Republicans thought it did. In the beginning they called the contest a "second war of independence", and while Britain's maritime practices never truly threatened the Republic's independence, the war did in a broad sense vindicate U.S. sovereignty. But it ended in a draw on the battlefield." Historians argue that it was an American success to end the threat of Indian raids, kill the British plan for a semi-independent Indian sanctuary, and hereby to open an unimpeded path for westward expansion.[k]Winston Churchill concluded:
The lessons of the war were taken to heart. Anti-American feeling in Great Britain ran high for several years, but the United States were never again refused proper treatment as an independent power.
American naval historian George C. Daughan argues that the US achieved enough of its war goals to claim a victorious result of the conflict, and subsequent impact it had on the negotiations in Ghent. Daughan uses official correspondences from President Madison to the delegates at Ghent strictly prohibiting negotiations with regards to maritime law, stating:
Madison's latest dispatches [arrived July 25–27, 1814] permitted them [the delegates] to simply ignore the entire question of maritime rights. Free trade with liberated Europe had already been restored, and the Admiralty no longer needed impressment to man its warships. The president felt that with Europe at peace the issues of neutral trading rights and impressment could safely be set aside in the interests of obtaining peace... Thus, from the start of the negotiations, the disagreements that started the war and sustained it were acknowledged by both parties to be no longer important.
The British permanently stopped impressing Americans, although they never publicly rescinding the possibility of resuming that practice. The US delegates at the meeting understood it to be a dead issue after the 1814 surrender of Napoleon.[260] In addition, the successful defence of Baltimore, Plattsburgh, and Fort Erie (a strategic fortress located in Upper Canada on the Niagara River, and occupied during the 3rd and most successful offensive into Canada) had very favorable influence on the negotiations for the Americans and prompted several famous responses from both sides. Henry Clay wrote to the delegates in October 1814, "for in our own country, my dear sir, at last must we conquer the peace." With growing pressure in Britain, The Duke of Wellington when asked to command the forces in America wrote to Liverpool on November 9, 1814 "I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of the war, to demand any concession of territory from America ... You have not been able to carry ... [the war] into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory on the point of attack [Fort Erie] ... Why Stipulate for uti possidetis?" The argument that the US failed to capture any Canadian territory that influenced the negotiations is an outdated and highly criticized position, argues Daughan. He cites the Edinburgh Reviewa British newspaper who had remained silent about the war with America for two years wrote "the British government had embarked on a war of conquest, after the American government had dropped its maritime demands, and the British had lost. It was folly to attempt to invade and conquer the United States. To do so would result in the same tragedy as the first war against them, and with the same result."
National bias of historians
Historians have different views on who won the War of 1812, and there is an element of national bias to this. British and Canadian historians follow the view that the war was a British victory, and some US historians also support this view. The opposing position, held by most US historians along with some Canadians and British, is that the result was a stalemate. Only US historians follow the minority view that the US was the victorious party in the war. Similarly, a survey of school textbooks found that historians from Canada, Britain, and the United States emphasize different aspects of the war according to their national narratives; some British texts will scarcely mention the war.
Indians as losers
Historians generally agree that the real losers of the War of 1812 were the Indians (called First Nations in Canada). Hickey says:
The big losers in the war were the Indians. As a proportion of their population, they had suffered the heaviest casualties. Worse, they were left without any reliable European allies in North America ... The crushing defeats at the Thames and Horseshoe Bend left them at the mercy of the Americans, hastening their confinement to reservations and the decline of their traditional way of life.[270]
The Indians of the Old Northwest (the modern Midwest) had hoped to create an Indian state to be a British protectorate. American settlers into the Middle West had been repeatedly blocked and threatened by Indian raids before 1812, and that now came to an end. Throughout the war the British had played on terror of the tomahawks and scalping knives of their Indian allies; it worked especially at Hull's surrender at Detroit. By 1813 Americans had killed Tecumseh and broken his coalition of tribes. Jackson then defeated the Creek in the Southwest. Historian John Sugden notes that in both theaters, the Indians' strength had been broken prior to the arrival of the major British forces in 1814. The one campaign that the Americans had decisively won was the campaign in the Old Northwest, which put the British in a weak hand to insist upon an Indian state in the Old Northwest.
Notwithstanding the sympathy and support from commanders (such as Brock,[l] Cochrane and Nicolls), the policymakers in London reneged in assisting the Indians, as making peace was a higher priority for the politicians. At the peace conference the British demanded an independent Indian state in the Midwest, but, although the British and their Indian allies maintained control over the territories in question (i.e. most of the Upper Midwest), British diplomats did not press the demand after an American refusal, effectively abandoning their Indian allies. The withdrawal of British protection gave the Americans a free hand, which resulted in the removal of most of the tribes to Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma). In that sense according to historian Alan Taylor, the final victory at New Orleans had "enduring and massive consequences". It gave the Americans "continental predominance" while it left the Indians dispossessed, powerless, and vulnerable.
The Treaty of Ghent technically required the United States to cease hostilities and "forthwith to restore to such Tribes or Nations respectively all possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to in 1811"; the United States ignored this article of the treaty and proceeded to expand into this territory regardless; Britain was unwilling to provoke further war to enforce it. A shocked Henry Goulburn, one of the British negotiators at Ghent, remarked:
Till I came here, I had no idea of the fixed determination which there is in the heart of every American to extirpate the Indians and appropriate their territory.
The Creek War came to an end, with the Treaty of Fort Jackson being imposed upon the Indians. About half of the Creek territory was ceded to the United States, with no payment made to the Creeks. This was, in theory, invalidated by Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent. The British failed to press the issue, and did not take up the Indian cause as an infringement of an international treaty. Without this support, the Indians' lack of power was apparent and the stage was set for further incursions of territory by the United States in subsequent decades.
See also
Notes
- ^ See Battle of the Thames in Encyclopædia Britannica: "Many British troops were captured and Tecumseh was killed, destroying his Indian alliance and breaking the Indian power in the Ohio and Indiana territories. After this battle, most of the tribes abandoned their association with the British."
- ^ All U.S. figures are from Hickey 2006, p. 297
- ^ Of these, upwards of 800 were killed at sea, 1,160 were British Army regulars, and the rest were militia.
- ^ Includes 2,250 men of the Royal Navy.
- ^ Includes 1,000 combat casualties on the northern front.
- ^ For GDP and population by year see "What Was the U.S. GDP Then?"
- ^ Admiralty reply to British press criticism).
- ^ For details of the negotiations, see Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (1956) pp 196–220; Remini 1991, pp. 94–122; Ward & Gooch 1922, pp. 537–542 and Mahan 1905, pp. 73–78
- ^ The British were unsure whether the attack on Baltimore was a failure, but Plattsburg was a humiliation that called for court martial (Latimer 2007, pp. 331, 359, 365).
- ^ Spain, a British ally, lost control of the Mobile, Alabama, area to the Americans.
- ^ The Princeton Encyclopedia of American Political History concludes, "British plans for an American Indian buffer state were dropped, and American Indian nations within U.S. borders lost their last major remaining European diplomatic partner, clearing a path for American westward expansion."
- ^ Sugden (1982, pp. 301–302) mentions that 'Brock had urged the British government to protect his Indian allies in peace negotiations, and by the end of 1812 he had obtained from Earl Bathurst, colonial secretary, a promise to that effect.'
References
- ^ Brands 2005, p. 163.
- ^ Chartrand 2012, p. 27.
- ^ Landon 1941, p. 123.
- ^ Rutland 1994, p. 200.
- ^ Thompson & Randall 2008, p. 23.
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- Stagg, John C.A. (January 1981). "James Madison and the Coercion of Great Britain: Canada, the West Indies, and the War of 1812". William and Mary Quarterly. 38 (1): 3–34. doi:10.2307/1916855. JSTOR 1916855.
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- Stagg, J.C.A. (2012). The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent. Cambridge Essential Histories. ISBN 0-521-72686-7.
- Stagg, John C.A. (2012). The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent. Cambridge University Press.
- Stanley, George F.G. (1983). The War of 1812: Land Operations. Macmillan of Canada. ISBN 0-7715-9859-9.
- "The Star-Spangled Banner and the War of 1812". Encyclopedia Smithsonian. Retrieved March 10, 2008.
- Stearns, Peter N., ed. (2008). The Oxford encyclopedia of the modern world. 7. p. 547.
- Stevens, Walter B. (1921). Centennial history of Missouri (the center state) one hundred years in the union, 1820-1921. St. Louis and Chicago: S. J. Clarke. Retrieved 8 February 2019 – via Internet Archive.
- Strannack, Lt. Commander Ian (1909). The Andrew And The Onions: The Story Of The Royal Navy In Bermuda, 1795–1975. The Bermuda Maritime Museum Press, The Bermuda Maritime Museum. ISBN 0-921560-03-6.
- Stuart, Reginald (1988). United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871. The University of North Carolina Press.
- Studenski, Paul; Krooss, Herman Edward (1963). Financial History of the United States. p. 77 tbl. 5 and p. 79 tbl. 6. ISBN 9781587981753.
- Sugden, John (January 1982). "The Southern Indians in the War of 1812: The Closing Phase". Florida Historical Quarterly. 60 (3): 273–312. JSTOR 30146793.
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- Swanson, Neil H. (1945). The Perilous Fight:Being a Little Known and Much Abused Chapter of Our National History in Our Second War of Independence... Recounted Mainly from Contemporary Records. Farrar and Rinehart.
- Taylor, Alan (2010). The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies. Knopf Doubleday Verlagsgruppe. ISBN 1-4000-4265-8.
- Thompson, John Herd; Randall, Stephen J. (2008). Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies. University of Georgia Press. ISBN 9780820331133.
- Toll, Ian W. (2006). Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy. New York: W.W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-05847-5.
- Trautsch, Jasper M. (January 2013). "The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate". Journal of Military History. 77 (1): 273–293.
- Trautsch, Jasper (December 2014). "Review of Whose War of 1812? Competing Memories of the Anglo-American Conflict". Reviews in History. doi:10.14296/RiH/issn.1749.8155. ISSN 1749-8155.
- "Treaty of Ghent - War of 1812 - PBS". Treaty of Ghent - War of 1812 - PBS. Retrieved 8 February 2019.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2011). "The Encyclopedia of North American Indian Wars, 1607–1890: A Political, Social, and Military History [3 volumes]". The Encyclopedia of North American Indian Wars, 1607–1890: A Political, Social, and Military History. ABC-CLIO. p. 1097. ISBN 9781851096039.
- Spencer Tucker; James R. Arnold; Roberta Wiener; Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr.; John C. Fredriksen (2012). The Encyclopedia of the War of 1812: A Political, Social, and Military History. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-85109-956-6.
- Turner, Wesley B. (2000). The War of 1812: The War That Both Sides Won. Toronto: Dundurn Press. ISBN 9781550023367.
- Turner, Wesley B. (July 4, 2011). The Astonishing General: The Life and Legacy of Sir Isaac Brock. Dundurn Press.citer
- Updyke, Frank Arthur (1915). The diplomacy of the war of 1812. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Upton, David (November 22, 2003). "Soldiers of the Mississippi Territory in the War of 1812". Internetarchiv. Archived from the original on September 6, 2007. Retrieved September 23, 2010.
- "The War of 1812: (1812–1815)". National Guard History eMuseum. Commonwealth of Kentucky. Archived from the original on March 2, 2009. Retrieved October 22, 2008.
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- "War of 1812 Website- War of 1812 Reenactment Section -Regiments Listing". www.warof1812.ca. Retrieved 8 February 2019.
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- "War of 1812–1815". Office of the Historian. United States Department of State. Retrieved April 26, 2016.
- Ward, A.W.; Gooch, G.P. (1922). The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919: 1783–1815. Macmillan Company.
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- White, Leonard D. (1951). The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History 1801-1829.
- White, Richard (2010). The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107005624.
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Further reading
- Center for Military History. U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812: Online free
- Barbuto, Richard V. The Canadian Theater 1813. (2013) ISBN 9780160920844
- Barbuto, Richard V. The Canadian Theater 1814. (2014) ISBN 9780160923845
- Blackmon, Richard D. The Creek War 1813–1814; 43pp ISBN 9780160925429
- Maass, John R. Defending A New Nation 1783–1811 (2013) 59pp
- Neimeyer, Charles P. The Chesapeake Campaign, 1813–1814 (2014) ISBN 9780160925351
- Rauch, Steven J. The Campaign of 1812 (2013); 58pp ISBN 9780160920929
- Stoltz III, Joseph F. The Gulf Theater, 1813–1815
- Cleves, Rachel Hope; Eustace, Nicole; Gilje, Paul (September 2012). "Interchange: The War of 1812". Journal of American History. 99 (2): 520–555. doi:10.1093/jahist/jas236. historiography
- Collins, Gilbert (2006). Guidebook to the historic sites of the War of 1812. Dundurn. ISBN 1-55002-626-7.
- Hickey, Donald R. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (1989); abridged as The War of 1812: A Short History (1995)
- Hickey, Donald R. Don't Give Up the Ship!: Myths of the War of 1812 (2006)
- Hickey, Donald R (Sep 2013). "1812: The Old History and the New". Reviews in American History. 41 (3): 436–444. doi:10.1353/rah.2013.0081.
- Hickey, Donald R. and Connie D. Clark, eds. The Routledge Handbook of the War of 1812 (2015) 336 pages
- Jensen, Richard. "Military history on the electronic frontier: Wikipedia fights the War of 1812." Journal of Military History 76.4 (2012): 523–556
- Malcomson, Robert. Historical Dictionary of the War of 1812. Landham, Maryland: Scarecrow.
- Perkins, Bradford (1961). Prologue to war: England and the United States, 1805–1812. Archived from the original on December 3, 2012.
- Randall, William Sterne (2017). Unshackling America: How the War of 1812 Truly Ended the American Revolution. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-1-2501-1184-5.
- Sapio, Victor. Pennsylvania and the War of 1812 (University Press of Kentucky, 2015).
- Smith, Gene Allen. The Slaves' Gamble: Choosing Sides in the War of 1812. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Smith, Joshua M. (June 2011). "The Yankee Soldier's Might: The District of Maine and the Reputation of the Massachusetts Militia, 1800–1812". New England Quarterly. LXXXIV (2): 234–264. doi:10.1162/tneq_a_00088.
- Stacey, CP (1964). "The War of 1812 in Canadian History". In Zaslow; Morris; Turner, Wesley B. The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812. Toronto.
- Stagg, J.C.A. (2012). The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent. Cambridge Essential Histories. ISBN 0-521-72686-7.
- Suthren, Victor (1999). The War of 1812. ISBN 0-7710-8317-3.
- Tanner, Helen H. (1987). Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History. Universität von Oklahoma Press. ISBN 0-8061-2056-8.
- Watts, Steven (1987). The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 1790–1820. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-3420-1.
- Williams, William Appleman (1961). The Contours of American History. W.W. Norton. ISBN 0-393-30561-9.
- Wilson, Major L. (1974). Space, Time, and Freedom: The Quest for Nationality and the Irrepressible Conflict, 1815–1861.
External links
- "War of 1812" bibliographical guide by David Curtis Skaggs (2015); Oxford Bibliographies Online
- The War of 1812, Government of Canada website
- The War of 1812, Department of National Defence (Canada) website
- Library of Congress Guide to the War of 1812, Kenneth Drexler
- The War of 1812 in the South, The William C. Cook Collection, The Williams Research Center, The Historic New Orleans Collection
- American Military History, Chapter 6 – The War of 1812, Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1989
- War of 1812 collection William L. Clements Library.
- The War of 1812 Website, MilitaryHeritage.com
- "Treaty of Ghent". Primary Documents in American History. The Library of Congress. 2010.
- "War of 1812". Galafilm. 2008. Archived from the original on January 19, 2000.
- Key Events of the War of 1812, chart by Greg D. Feldmeth, Polytechnic School (Pasadena, California), 1998.
- "War of 1812". historycentral.com. 2000. Archived from the original on February 21, 2001.
- "The War of 1812". Archives of Ontario. 2009–2010. Archived from the original on January 4, 2013.
- Black Americans in the U.S. Military from the American Revolution to the Korean War: The War of 1812, David Omahen, New York State Military Museum and Veteran Research Center, 2006
- President Madison's War Message, lesson plan with extensive list of documents, EDSitement.com (National Endowment for the Humanities)
- PBS Documentary The War of 1812
- The short film "The War of 1812" U.S. Navy is available for free download at the Internet Archive
- Indexed eLibrary of War of 1812 Resources at Fire Along the Frontier Resource Site
- Illustrated War of 1812 Timelines at Fire Along the Frontier Resource Site
- War of 1812 Reenactment Groups
- BBC Radio 4: In Our Time. The War of 1812, January 31, 2013
- Indiana University Lilly Library Digital Collection of War of 1812
- The War: A War of 1812 Newspaper Brock University Library Digital Repository
- War of 1812 Collection Brock University Library Digital Repository
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